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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s patent law
decisions in 2017 reflected significant development of the legal
landscape. The Federal Circuit decided many novel questions
implementing the Supreme Court’s decision regarding venue,
continued to address the question of patent eligibility, and
encountered the first waves of the constitutionality of proceedings
before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO). After a three-year stint of an overloaded
patent docket, the Federal Circuit has adjusted to the surge of patent
suits following the America Invents Act (“AIA”), allowing judges to
write more opinions and reach greater consensus than previous years.
Nevertheless, patent appeals remain the majority of the Federal
Circuit’s workload and promises to remain so. This Article collects and
summarizes the Federal Circuit’s 2017 patent decisions and analyzes
their impact on patent practice moving forward.
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PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. Venue Law Post-TC Heartland
In TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,1 the Supreme
Court transformed patent venue law, finding that domestic
corporations “reside” only in their state of incorporation. While a
decision of the higher court, TC Heartland significantly affected
Federal Circuit law and its aftermath is seen in the Federal Circuit’s
rulings throughout the remainder of the term and in the lower courts.
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s denial of a writ of
mandamus2 concerning venue in a patent infringement case.3 The
Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit erred in reasoning that
TC Heartland, allegedly an Indiana corporation, “resided” in Delaware
for venue purposes.4 Per Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.,5
the word “reside[nce]” in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the patent venue
statute, as applied to a domestic corporation, refers only to the state of
incorporation.6 Kraft’s argument that the meaning of the post-Fourco
amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general venue statute, altered the
meaning of § 1400(b) failed before the court.7
The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rationale for
reaching the opposite result.8 The amendments to § 1391 stated that
for “all venue purposes,” a corporation would “reside” in any judicial
district where it was subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.9 The
principal basis for the Federal Circuit’s opinion in TC Heartland was
the holding In VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,10 which
held that the amendments to § 1391 redefined venue for all other
venue statutes in the same chapter, which also included the patent
1. 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
2. In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom.
TC Heartland LLC., 137 S. Ct. 1514.
3. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1517–18.
4. Id.
5. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
6. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520 (alteration in original); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) (2012) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the
judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”).
7. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (providing the
rules governing civil action venue in United States district courts).
8. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520.
9. Id. (citing § 1391(c)(2)).
10. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), abrogated by TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514.
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venue statute.11 In reversing the Federal Circuit’s denial of the writ of
mandamus and remanding for further proceedings, the Supreme
Court implicitly overruled VE Holding.12
The Supreme Court’s decision appears to leave In re Cordis Corp.13
untouched in what a “regular and established place of business” means
under the other prong of the subject-matter jurisdiction statute 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b).14 In re Cordis Corp. held, somewhat broadly, that “the
appropriate inquiry is whether the corporate defendant does its
business in that district through a permanent and continuous presence
there.”15 Under the facts of that case, Cordis had salespeople in
Minnesota who would visit physicians and guide them through
surgeries.16 So Cordis had a regular physical presence and conducted
infringing business via that physical presence in Minnesota.17 But it
seems a stretch to read Cordis to cover omnipresent companies, such
as Google or Amazon, and the evolving means of those companies,
such as whether the presence of Amazon lockers would create nationwide venue over Amazon.
Following TC Heartland, both the Federal Circuit and district courts
were forced to reconcile the new venue law with ongoing litigations. In
In re Sea Ray Boats, Inc.,18 the Federal Circuit denied a motion to stay trial
and a petition for a writ of mandamus following the district court’s
denial of motion to transfer venue.19 The underlying litigation began in
January 2015; the motion to transfer was filed approximately two weeks
before trial, well beyond a timely motion to transfer on the eve of trial.20
Dissenting, Judge Newman would have granted the stay and ordered
expedited briefing and resolution of the issue, noting that the district
court found venue in Virginia proper even under the Fourco standard21

11. Id. at 1575; see TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1519–20 (describing the Federal
Circuit’s holding in VE Holding).
12. Id. at 1521.
13. 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
14. Id. at 737.
15. Id. (rejecting the argument that a fixed physical presence, such as an office or
store, should be sufficient to establish place of business in a jurisdiction).
16. Id. at 735.
17. Id. at 734.
18. 695 F. App’x 543 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 544.
20. Id. at 543.
21. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1957)
(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the “sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in
patent infringement actions,” versus the general corporation venue statute at § 1391(c)).
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that TC Heartland embraced.22
Addressing the question of timeliness in ongoing litigations, the
Federal Circuit found that parties may bring venue motions based on
TC Heartland in pending cases, but district courts have discretion
whether the issue has been waived. In In re Micron Technology, Inc.,23
the Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus vacating the denial of a
motion to dismiss for improper venue.24 The court determined that
the district court erred in finding the venue issue waived based on
Micron’s failure to include the issue in its initial motion to dismiss and
in reasoning that TC Heartland was not a change of law sufficient to
release Micron from the waiver.25 Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h)(1)(A) and Rule 12(g)(2), there was no waiver because the venue
defense was not “available” to Micron prior to TC Heartland.26
However, the district court declined to order either the dismissal or
transfer of the case.27 The Federal Circuit described how district courts
have “inherent powers” that may be used to find a venue objection
forfeited, notwithstanding a movant’s technical compliance with Rule
12.28 In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that district courts in the
past did not abuse discretion by denying post-TC Heartland venue
motions presented close to trial.29 District courts may also take into
account the general timeliness of the motion and evidence of “a
defendant’s tactical wait-and-see bypassing of an opportunity to
declare a desire for a different forum.”30 On remand, the district court
could take such issues into account.
Applying TC Heartland, the Federal Circuit more clearly defined a
“regular and established” place of business for venue purposes by
excluding an employee’s home office, virtual spaces, or electronic
communications from one person to another. In In re Cray Inc.,31 the
Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus directing a case transfer,32
finding that the district court abused its discretion and committed an

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

In re Sea Ray Boats, 695 F. App’x at 544–45 (Newman, J., dissenting).
875 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1101 (citing Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016)).
Id. at 1102.
Id.
871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1357.
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error of law in denying defendant’s motion for transfer on venue
grounds, and consequently, mandamus was warranted to decide an
issue “important to ‘proper judicial administration.’”33 The Federal
Circuit discussed the proper standards for determining whether a
litigant has a “regular and established place of business” in the forum
district per § 1400(b) and TC Heartland.34 The Federal Circuit
reasoned that the “place” of business need not be a “formal office or
store,” but must “be a physical, geographical location in the district
from which the business of the defendant is carried out.”35 It must also
be a “regular” place of business, and the opinion recited various
definitions of “regular,” such as “if it operates in a ‘steady[,] uniform[,]
orderly[, and] methodical’ manner.’”36 It must be “established,”
emphasizing that “the place of business is not transient.”37 Finally, it
must be a place “of the defendant,” not solely a place of the defendant’s
employee, noting “[e]mployees change jobs.”38 Applying those
standards to this case, the home of a Cray employee, which does not
seem to have been established by Cray, but rather by the employee, was
insufficient to establish venue.39
As the Federal Circuit and district courts develop venue law based
on TC Heartland, litigants should consider the implications. For
example, the parties should consider the cost-benefit analysis of
disputing venue at the outset of litigation to weigh overall cost and
delay. Ultimately, this may lead to plaintiffs choosing undisputable
venues even if that means giving up patentee-preferred districts. Also,
from the outset, judges may see a rise in 12(b) motions objecting to
venue before defendants answer the complaint. Alternatively, the only
practical way to seek review of venue decisions is mandamus or
certification by a judge who is genuinely in doubt or prefers not to have
a mandamus motion filed.

33. Id. at 1358 (quoting In re BP Lubricants USA Inc., 637 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
34. Id. at 1360–62.
35. Id. at 1362.
36. Id. (alterations in original).
37. Id. at 1363.
38. Id. (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 1366; see, e.g., U.S. Aluminum Corp. v. Kawneer Co., 694 F.2d 193, 195
(9th Cir. 1982) (“Venue in a declaratory judgment action for patent noninfringement
and invalidity is governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c),
and not the special patent infringement venue statute . . . .”).
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B. Federal Jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit considered the breadth of its own jurisdiction
over several key areas of patent law. First, analyzing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c), the Federal Circuit determined that it lacks jurisdiction to
hear non-final “accounting” orders notwithstanding jurisdiction to
hear orders “final except for an accounting.” In Halo Electronics, Inc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc.,40 the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal of a
decision awarding, but not actually computing, prejudgment and postjudgment interest and supplemental damages.41 The 2016 final
judgment followed a 2013 decision finding that Pulse infringed Halo’s
patent.42 The Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction over
Pulse’s appeal from the 2016 decision concerning prejudgment
interest.43 The Federal Circuit based its opinion on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c),44 which permits appeals from judgments that are “final except
for an accounting.”45 Jurisdiction for each appeal must be separately
established.46 Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to adjudicate
an appeal from the 2013 judgment was “not dispositive of whether we
have jurisdiction in this appeal.”47
In this appeal, the 2016 order was neither “final” nor “final except for
an accounting.”48 It was not “final” because the district court had not yet
determined the amount of prejudgment interest or the computational
method to be used in that determination.49 And, although the 2016
order was part of the “accounting” that followed the 2013 order,
“§ 1292(c)(2) ‘does not go so far as to permit us to consider [a] non-

40. 857 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
41. Id. at 1348 (dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the
merits of the claims).
42. Id. at 1348–50; see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00331PMP-PAL, 2013 WL 2319145, at *16 (D. Nev. May 28, 2013), vacated 136 S. Ct. 1923
(2016) (entering judgment in favor of Halo on the infringement claims, except for
the willfulness claim).
43. Halo Elecs., Inc., 857 F.3d at 1353.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (2012) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction
over interlocutory appeals arising under § 1292(a) and (b) and appeals from final
judgements in patent infringement suits).
45. Halo Elecs., Inc., 857 F.3d at 1351 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2)).
46. Id. at 1362–63.
47. 320 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
48. Halo Elecs., Inc., 857 F.3d at 1352 (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction
under both § 1295(a)(1) and § 1292(c)(2) because the prejudgment interest order
from the district court was not final).
49. Id. at 1351–52.

1148

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1141

final order’ that is related to the accounting.”50 The Federal Circuit
further noted that Pulse preserved its right to file a “proper appeal
concerning a final award of prejudgment interest” at a later time.51
Second, in Preston v. Nagel,52 the Federal Circuit determined that the
America Invents Act53 (AIA) does not create an exception to the
general bar on reviewability of orders remanding to state court, so the
Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from remand to state court.54
Because the district court’s remand was based on a lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, its order was not reviewable by the Federal Circuit
per 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).55 Even though Mr. Nagel attempted to raise
counterclaims for declaratory judgment of patent noninfringement,
his actions did not create an exception to § 1447(d).56 The Federal
Circuit rejected Mr. Nagel’s argument that the AIA created such an
exception, and further rejected Mr. Nagel’s attempt to analogize this
case to Osborn v. Haley,57 finding that the AIA provisions relating to
jurisdiction over patent cases were unlike the provisions at issue in
Osborn.58 The Federal Circuit also rejected Mr. Nagel’s contention that
he will have been deprived of a forum for his counterclaims because
he could still present a separate federal declaratory judgment action.59
The Federal Circuit also determined that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over overseas infringement of foreign patents, dismissing
the cause of action in Allied Mineral Products, Inc. v. Osmi, Inc.60 The
district court had correctly determined that the sending of a notice
letter to two of Allied’s Mexican customers, asserting a Mexican patent
50. Halo Elecs., Inc., 857 F.3d at 1352 (alteration in original) (quoting Alfred E. Mann
Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 841 F.3d 1334, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
51. Id. at 1353.
52. 857 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
53. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
54. Preston, 857 F.3d at 1383.
55. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012) (“An order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that
an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to
[§] 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”).
56. Preston, 857 F.3d at 1384–85.
57. 549 U.S. 225, 252–53 (2007) (plurality opinion) (finding that the federal
statutory bar against appellate review of remand orders did not displace provision of
the Westfall Act, which shielded from remand any action removed to federal court
based upon Attorney General's certification).
58. Preston, 857 F.3d at 1385–86.
59. Id. at 1386.
60. 870 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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and alleging acts of infringement under Mexican law, was insufficient
to create a case or controversy in the United States to support Allied’s
complaint for declaratory judgment.61 The Federal Circuit rejected
Allied’s attempt to argue for jurisdiction under Innovative Therapies,
Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.62 or Arkema Inc. v. Honeywell International,
Inc.63 because both involved substantially different facts.64
Likewise, the Federal Circuit found that the district court properly
dismissed a declaratory judgment action on patents not owned by the
accused party. In First Data Corp. v. Inselberg,65 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.66 The
claims in question were counterclaims brought by First Data and its CEO
Frank Bisignano for declaratory judgment of noninfringement and
invalidity for certain patents that listed Eric Inselberg as the inventor.67
The opinion describes how Mr. Inselberg had threatened infringement
litigation against Mr. Bisignano and First Data.68 However, per a signed
2011 agreement, Mr. Bisignano—not Mr. Inselberg—was the apparent
owner of the patents in question.69 The district court did not err in
dismissing First Data’s declaratory judgment claims because the claims
had apparently been made solely for the purpose of establishing
federal jurisdiction.70 Per Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Systems, Inc.71 and
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,72 there was no plausible basis under which First
Data could have contended that the assignment agreement was null
and void (though Mr. Inselberg contested, via his state law claims, the
validity of that agreement).73 The Federal Circuit explained that,
unless and until a state court granted rescission of the 2011
assignment, there was no dispute that Mr. Inselberg did not own any
of the patents at issue.74 Additionally, Mr. Bisignano and First Data still

61. Id. at 1338–39.
62. 599 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
63. 706 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
64. Allied Mineral Prods., Inc., 870 F.3d at 1339–40.
65. 870 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
66. Id. at 1369.
67. Id. at 1369–70.
68. Id. at 1370.
69. Id. at 1369.
70. Id. at 1373.
71. 109 F.3d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
72. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
73. First Data Corp., 870 F.3d at 1374 (emphasizing that First Data’s argument
misunderstood the reasoning in Jim Arnold).
74. Id. at 1375.
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faced significant standing and ripeness challenges.75
In ArcelorMittal v. AK Steel Corp.,76 the Federal Circuit considered its
subject matter jurisdiction by affirming the district court’s decision, on
remand, to invalidate its initial grant of summary judgment.77 The
Federal Circuit stated that this dispute over the validity of an asserted
patent is not moot despite the fact that ArcelorMittal filed with the
court a covenant not to sue conditioned on resolution of a related
procedural matter.78 The case was complicated by a lengthy
procedural history involving a reissue procedure, substitution of claims
in the complaint, and a remand.79 The Federal Circuit found that the
district court did not err in exercising jurisdiction to invalidate two of
ArcelorMittal’s claims.80 The Federal Circuit reached this conclusion
even though ArcelorMittal had from time to time urged that the two
claims were not at issue in the case, though others from the same
patent were.81 The Federal Circuit described how ArcelorMittal made
sufficient statements to indicate that the claims in question were
asserted in the case and had tacitly accepted other statements by AK
Steel indicating that they understood the claims were in the case.82
This was sufficient to demonstrate a substantial controversy between
the parties over these claims.83
The Federal Circuit also determined that the issue was not moot.
The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in
determining that ArcelorMittal’s conditional tender of a covenant not
to sue on the two claims did not moot the matter.84 Mootness arises
when the issues are “no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.”85 ArcelorMittal’s various attempts to enter a
covenant were all conditional, so its attempts did not resolve the merits

75. Id. (noting that because Mr. Inselberg did not have an ownership interest in
the patent, the plaintiffs would have a difficult time establishing standing and ripeness
due to the contingent event of Mr. Inselberg ever recovering title to the patent). First
Data also disputed the district court’s remand of state law claims to state court, but the
Federal Circuit was precluded from reviewing that remand by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Id.
76. 856 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
77. Id. at 1367.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1367–68.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1369.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1372.
85. Id. at 1370 (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)).
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of the matter. The Federal Circuit found that “[a]t no time before the
court entered summary judgment did ArcelorMittal unconditionally
assure [AK Steel] and their customers that it would never assert RE’153
claims 24 and 25 against them.”86 The Federal Circuit noted that a
covenant, relied on by the dissent, filed with the district court by
ArcelorMittal expressly made the covenant conditional on resolution
of a procedural issue (a motion to amend a co-pending complaint), and
characterized this covenant as unable to support mootness due to its
conditional nature.87 The Federal Circuit’s rejected ArcelorMittal’s
remaining arguments, concluding that the district court’s consideration
of the two claims was consistent with a prior Federal Circuit remand, and
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
ArcelorMittal’s request for new discovery on the commercial success of
the claims at issue.88 In dissent, Judge Wallach indicated that the
covenant not to sue would have mooted the issue because it invalided
the existence of a “case or controversy.”89
1. Interlocutory Appeals
In Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,90 the Federal Circuit
dismissed an appeal from a denial of motions seeking relief from
discovery orders, finding that there is no interlocutory appeal for an
order compelling document production.91 The appellant was Anthony
Levandowski, a former Waymo employee accused of “improperly
download[ing] thousands of documents related to Waymo’s driverless
vehicle technology, and then [leaving] Waymo to found Ottomotto,
which Uber subsequently acquired.”92 On appeal, Mr. Levandowski
argued that the court should analyze whether it has jurisdiction to hear
the case under mandamus and the Perlman93 doctrine94 because either
doctrine authorizes immediate appeal of an order compelling third

86. Id. at 1370.
87. Id. at 1371–72.
88. Id. at 1372.
89. Id. at 1374 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
90. 870 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
91. Id. at 1355.
92. Id.
93. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
94. Waymo LLC, 870 F.3d at 1366 (“The Perlman doctrine provides that ‘a discovery
order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable
final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the
proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.’”).
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party disclosure of privileged materials.95
The Federal Circuit found that Mr. Levandowski’s appeal did not
warrant a writ of mandamus because he did not establish that typical
review after final judgment would be inadequate to protect his rights.96
The Federal Circuit rejected both of Mr. Levandowski’s arguments:
that certain materials ordered to be disclosed were privileged and/or
work product and that the disclosure would be particularly injurious
or would raise a particularly novel issue of law.97 Mr. Levandowski also
did not establish a clear, indisputable right to a mandamus writ.98 The
Federal Circuit further determined that he could not to assert privilege
under “common interest doctrine” because the disclosures at issue
were not attorney-client privileged communications.99 It rejected Mr.
Levandowski’s argument that common interest can protect against
disclosure of non-privileged material.100 Similarly, the Federal Circuit
rejected Mr. Levandowski’s invocation of work-product protection
because the material in question was not prepared by Mr. Levandowski
or his counsel, but the material was disclosed to him by Uber’s counsel
(in circumstances not warranting common interest protection).101
Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed Mr. Levandowski’s attempt to
invoke the Fifth Amendment.102
Mr. Levandowski’s appeal also did not warrant invocation of the
Perlman doctrine because that doctrine generally does not apply in civil
litigation and his issues were appealable after final judgment.103 Also,
the Federal Circuit concluded that Mr. Levandowski was not a
disinterested third party, as a former employee of both parties in the
litigation, and that his actions were “central to Waymo’s claims.”104
C. Personal Jurisdiction
In weighing the sufficiency of contacts to establish personal
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit differentiated between directed
contact with the forum and attenuated connections. For example, in

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 1358.
Id.
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1359–60.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
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Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co.,105 the Federal Circuit
determined that notice letters, travel to the forum, and past litigation
in the forum were sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction
for a declaratory judgment action that reversed the lower court’s
dismissal.106 Although the District of Delaware had recently transferred
Papst’s separate infringement suit against Xilinx to the district court that
originally rejected Xilinx’s declaratory judgment action, the issue was
not moot because Xilinx had not asserted declaratory judgment
counterclaims in the transferred action.107 The Federal Circuit
determined that the “[t]he mere availability of this unpursued
alternative route to relief does not render moot Xilinx’s action seeking
the same relief.”108 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California erred in
concluding that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Papst.109
The Federal Circuit determined that the record established that Papst
had minimum contacts with the forum and that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction was both reasonable and fair.110
Regarding minimum contacts, the Federal Circuit found “no
question that Papst has the required minimum contacts with
California,” noting that Papst sent notice letters to Xilinx and traveled
there to discuss Papst’s allegations of patent infringement.111
Additionally, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Papst was both
reasonable and fair.112 The Federal Circuit rejected Papst’s argument
that, under Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc.,113 the
exercise of jurisdiction based only on Papst’s attempt to inform Xilinx
of its infringement would be unreasonable.114 Unlike the situation in
Red Wing, Papst had done more than send notice letters; it had traveled
to California to meet with both Xilinx and Altera.115 Further, the
burden of Papst traveling to the district was mitigated, and therefore
105. 848 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
106. Id. at 1349.
107. Id. at 1352.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1358.
110. Id. at 1355–58.
111. Id. at 1354.
112. Id. at 1358.
113. 148 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
114. Xilinx, 848 F.3d at 1354 (relating Red Wing to the case at hand, namely in
holding that cease-and-desist letters sent by the patentee in the forum are enough to
establish minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction).
115. Id. at 1357.
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not an undue burden, because Papst is a “non-practicing patent holder
residing outside of the United States” that must litigate its U.S. patents
overseas regardless of the forum.116 To further bolster the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning, the court cited to the fact that Papst had previously
litigated in California.117
By comparison, the Federal Circuit determined that an exclusive
license with an entity located in the forum is insufficient, without more,
to establish specific personal jurisdiction over a patentee. In New World
International, Inc. v. Ford Global Technologies, LLC,118 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a declaratory judgment complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction.119 The Federal Circuit found that the district
court correctly determined that, per Breckenridge Pharmaceutical, Inc. v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,120 the mere existence of an exclusive license
of certain design patents between Ford Global Technologies, LCC
(“FGTL”) and LKQ Corp., a company doing business in Texas, was
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over FGTL in Texas.121 The
Federal Circuit also found that the district court correctly determined
that FGTL’s obligation to indemnify LKQ in certain circumstances was
insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction.122 The Federal
Circuit’s holding in Genetic Implant Systems, Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp.123 was
not contrary because that case merely noted the presence of an
indemnity obligation but did not rely on such an obligation to find
personal jurisdiction.124 Further, the indemnity agreement required
FGTL to indemnify LKQ for claims alleging infringement of the
patents of others and had nothing to do with FGTL’s design patents at
issue.125 Likewise, the Federal Circuit found that the district court also
correctly determined that New World failed to demonstrate that, when
FGTL sent cease-and-desist letters, it had coordinated with LKQ in any
way.126 The Federal Circuit found that this case was thus further
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 859 F.3d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
119. Id. at 1034–35.
120. 444 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
121. New World Int’l, Inc., 859 F.3d at 1040 (rejecting New World’s argument that
FGTL’s license with LKQ was sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction).
122. Id. at 1040–41.
123. 123 F.3d 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
124. New World Int’l, Inc., 859 F.3d at 1040–41.
125. Id. at 1041.
126. Id. at 1042 (stating that “LKQ’s role was that of another recipient of the letters, not a cosender requesting that New World cease and desist infringing the [FGTL] design patents”).
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distinguishable from Breckenridge, which demonstrated patentenforcement coordination between the licensee and the licensor.127
Taking all evidence into consideration, the license between FGTL and
LKQ did not “impose a sufficient obligation on the patent holder[,
FGTL,] regarding the enforcement of the patent rights to subject the
patent holder to specific jurisdiction” in Texas.128
Lastly, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying New World’s motion to amend its
complaint post-dismissal by adding new allegations in support of
personal jurisdiction over FGTL.129 New World’s desire to “buttress its
jurisdictional presentation” was insufficient to overcome the district
court’s discretion, particularly as New World maintained that it “had
done enough previously to avoid dismissal.”130 Notably, New World
had not alleged the discovery of any new evidence.131
Similarly, in NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc.,132 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction because a website and single, free-trial offer was
insufficient contacts with the forum.133 In NexLearn, the Federal Circuit
held that the district court correctly determined that NexLearn’s
complaint failed to allege specific jurisdiction over Allen relative to
NexLearn’s patent complaint.134 Allen’s emails, presentations, and
advertisements in Kansas were not relevant because they predated the
asserted patent.135 A trial relating to the accused product was “too
attenuated” to form a sufficient contact.136 And Allen’s execution of a
Non-Disclosure Agreement and a End-Use Licensee Agreement
including Kansas choice-of-law provisions were insufficient to confer
jurisdiction per Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.137 Nor did operation of

127. Id.; see Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that an ongoing relationship was created between
licensee and licensor through their coordinated efforts in the state of Florida).
128. New World Int’l, Inc., 859 F.3d at 1043.
129. Id. at 1044.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 859 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
133. Id. at 1373.
134. Id. at 1376–77 (declining to address general jurisdiction since NexLearn did not
claim there was general jurisdiction in its briefs to the Federal Circuit or the district court).
135. Id. at 1376.
136. Id. at 1377.
137. 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (requiring defendants to purposefully direct activities toward
the forum state and for the harm to arise from their activities); NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1377.
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a website render it subject to specific jurisdiction, as there was no
evidence that Allen “purposefully availed itself of Kansas [or] that
NexLearn’s claim arises out of or relates to those contacts.”138 As in
the application of the district’s long-arm statute in Trintec Industries,
Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Products, Inc.,139 there was no evidence that the
website was directed to Kansas, and there was no indication of a sale in
Kansas from the website.140 A single post-issuance email from Allen
into Kansas offering a free trial, while relevant, was insufficient on its
own to confer specific jurisdiction.141 Finally, the opinion also affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of NexLearn’s breach of contract claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.142
D. Standing
The Federal Circuit highlighted the different standing requirements
between appellants and appellees from the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board’s (PTAB) decisions. In Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc.,143 the
Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from a final inter partes
review144 (IPR) decision for lack of standing because the appellant did
not face any risk of invalidating appellant’s patent.145 The PTAB had
instituted an IPR of ImmunoGen’s ’856 patent on Phigenix’s petition,
but its final decision confirmed patentability of ImmunoGen’s claims.146
The Federal Circuit determined that the record failed to demonstrate
that Phigenix suffered an injury-in-fact from this decision sufficient to
confirm Article III standing.147 Phigenix does not manufacture
138. NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1378.
139. 395 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
140. NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1378 (citing Trintec Industries, Inc., 395 F.3d at 1281–82)
(comparing Allen’s website to Trintec’s website, which was not specifically directed to
customers in the District of Columbia and had neither sales nor residents in the District).
141. Id. at 1379.
142. Id. at 1381 (noting that dismissing the patent claim left no claim over which
the district court could exercise original subject matter jurisdiction).
143. 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
144. Inter partes review is a trial proceeding conducted by the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB) to review “claims in a patent only on a ground that could be
raised under [35 U.S.C] §§ 102 or 103, and only on the basis of prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications.” Inter Partes Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review
(last modified May 9, 2018 10:15 AM).
145. Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1170.
146. Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., No. IPR2014-00676, 2015 WL 6550500
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015), appeal dismissed, 845 F.3d 1168.
147. Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1174.
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products, but it was in the process of trying to find licensees for a patent
of its own and submitted declarations asserting that the PTAB’s
decision tends to increase competition in those efforts to license.148
The court found the question of what standard should apply to
ascertaining standing for an appeal from an agency action to be one
of first impression.149 The court took guidance from Sierra Club v.
Environmental Protection Agency150 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,151
which together stand for the principle that a party facing a standing
challenge in its efforts to seek appellate review of an agency action has
a “summary judgment burden of production,” i.e., a party must present
evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment-type adjudication.152
The Federal Circuit held that, if the appellant’s standing is not selfevident (e.g., established by the administrative record alone), it must
tender evidence, such as affidavits or declarations, directly to the
appellate court.153 Further, the appellant must identify such evidence
“at the first appropriate time” after the standing challenge surfaces,
such as in a response to a motion to dismiss or an opening brief.154
The Federal Circuit determined that Phigenix failed to demonstrate
standing under such standards. The two declarations the company
provided as documentation were insufficient to demonstrate
injury-in-fact, largely because “there [was] simply no allegation here
that Phigenix [had] ever licensed [its] ’534 patent to anyone, much
less that it licensed the ’534 patent to entities that have obtained
licenses to the ImmunoGen ’856 patent.”155 Statements to the contrary
were conclusory and, therefore, not contradictory.156 The Federal
Circuit rejected Phigenix’s argument that 35 U.S.C. § 141, by creating
a path to appeal, obviated any standing problem and instead
concluded that “Phigenix [could not] base its injury-in-fact upon a
violation of § 141(c) because it [had] been permitted to file its appeal,
and the exercise of its right to appeal [did] not necessarily establish
that it possesse[d] Article III standing.”157 It also rejected Phigenix’s

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1170, 1173–74.
Id. at 1172.
292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1172–73 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
Id. at 1173 (citing Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900).
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900).
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1174–75.
Id. at 1175 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)).
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attempt to argue that the IPR estoppel of § 315 created an injury-in-fact
because “the appellant ‘is not engaged in any activity that would give
rise to a possible infringement suit.’”158
While appellants from the PTAB must establish Article III standing
to bring an appeal to the Federal Circuit, appellees do not. In Personal
Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier Foundation,159 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the PTAB’s anticipation and obviousness determination160
and Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) standing to participate in
the appeal.161 Although Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation162 held that a PTAB petitioner-appellant who did not meet
the Article III case-or-controversy requirement lacked standing to
initiate an IPR appeal,163 in this case EFF was the appellee—not the
appellant.164 Because EFF was not invoking judicial review, there was
no constitutional exclusion against EFF appearing in court to defend
the PTAB’s decision.165
E. Injunctions
The Federal Circuit considered the standard for awarding a
permanent injunction focusing on the support required to find
irreparable harm in Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Americas, Inc.166 There, the
Federal Circuit found no error in denying a permanent injunction where
the record indicated a past willingness to license the asserted patents,
affirming the bench judgment of liability for patent infringement.167
The Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse
158. Id. at 1175–76 (quoting Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found.,
753 F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
159. 867 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-1085 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2018).
160. Id. at 1247–48.
161. Id. at 1250.
162. 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
163. Id. at 1261–62.
164. Personal Audio, LLC, 867 F.3d at 1249–50.
165. Id. at 1250.
166. 855 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
167. Id. at 1344. The Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not
clearly err in finding Nichia’s patents, which related to designs and methods for
manufacturing LEDs, valid and infringed. The Federal Circuit considered how the
district court correctly construed the claims. Id. at 1333. It rejected Everlight’s
argument that “if different words are used in the claim and specification, then we must
read that distinction as an intended difference.” Id. at 1335–36. While different terms
may denote different meanings in some patents, that was not the case in Nichia’s
patents. Id. The Federal Circuit also rejected Everlight’s invalidity arguments as
lacking both in the references and in the reason to combine. Id. at 1339.
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its discretion in declining to enter a permanent injunction against
Everlight because Nichia failed to demonstrate that irreparable harm
would result absent an injunction.168 Moreover, the Federal Circuit
found that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Nichia
was not in meaningful competition with Everlight, noting that “Nichia
is an LED chip manufacturer as well as a packager, ‘while Everlight is
solely an LED packager.’”169 Moreover, Everlight’s sales, compared to
Nichia’s total sales, were “the proverbial drop in the bucket.”170
Similarly, Nichia failed to demonstrate and a single lost sale
attributable to Everlight’s activity.171 In fact, while rejecting Nichia’s
price erosion argument, the Federal Circuit pointed out that there
were other low-price competitors in the market besides Everlight that
were applying price pressure to Nichia.172 Finally, the Federal Circuit
held that the district court did not err in concluding that Nichia’s past
willingness to license its patents weighed against a finding of
irreparable harm.173 Per Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,174 the district court
was entitled to rely on past licensing activity as suggesting that a royalty
would be sufficient to remedy any infringement.175
In Genband US LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp.,176 the Federal Circuit
vacated an order denying a permanent injunction and remanded the
case to ensure that the trial court did not apply too rigorous of a “causal
nexus” standard to support a finding of irreparable harm.177 The
Federal Circuit found that the district court’s analysis of irreparable
harm, and specifically its determination that Genband had failed to
show that the patented features drive demand for the infringing
product, was unclear as to whether it was properly applying the “causal
nexus” standard.178 Per Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Apple III)179
and Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Apple IV),180 Genband’s burden
was to show that the patented features were “‘a driver’ [for demand] as
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1343.
Id.
551 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Nichia Corp., 855 F.3d at 1343–44.
861 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1385.
Id. at 1382.
735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
809 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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opposed to ‘the driver,’ applied in the multi-consumer, multi-feature
context.”181 The Federal Circuit recited some of the Federal Circuit’s
recent case law—notably the various Apple-Samsung cases—to support this
statement of the proper standard.182 Because the district court’s opinion
was unclear as to whether it had properly applied this standard or had
improperly applied a more rigorous standard, remand was necessary.183
The Federal Circuit held that it is “not in a position to conclude that
applying the Apple III/Apple IV standards would make no difference to the
district court’s finding of no causal nexus and, hence, no irreparable
injury.”184 The Federal Circuit declined to affirm based on the district
court’s determination of no irreparable harm due to Genband’s delay
in filing suit and ultimately remanded the case.185 The issue of
irreparable harm was included in the remand because the assessment
of whether and how the patented features drive demand might affect
how the district court views the timing of Genband’s suit.186
In the preliminary injunction space, the Federal Circuit determined
that a claimed loss of “lifetime customers” due to brand loyalty is
sufficient to show irreparable harm. In Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro
Co.,187 the court affirmed Scag Power Equipment’s (“Scag”)
preliminary injunction against Toro.188 The patent at issue related to
lawnmowers with a suspended operator platform.189 The Federal
Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that patentee Scag was entitled to preliminary relief.190
Further, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s
irreparable harm finding was not clearly erroneous.191 Scag’s assertion
that Toro’s infringement192 could lead to the loss of “a potentially
181. Genband US LLC, 861 F.3d at 1382.
182. Id. at 1382–83.
183. Id. at 1384.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1385.
186. Id.
187. 848 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
188. Id. at 1370.
189. Id. at 1362. Scag is Metalcraft’s trade name. Id.
190. Id. at 1363.
191. Id. at 1369.
192. Id. The court rejected Toro’s noninfringement arguments because Scag’s
claims cover mowers with chassis-mounted controls because the claims include no
restriction against that configuration. Id. at 1366–67. As to obviousness, the district
court did not commit clear error in concluding that Toro had failed to demonstrate a
reason why a person of skill would have combined the references Toro was presenting.
Id. at 1367. The court declined to take up Toro’s anticipation arguments, as they only
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lifelong customer” due to brand loyalty in the mower business was
sufficient to support the irreparable harm finding.193 The Federal
Circuit found that “the loss by Scag of customers may have farreaching, long-term impact on its future revenues, and the sales lost by
Scag are difficult to quantify due to ‘“ecosystem” effects, where one
company’s customers will continue to buy that company’s products
and recommend them to others.’”194 The Federal Circuit also found
that the district court did not abuse discretion in rejecting Toro’s
equitable and public interest arguments.195 The injunction, which
enjoined “making, using, selling, and offering to sell lawnmowers
equipped with platform suspension systems that infringe [Scag’s
patent],” was not overly broad, particularly as Toro had offered no
meaningful delineation between the accused products.196
The Mylan Institutional LLC v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd.197 appeal raised
questions about the suitability of the “function-way-result” equivalence test
for some cases.198 The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of preliminary
injunction barring Aurobindo from making or selling isosulfan blue
(ISB)—a dye used in the mapping of lymph nodes—but modified the
injunction so that it is premised only on a composition patent asserted by
Mylan.199 In doing so, the court determined that the district court had
erroneously also based the injunction on two process patents.200
As to the process patents, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court abused its discretion in concluding that Mylan was likely to
succeed on the merits by proving infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.201 The court noted that “the district court’s analysis of
equivalence in this case was flawed, no doubt because of the sparse and
confusing case law concerning equivalents, particularly the paucity of
chemical equivalence case law, and the difficulty of applying the legal
concepts to the facts.”202 The Federal Circuit analyzed the function-wayresult test, concluding that Aurobindo had raised “sufficient doubt” as to

addressed a subset of Scag’s asserted claims. Id. at 1368.
193. Id. at 1368–69.
194. Id. at 1368 (quoting Apple IV, 809 F.3d 633, 641, 645 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
195. Id. at 1369.
196. Id. at 1369–70.
197. 857 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
198. Id. at 867.
199. Id. at 873.
200. Id. at 866.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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whether two compounds, silver oxide and manganese oxide, oxidize
isoleuco acid in the same way as the claimed invention as to make the
district court’s finding abuse of discretion.203 The Federal Circuit
noted that, at the full trial on the merits, the district court may wish to
consider whether the “substantial differences” test for equivalents is
better suited to chemical cases than the function-way-result test.204
As to the composition patent, the Federal Circuit found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mylan likely to
prevail on the merits.205 Aurobindo did not contest the likelihood of
an infringement finding, and the Federal Circuit found that the
district court did not clearly err in its rejection of Aurobindo’s
invalidity defenses.206 Each of the errors Aurobindo alleged were
factual in nature, so the Federal Circuit deferred to the district court.207
It also noted that Mylan had evidence of secondary considerations to
overcome Aurobindo’s obviousness attack.208
As to irreparable harm, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court did not err in rejecting Aurobindo’s arguments against causal
nexus.209 The Federal Circuit rejected Aurobindo’s argument that the
district court had based its finding of nexus solely on the fact that the
FDA had approved Aurobindo’s abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA).210 The record also included evidence of copying and
otherwise indicated that Aurobindo would not have been able to make
the product described in its ANDA without infringement.211
In Tinnus Enterprises, LLC v. Telebrands Corp.,212 the Federal Circuit shed
some light on the effect of a PTAB decision on a parallel district court
action. Although the PTAB has issued a Post-Grant Review (PGR)213
203. Id. at 866–69.
204. Id. at 867, 869–70.
205. Id. at 870.
206. Id. at 870–72.
207. Id. at 870.
208. Id. at 871.
209. Id. at 872–73.
210. See id. (explaining that Aurbindo misinterpreted the district court’s reasoning
and how that court examined the evidence to find a causal nexus between harm and
infringement).
211. Id. at 873.
212. 846 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
213. A PGR is a procedure to review the patentability of a patent’s claims. The
review of a PGR is broader in scope than an IPR but must be filed within nine months
of the issue or reissue of a patent. Post Grant Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/post-grant-review (last
modified May 9, 2017 10:16 AM).
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determination of indefiniteness, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s parallel entry of a preliminary injunction against Telebrands.214 The
Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that irreparable harm would result absent the
injunction and that Tinnus was likely to prove its patent valid and
infringed.215 The Federal Circuit rejected Telebrands’s argument that the
district court declined to construe two of the disputed claim terms, “not less
than” and “connecting force”; to the contrary, the district court held that
Tinnus was likely to prevail irrespective of those terms’ construction.216
While evaluating the success on the merits, the court also rejected
Telebrands’s invalidity arguments.217 Because Telebrands did not
object to the magistrate judge’s definiteness analysis, the Federal
Circuit reviewed the district court’s conclusion that Telebrands had
failed to raise a substantial question of validity for plain error.218 The
court found no such error in the district court’s reasoning that the
term “substantially filled” could meet definiteness standards,
particularly in view of the skill to be applied by a person having
ordinary skill in the art.219 The Federal Circuit noted that in a month
before the appeal, following the PGR proceedings, the PTAB entered
a final written decision finding Tinnus’s claims indefinite.220 That
decision is non-binding on the Federal Circuit, and the appellate
record supported the district court’s treatment of the definiteness
issues.221 However, the Federal Circuit suggested that “[t]he parties
are, of course, free to ask the district court to reconsider its preliminary
injunction in light of the PTAB’s decision.”222
Likewise, the court found that there was no plain error in the district
court’s rejection of Telebrands’s obviousness arguments, as Telebrands

214. Tinnus, 846 F.3d at 1208.
215. Id. at 1194.
216. Id. at 1203, 1204–05. The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not
clearly err in holding that certain tubes in Telebrands’s balloon-filling product were
“attached” to the main housing during claim construction even though they only
attached by sliding into place, and could be removed. Id. at 1204–06. And there was no
reversible error in the district court relying on Telebrands’s instruction manual (rather
than direct citation to the product) to find infringement likely. Id. at 1204–05.
217. Id. at 1205.
218. Id. at 1202–03.
219. Id. at 1205–06.
220. Id. at 1202 n.7.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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failed to identify a sufficient motivation to combine prior art.223 Finally,
there was no clear error in the district court’s irreparable harm analysis,
including the district court’s part-reliance on evidence from the time
before Tinnus’s patent as circumstantial evidence of consumer
confusion, harm to reputation, or loss of goodwill.224
F. Collateral Estoppel
In Phil-Insul Corp. v. Airlite Plastics Co.,225 the Federal Circuit
determined that Rule 36 affirmances are sufficiently valid and final to
support collateral estoppel affirming the grant of summary judgment
for noninfringement.226 In the prior 2011 case, IntegraSpec, the trade
name of Phil-Insul, had unsuccessfully sued separate defendants on the
same patent, “the ’933 patent,” resulting in a claim construction and
summary judgment of noninfringement, which the Federal Circuit
affirmed without opinion through Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 36.227 The Federal Circuit determined that the district court
did not err in concluding that the previous Rule 36 affirmance barred
IntegraSpec’s assertion of the same patent in the present suit due to
collateral estoppel.228 The Federal Circuit rejected IntegraSpec’s
argument that a Rule 36 summary affirmance is not valid and that final
judgments are suitable to support collateral estoppel.229 Relying on
Taylor v. McKeithen,230 the Federal Circuit confirmed that Rule 36
affirmances are valid and final judgments231 and support the
application of collateral estoppel per Rates Technology, Inc. v. Mediatrix
Telecom, Inc.232 The Federal Circuit held that TecSec, Inc. v. International
Business Machines Corp.,233 was not contrary because, in that case, the
issue was whether the parties were bound by a district court’s claim
construction in a matter resolved via Rule 36 affirmance and, whether
it was consequently preclusive because that construction was not

223. Id. at 1207.
224. Id. at 1207–08.
225. 854 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
226. Id. at 1359.
227. Id. at 1347; see FED. R. APP. P. 36 (authorizing federal appeals courts to affirm a
lower court judgment without opinion).
228. Phil-Insul Corp., 854 F.3d at 1347–48.
229. Id. at 1354–55.
230. 407 U.S. 191 (1972) (per curiam).
231. Phil-Insul Corp., 854 F.3d at 1354–55 (citing Taylor, 407 U.S. at 194 n.4).
232. 688 F.3d 742, 750 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Phil-Insul Corp., 854 F.3d at 1355.
233. 731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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necessary to the judgment.234 Indeed, the TecSec court expressly
rejected the contention that Rule 36 affirmance can always support
collateral estoppel.235 In the present appeal, it was “clear that the prior
panel actually and necessarily adopted the district court’s claim
constructions when it affirmed the judgments,” so TecSec did not
apply.236 Further, IntegraSpec had not appealed certain claim
construction issues in the prior appeal. The Federal Circuit compared
the prior 2011 case and the present one to find no error in the
determination that the accused products in both cases were
substantially the same, and, therefore, there was no error in summary
judgment of noninfringement, giving weight to the apparent criticality
of the claim construction to the Rule 36 affirmance.237 Finally, the
Federal Circuit rejected IntegraSpec’s argument that claim two (in the
present case) should be construed anew because that claim was not at
issue in the present appeal.238
G. Arbitration
In Evans v. Building Materials Corp. of America,239 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss and stay pending arbitration,
finding the arbitrability claim “wholly groundless” where a prior art
agreement had no relationship to the patent and trade dress claims in
suit.240 Applying Fourth Circuit law and the “wholly groundless”
standard of Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp.,241 the Federal Circuit
determined that the district court had correctly found the assertion of
arbitrability by General Aniline & Film (GAF) (trade name of Building
Materials Corp. of America) wholly groundless.242 The Federal Circuit
declined to resolve whether the “wholly groundless” test is the only test

234. Phil-Insul Corp., 854 F.3d at 1355–57.
235. Id. at 1356.
236. Id. at 1357.
237. Id. at 1357–58 (rejecting IntegraSpec’s attempt to cite the oral argument
transcript in the prior appeal as casting doubt on the correctness of the district court’s
claim constructions, TecSec did not apply).
238. Id. at 1359 (finding that numerous claim terms overlap and rejecting IntegraSpec’s
contention that the same words might be construed differently in the two claims).
239. 858 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
240. Id. at 1379. The wholly groundless standard is a limited inquiry as to whether
any legitimate argument could be made and applies when an arbitration agreement
clearly and unmistakably refers the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Id. at 1380.
241. 466 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
242. Evans, 858 F.3d at 1379.
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to be used in review of arbitrability under Fourth Circuit law.243 Indeed,
GAF’s claims for patent infringement, trade-dress infringement, and
unfair competition were completely unrelated to the arbitration
agreement, as they involved completely different products and no issue
“related to the performance or interpretation of the contract itself.”244
The Federal Circuit also rejected GAF’s claim that some of Mr. Evans’s
claims incorporated a dispute over whether GAF had breached various
confidentiality obligations.245 And while some of Mr. Evans’s claims
urged “willfulness and similar states of mind,” those states of mind
related to GAF’s conduct regarding its allegedly infringing products,
not its state of mind relating to the confidentiality agreement.246
II. VALIDITY
A. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
In the 2017 term, the Federal Circuit continued to provide direction
to the patent eligibility of computing-based claims for data organization
and structure and pharmaceutical patents under the patent eligibility
standard excluding laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract
ideas. In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp.,247 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court holding two
patents ineligible under § 101, finding that the introduction of allegedly
new “data structures” was insufficient to avoid ineligibility.248 The
Federal Circuit found that summary judgment of ineligibility as to
Intellectual Ventures I’s (IV) patent was warranted.249 The patent
related to techniques for dynamically managing Extensible Markup
Language (XML) data.250 IV’s patent failed the Supreme Court’s twopart test for patent subject matter eligibility outlined in Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank International251 steps.252 At step one, the patent addressed
243. Id. at 1380.
244. Id. at 1381.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1382.
247. 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
248. Id. at 1342–43 (granting summary judgment in a collateral estoppel claim
regarding a third patent). The opinion refers to the plaintiff’s as “IV”. Id. at 1334.
249. Id. at 1342.
250. Id. at 1338–39.
251. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
252. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850 F.3d at 1340, 1342. The Alice test is a two-step
inquiry: (1) whether the claim under examination is a patent-ineligible concept, such
as an abstract idea; and (2) whether the patent adds to the idea “something extra” that
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abstract “data manipulation” steps.253 Though it specifically related to
making XML documents compatible via the use of “management
record types” (MRTs) and “primary record types” (PRTs), at best this
limited the invention “to a technological environment for which to
apply the underlying abstract concept,” but did not make them less
abstract.254 At Alice step two, nothing transformed the abstract method
into an inventive concept because the claims did little more than
describe the method.255 The Federal Circuit rejected IV’s argument
that the patent was unconventionally improving a technological
process, notwithstanding its introduction of MRTs and PRTs.256
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he mere fact that
the inventor applied coined labels to conventional structures does not
make the underlying concept inventive.”257
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in a companion case, Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co.,258 discussed the ineligibility of IV’s
third patent.259 Finding that the lack of detail as to how the asserted
patents would accomplish the claimed benefits indicated the absence
of inventive concept, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment of § 101 ineligibility as to two patents.260 Further, the Federal
Circuit dismissed the infringement claims under the third patent for
lack of standing and consequently vacated a collateral holding that the
third patent was also § 101 ineligible.261 The Federal Circuit instructed
the lower court to dismiss the claims of the first asserted patent, the
’581 patent,262 applying California law to the interpretation of an
agreement between prior assignee AllAdvantage.com and a company
called Alset (the alleged assignor to IV).263 The Federal Circuit

embodies an “inventive concept.” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355, 2357.
253. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850 F.3d at 1340.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1341.
256. Id. at 1341.
257. Id. at 1342. The Federal Circuit also considered how the claims lacked detail
on how to overcome specific problems IV claimed they addressed. Id.
258. 850 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
259. Id. at 1331–32 (concluding that the claims failed to “recite an inventive concept
that transforms the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”).
260. Id. at 1319.
261. Id. at 1332.
262. Id. at 1324–25.
263. Id. at 1320–21. In a footnote the opinion notes that Federal Circuit law
sometimes controls issues of assignment, but the parties seem to have agreed to
application of California law. See id. at 1320 n.1.
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concluded that this agreement did not include any assignment of rights
to the application leading to the ’581 patent, even though Alset held
itself out as the ’581 patent’s assignee post-issuance, including updating
power of attorneys, paying the issuance fee, and recording an
assignment from itself to IV.264 Further, the Federal Circuit rejected
IV’s argument that Alset and AllAdvantage.com intended to convey the
’581 patent; the contract was unambiguous and the Federal Circuit
declined to take up IV’s submission of extrinsic evidence as to the
parties’ general behavior.265 Because IV was not the assignee, the court
determined that IV lacked standing to bring suit on the ’581 patent.266
Given the lack of standing, the Federal Circuit vacated the district
court’s determination that the ’581 patent was § 101 ineligible.267
The Federal Circuit also determined that summary judgment of
§ 101 ineligibility was appropriate for IV’s other two patents. The first,
the ’434 patent, related to the use of an index to locate information in
a computer database.268 The court held that this failed Alice step one,
reasoning that the use of index-searchable databases existed long
before the patent and cited library indexes of books.269 Further, it
rejected IV’s argument that the patent improved how computer
databases function, as in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.270 While some
claims recited use of XML tags to improve indexing, not all claims
required this, and the specification indicated that the invention was
“not necessarily limited to XML language.”271 In any event, even the
XML claims were not focused on how use of XML improved the
technology, but merely “call[ed] for XML-specific tags in the index
without any further detail.”272 The patent also failed Alice step two.273
Recitation of an XML-based index was not enough to transform the
abstract idea into a patentable invention, and the claims’ other

264. Id. at 1322.
265. Id. at 1322–23.
266. Id. at 1324.
267. Id. at 1324–25.
268. Id. at 1325.
269. Id. at 1327–28.
270. 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that Enfish’s “self-referential
table” claims were not directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one because the
techniques improved specific database functions, and thus Enfish’s claims were patenteligible); Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d at 1327–28.
271. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d at 1327–28.
272. Id. at 1328.
273. Id.
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limitations recited routine computer functions.274
The Federal Circuit further found that summary judgment of § 101
ineligibility was also appropriate for the third patent, the ’002 patent.275
The patent related to techniques for accessing remotely stored data
using a “mobile interface.”276 First, the ’002 patent failed Alice step one
because “[r]emotely accessing and retrieving user-specified information
is an age-old practice even though the mobile interface requirement
only specified a particular field of use.277 Second, the ’002 patent failed
Alice step two because it simply applied a generic computer
implementation to the abstract idea and provided no inventive
solution.278 The court noted that the claimed interface was “so lacking in
implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component
(software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the
abstract idea.”279 And the failure to describe how the claimed mobile
interface would overcome cited “compatibility issues” bars taking that
“purported feature” of the invention as an inventive concept.280
In Thales Visionx Inc. v. United States,281 the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court’s judgment on the pleadings of § 101 patent
ineligibility, finding that claims applying a specific algorithm to track
movements were not abstract.282 Thales Visionx Inc.’s claims related
to inertial tracking, i.e., using accelerometers and gyroscopes to track
an object’s’ movement.283 The claims recited the use of two inertial
sensors, and the computation of an object’s orientation was “based on
signals received” from those sensors.284 The Federal Circuit reasoned
that the claims required use of the mathematical techniques disclosed
in the specification and were thus “indistinguishable from the claims
at issue in [Diamond v.] Diehr.”285 The Federal Circuit determined that
“[j]ust as the claims in Diehr reduced the likelihood that the rubber
molding process would result in ‘overcuring’ or ‘undercuring,’ the
claims here result in a system that reduces errors in an inertial system
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 1328–29.
Id. at 1329.
Id.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1331–32.
850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345.
450 U.S. 175 (1981); Thales Visionx Inc., 850 F.3d at 1348.
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that tracks an object on a moving platform.”286 Since the inertial
sensors were used in a non-conventional way, the idea was patentable
and not abstract and, thus, survived step one of Alice.287
By comparison, in RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,288 the Federal
Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings of patent ineligibility
because invocation of a particular algorithm in face compositing
claims was insufficient to confer patentability.289 RecogniCorp’s patent
related to techniques for building a composite facial image from
constituent parts.290 The patent failed both steps of the Alice inquiry.
At step one, RecogniCorp’s patent addressed “the abstract idea of
encoding and decoding image data.”291 Per Diehr, it was not the mere
use of a mathematical formula that rendered the representative claim
abstract, but the absence of any patentable subject matter outside of
the mathematical formula.292 The Federal Circuit found Digitech Image
Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc.293 applicable because
RecogniCorp’s claim, like the claim in Digitech, was abstract because it
“started with data, added an algorithm, and ended with a new form of
data.”294 At step two, the Federal Circuit rejected RecogniCorp’s
argument that the “particular encoding process using the specific
algorithm disclosed” was sufficient to confer patentability.295 The court
distinguished the case from DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.296
because, unlike DDR Holdings, there was nothing in RecogniCorp’s
claim to provide the required inventive concept.297 The Federal Circuit
reasoned that “[t]he addition of a mathematical equation that simply
changes the data into other forms of data cannot save [a claim].”298
The Federal Circuit also rejected RecogniCorp’s attempt to argue that,
under BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,299

286. Thales Visionx Inc., 850 F.3d at 1348 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Diehr,
450 U.S. at 187).
287. Id. at 1349.
288. 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 672 (2018).
289. Id. at 1324.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1326–27 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 192 (1981)).
293. 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
294. RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1327 (citing Digitech Image Techs., 758 F.3d at 1351).
295. Id.
296. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
297. RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1327–28.
298. Id. at 1328.
299. 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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the claims had some “particularized application” of the image
encoding/decoding techniques sufficient to confer patentability.300 In
its conclusion, the Federal Circuit held that the patent “claims the use
of a computer, but it does exactly what we have warned it may not: tell
a user to take an abstract idea and apply it with a computer.”301
In Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp.,302 the Federal Circuit held that a
claim addressing use of categorical data storage in a computer memory is
non-abstract, reversing the district court’s determination of subjectmatter-ineligibility.303 Visual Memory’s patent related to a computer
memory system tailorable for use with different processors without a
performance penalty.304 The Federal Circuit found that the district court
erred at Alice step one by reasoning that Visual Memory’s claims only
encompassed an abstract idea.305 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
Visual Memory’s claims were addressed to an improved memory system,
not just the abstract idea of “categorical data storage” (i.e., storing data in
different caches based on the data type).306 The Federal Circuit noted
that the claims recited a number of limitations restricting their coverage
to a memory system and not “all types and all forms of categorical data
storage.”307 Thus, Visual Memory’s patent addressed a technological
improvement as in Enfish and Thales, and that cases like Content Extraction
and In re TLI Communications LLC,308 were distinguishable.309
In Judge Hughes’s dissent, he argued that the claims’ “fundamental
concept” was expressed generally and should be interpreted as such in
the Alice analysis.310
He would have affirmed the
subject-matter-ineligibility finding.311
Affirming § 101 patent-ineligibility in Smart Systems Innovations, LLC
v. Chicago Transit Authority,312 the Federal Circuit held that claim

300. RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1328.
301. Id. (citing Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2015)).
302. 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
303. Id. at 1255.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1257.
306. Id. at 1258–59 (citing Thales Visionx Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
307. Id. at 1259.
308. 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
309. Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1260.
310. Id. at 1262 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 1264.
312. 873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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references to tangible items are insufficient to demonstrate nonabstractness.313 Smart Systems Innovations (“SSI”) claims related to
techniques for using bankcards to regulate rider access to a transit
system and for collecting/storing funding data.314 Four patents were
at issue, and the Federal Circuit addressed them together, finding that
they all failed both steps of the Alice inquiry.315 At step one, the Federal
Circuit rejected SSI’s arguments that the claims were non-abstract
because they operated in the “tangible” world.316 The claims were all
“directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of data” and were
thus abstract.317 The Federal Circuit also rejected SSI’s contention that
the claims improved existing technological processes, as in Enfish and
DDR Holdings.318 SSI’s claims did not improve computer technology,
“but rather invoke computers in the collection and arrangement of
data.”319 The Federal Circuit explained that there was no inventive
concept, despite the fact that the claims were limited to mass transit
applications.320 At step two, the Federal Circuit found no inventive
concept sufficient to confer patentability.321 The Federal Circuit also
rejected SSI’s arguments as to lack of preemption and alleged
satisfaction of the machine-or-transformation test.322 Thus, the Federal
Circuit found the patent invalid under § 101.
Judge Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part, would have
found two of SSI’s patents—those specifically related to the use of a
bankcard in accessing a transit system—to be directed to non-abstract
ideas and thus patent-eligible.323
In Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC,324 the
Federal Circuit affirmed a determination of § 101 subject-matter

313. Id. at 1366–67.
314. Id. at 1368.
315. Id. at 1366–67.
316. Id. at 1371.
317. Id. at 1372.
318. Id. (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir.
2016); DDR Holding, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
319. Id. at 1272–73.
320. Id. at 1373.
321. Id. at 1373–74 (finding no inventive concept because “the claims at issue use
generic computer components ‘in which to carry out the abstract idea.’” (quoting
Lending Tree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
322. Id. at 1373–75.
323. Id. at 1376, 1383–84 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
324. 874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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ineligibility for claims reciting results of simple functions.325 Four
Two-Way patents were at issue, all relating to systems for streaming over
the internet using multicasting.326 The Federal Circuit discussed them
in two sets. Under Alice step one, the first set of patents concerned the
abstract idea of sending and monitoring the transmission of
information.327 Even if Two-Way’s proposed claim constructions had
been adopted by the district court, they did not make this idea nonabstract.328 The Federal Circuit found that the lower court did not
oversimplify the patent claims as Two-Way had suggested, and it
instead agreed with the determinations that the patent claims related
to “basic functions” instead of specific techniques that could be used
to perform the functions.329 At Alice step two, there was no inventive
concept in the application of the idea; the claims used only generic
functional language to describe implementation and the order of the
combination did not provide an inventive concept.330
As to the second set of patents, at Alice step one, Two-Way’s claims
were directed to the abstract idea of monitoring and measuring
delivery of real-time information.331 Further, the district court did not
err when it cited the claim’s preamble in analyzing the patent’s
abstractness.332 At Alice step two, there was again no inventive concept
because the claims only used conventional computer and network
components, operating according to ordinary functions.333
In Secured Mail Solutions LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc.,334 the Federal
Circuit held postal “unique identifier” patents ineligible under § 101,
affirming the district court’s determination.335 The case involved
multiple patents, and the Federal Circuit addressed them in three
categories while conducting an Alice inquiry.336 At Alice step one, the
court reasoned that all three categories claimed abstract ideas—first,
325. Id. at 1332.
326. Id. at 1333.
327. Id. at 1337.
328. Id. at 1338.
329. Id. at 1337–38 (citing Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Directv, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253,
1258–59 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1596 (2017) (mem.); Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
330. Id. at 1338–39.
331. Id. at 1340.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1340–41.
334. 873 F.3d 905 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-1319 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2018).
335. Id. at 907.
336. Id.
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the idea of using a “unique identifier” to identify the senders of mail;
second, the idea of using a quick response code (QR)code for a similar
purpose; and third, the idea of using a personalized URL as an
identifier.337 The court rejected Secured Mail’s argument, under
Enfish, that such analysis described the claims too generally.338 At Alice
step two, none of the categorized patents included an inventive
concept sufficient to confer patent-eligibility.339 The Federal Circuit
rejected Secured Mail’s citation to DDR Holdings because the claims do
no more than “cite well known and conventional ways to allow generic
communication between a sender and a recipient using generic
computer technology.”340 The Federal Circuit found no error in the
district court dismissing the case at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.341 Finally,
the Federal Circuit rejected Secured Mail’s argument that the district
court misplaced the burden of proof.342
In Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC,343 the
Federal Circuit addressed the product of nature concept of section 101
when it affirmed the district court’s determination of patent
ineligibility of claims for correlating enzyme levels to cardiovascular
disease.344 The Cleveland Clinic’s patents related to methods for
detecting myeloperoxidase (“MPO”) in the body and correlating the
results to cardiovascular risk.345 As a procedural matter, the district
court did not err in addressing only certain claims from Cleveland
Clinic’s three patents.346 Per Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
Wells Fargo Bank,347 it is appropriate to review only representative claims
where the claims are substantially similar and linked to the same law of
nature.348 The Federal Circuit also found that the district court also
did not err in rejecting the claims at the motion to dismiss stage, per

337. Id.
338. Id. at 909–11 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1332–33
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
339. Id. at 911–12.
340. Id. at 912.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 913.
343. 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-997 (U.S.
Jan. 18, 2018).
344. Id. at 1355.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1359.
347. 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
348. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1360 (citing Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348).
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Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C.349 and other cases.350
At step one of the Alice analysis, Cleveland Clinic’s claims were
directed to the natural law correlating presence of MPO to
cardiovascular disease.351 As in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,352
here, “the method starts and ends with naturally occurring phenomena
with no meaningful non-routine steps in between.”353 The Federal
Circuit rejected Cleveland Clinic’s citation to Rapid Litigation
Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc.354 because Cleveland Clinic did not
create a new laboratory technique but was only using well-known
techniques to execute the claimed method.355 At step two of Alice,
Cleveland Clinic’s claims lacked an inventive concept sufficient to
confer patentability. Citing Ariosa and Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,356 the Federal Circuit concluded that
Cleveland Clinic’s claims were merely applying a law of nature.357 The
techniques used to assess MPO levels were well-known, as were the
statistical techniques for making the required comparison to control
levels.358 The Federal Circuit distinguished the case from CellzDirect
because, in that case, there was an improvement to existing methods
of cell preservation that applied a new discovered natural law; here,
the patents “[did] not extend their discovery” of a correlation between
MPO and cardiovascular disease.359
The Federal Circuit also found that the district court also did not err
in dismissing Cleveland Clinic’s claims under a separate patent, which
related to methods of treating cardiovascular disease by prescribing
lipid-lowering drugs.360 The district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Cleveland Clinic’s request for leave to amend its complaint
to correct some of the issues herein; the request was “buried” in

349. 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 242 (2016) (mem.).
350. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1360 (citing Genetic Techs. Ltd., 818 F.3d at 1373–74;
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Content Extraction,
776 F.3d at 1349; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
351. Id.
352. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
353. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1361.
354. 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
355. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1361.
356. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
357. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1362.
358. Id.
359. Id. (citing CellzDirect, 827 F.3d at 1051).
360. Id. at 1363.
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Cleveland Clinic’s opposition to True Health’s motion to dismiss.361
The Federal Circuit considered how True Health’s sale of lab reports,
documenting various testing services, could not support contributory
infringement liability because they were not a “material or apparatus”
used for infringement.362 Nor could the sale of such reports support
inducement due to Cleveland Clinic’s failure to allege a connection
between True Health’s reports and any subsequent prescription of
lipid lowering drugs by physicians.363
B. Anticipation
The Federal Circuit addressed issues of precision in anticipatory
prior art. In Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,364 the
Federal Circuit held that possibilities untaught in a reference, but
“immediately envision[ed],” may not support a finding of anticipation,
thus reversing the PTAB’s IPR determination.365 During the IPR, the
parties agreed that a claimed signal had to be in a certain “frame of
reference;” however, the PTAB’s determination relied on prior art
signals in a different reference frame.366 The Federal Circuit found
that, even if a person of skill could “at once envisage” the claimed
signals, that fact alone was insufficient to establish anticipation.367
Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co.368 was not contrary because,
there, the prior art disclosed various components and taught that they
could be intertwined.369 As such, the reference “effectively taught” the
claimed combination.370 The Federal Circuit reasoned that “Kennametal
addresse[d] whether the disclosure of a limited number of combination
possibilities discloses one of the possible combinations . . . . [It] does
not permit the Board to fill in missing limitations simply because a
skilled artisan would immediately envision them.”371
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute,372 the
361. Id. at 1363–64.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1364.
364. 851 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
365. Id. at 1270–71.
366. Id. at 1273.
367. Id. at 1274 (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d
1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
368. 780 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
369. Nidec Motor Corp., 851 F.3d at 1274 (citing Kennametal, 780 F.3d at 1382–83).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1274–75.
372. 849 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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Federal Circuit applied the same concept, this time affirming the
PTAB’s determination of non-anticipation.373 The Los Angeles
Biomedical Research Institute at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center’s
(“LAB”) claim required application of treatment “for not less than 45
days.”374 The allegedly anticipatory reference did not expressly teach
forty-five days of treatment, and the Federal Circuit found that the
PTAB did not err in finding that it did not inherently teach such
treatment.375 The prior art’s reference to “chronic administration” was
insufficient to teach the full forty-five days.376 The court found
AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc.377 directly on point because, while the prior
art may have “suggested” the claim duration, these suggestions are
insufficient to succeed on an anticipation claim.378 Thus, similar to
AstraZeneca, despite the prior art suggesting the claimed duration, it
was not enough to anticipate the claim.379
Holding that factual predicate must be established to support reading
prior art genus to anticipate a claimed species, the Federal Circuit
generally affirmed IPR determinations of Wasica Finance GmbH v.
Continental Automotive Systems, Inc.380 on patentability (finding some claims
patentable, others not) and reversed determination of patentability as to
one claim.381 The Federal Circuit treated the appeals from patent-owner
Wasica and from petitioners Continental and Schrader separately.382
In assessing Wasica’s appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB
did not err in finding the claims under review unpatentable as anticipated
and obvious.383 Phillips v. AWH Corp.384 sets the standard for construing
and reviewing claims of expired patents.385 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit rejected Wasica’s argument that certain “pressure signal”
limitations should have required numeric values instead of non-numeric

373. Id. at 1076.
374. Id. at 1074.
375. Id. at 1074–75.
376. Id. at 1075.
377. 633 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
378. Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d at 1075–76 (citing AstraZeneca, 633 F.3d at 1054–55).
379. Id. at 1076.
380. 853 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
381. Id. at 1289 (finding claims 1–5, 9–19, and 21 unpatentable and claims 6–8 and
20 patentable).
382. Id. at 1278, 1282.
383. Id. at 1278–79.
384. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
385. Wasica, 853 F.3d at 1279–80.
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representations as lacking support in the claim text or description.386 The
Federal Circuit also rejected Wasica’s argument that the claim limitation
“emittance of a . . . signal” should have been limited to wireless signals.387
The plain meaning of “emit” could include wired communication, and
there was no redefinition or disavowal in the patent.388
The PTAB did not err either when it found certain art cited by
Schrader as too “unclear,” or when it rejected Continent’s argument
that because the same prior art discussed using “any” modulation
scheme, it should be held to inherently disclose the claimed
modulation scheme.389 The Federal Circuit also found that Schrader
waived its obviousness challenge because it did not include it in its
petitions or appeals.390 The PTAB also did not err in rejecting
Continental’s argument that it should be held to inherently disclose
the claimed modulation scheme because the same prior art disclosed
using “any” modulation scheme.391 Per Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical
Corp.,392 not every disclosure of a genus also discloses every species
within.393 Moreover, the Federal Circuit determined that Kennametal is
not contrary, and Continental failed to develop the sort of factual
showing necessary to prove that the disclosed genus teaches the
claimed species.394 There were similar defects in Continental’s
obviousness contention.395
Further, the court also found that, because a dependent claim was
anticipated, the PTAB erred in holding that the claim was
patentable.396 Upon review of the specification and structure of the
claims, the Federal Circuit found that “bit sequence” could include a
sequence of a single bit.397 Thus, the PTAB construction (“two or more
bits”) was overly restrictive.398 Thus, under the Federal Circuit’s

386. Id.
387. Id. at 1282.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1287.
390. Id. at 1284–85.
391. Id. at 1285.
392. 441 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
393. Wasica, 853 F.3d at 1285 (citing Atofina, 441 F.3d at 999).
394. Id. at 1285–86 (citing Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d
1376, 1381–83 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
395. Id. at 1286.
396. Id. at 1288.
397. Id.
398. Id.
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construction, the dependent claim was invalid as anticipated.399
C. AIA On-Sale Bar
In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,400 the
Federal Circuit held that the AIA on-sale bar may be triggered by a
contract despite terms to keep certain invention details confidential,
reversing a bench trial determination that Helsinn’s patents were not
invalid per the on-sale bar provision of § 102.401 The case involved four
Helsinn patents relating to reducing chemotherapy-induced nausea
and vomiting.402 Pre-AIA § 102 applied to three of the patents,403 while
AIA § 102 applied to the fourth.404
As to the three pre-AIA patents, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court correctly determined that a 2001 supply agreement
between Helsinn and MGI Pharma was a contract for future sale of a
commercial product embodying the three patents.405 The Federal
Circuit rejected Helsinn’s argument that, because the contract was
contingent on FDA approval for Helsinn’s product, the arrangement
would not be commercially understood as a contract for sale.406 Citing
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and BG Group PLC v. Republic
of Argentina,407 the Federal Circuit reasoned that a contract with a
condition precedent remains a valid, enforceable contract.408 The
Federal Circuit found that although the agreement contemplated two
products—one practicing the claims and one note—it did not change
the outcome.409 The Federal Circuit rejected Helsinn’s argument,
under Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc.,410 that the law will not find
commercial activities invalidating if those same activities (here, MGI
Pharma’s selection of Helsinn as a sole supplier) could have been
performed in house.411 Helsinn’s relationship with MGI Pharma was
399. Id. at 1288–89.
400. 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-1229 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2018).
401. Id. at 1359–60.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1360.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1364.
406. Id. at 1365–66.
407. 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).
408. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1365 (citing U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2003); BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207).
409. Id. at 1366.
410. 827 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc).
411. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1367.
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too different from the contract manufacturing arrangement in
Medicines Co. to invoke that case’s rule.412
As to the fourth patent, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
erred in concluding that the same agreement failed to invoke the AIA
on-sale bar because the agreement kept the actual dosing details—which
were part of the claims—confidential.413 The Federal Circuit analyzed
AIA § 102’s rule barring “patentability of an invention [that] was
‘patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale,
or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention.’”414 Further, it rejected Helsinn’s argument that the
revision to § 102 means that the on-sale bar does not apply to sales that
do not disclose the invention itself to the public—i.e., sales that keep no
details of the invention confidential.415 Citing a variety of Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit authority, the Federal Circuit reasoned that
the history of the on-sale bar has not required full disclosure of all claim
elements, so long as there is a sale of an embodiment of the invention.416
Reviewing the legislative history of the AIA, the Federal Circuit also
found no basis to support overturning such history.417 It therefore
concluded that the 2001 supply agreement was a contract for future sale
of the invention of the fourth patent.418
Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that the inventions of all four
patents were ready for patenting as of the critical date, as required by
the on-sale bar standard established in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,419
due to actual reduction to practice.420 It was uncontested that Helsinn
made the formulation in a stable form by that date.421 The district
court erred in concluding that Helsinn had not yet determined that
the invention would work for its intended purpose.422 To satisfy that
standard, it is not necessary to meet U.S. Food and Drug
412. Id.
413. Id. at 1369.
414. Id. at 1368 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)).
415. Id. at 1369.
416. Id. at 1369–71 (citing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829); Abbott
Labs. V. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 1999); RCA Corp. v.
Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by
Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
417. Id. at 1371.
418. Id.
419. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
420. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1371 (citing Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67–68).
421. Id. at 1372.
422. Id. at 1373.
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Administration (FDA) standards for approval, but only to show that
the invention works “beyond a probability of failure” but not “a
possibility of failure.”423 The Federal Circuit concluded that, on the
record available, as of the critical date it was clear that the invention
would work for its intended purpose.424
D. Obviousness
In 2017, the Federal Circuit weighed in on various secondary
consideration analyses affecting the obviousness determinations of the
lower courts in Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.425 The
Federal Circuit entered judgment for Millennium and determined
that a failure to prove motivation to combine and failure to overcome
secondary considerations warranted a reversal of an invalidity
judgment.426 In this Hatch-Waxman case,427 where the defendant
stipulated to infringement, the Federal Circuit further vacated
judgments in separate actions that were based on collateral
estoppel.428 Millennium’s patent claims the structure of Velcade, an
anticancer drug.429 The Federal Circuit found that, based on the
references, the district court erred in concluding that a person of skill
would have had a reason to produce the compound in question.430
There was no dispute that a key process was known in the art, but there
was nothing in the record to suggest applying that process in the
manner required to reach the claimed compound.431 The opinion
discussed the various references and theories, and describes why none
of them taught or suggested the required process.432
The Federal Circuit found that the district court also erred in
determining that the prior art did not teach away from application of

423. Id. at 1372 (quoting Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
424. Id. at 1373.
425. 862 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
426. Id. at 1370.
427. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012); see Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189–90
(1999) (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act creates a regulatory process by which
generic pharmaceuticals are approved and relevant causes of action for developers
seeking to safeguard their drug patenting rights).
428. Millennium Pharm., 862 F.3d at 1370.
429. Id. at 1360–61.
430. Id. at 1364.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 1364–65.
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the proposed process in its application of inherency.433 While it was
undisputed that the application of the process in question would have
led to the claimed compound, that it did so was unexpected prior to
the invention.434 The Federal Circuit rejected Sandoz’s argument that
the reactions at issue could not be inventive because they were
“inherent” to the materials and process being used.435
The Federal Circuit found that the district court also clearly erred in
its analysis of objective indicia of secondary considerations established
in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,436 including unexpected results
and long-felt need, as “[t]hese indicia cannot be set aside in the analysis
of obviousness.”437 The opinion described how the district court erred
in determining what the “closest prior art compound” was for purposes
of this analysis; correcting for this, the record showed unexpected
results.438 The Federal Circuit also found that the district court erred in
concluding that Millennium had failed to show a long-felt need or
commercial success because the record demonstrated both.439 In view
of the above, the Federal Circuit held that the district court should not
have found invalidity and reversed the district court’s judgment.440
In another secondary considerations case, Intercontinental Great
Brands LLC v. Kellogg North America Co.,441 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for patent invalidity
due to obviousness, finding no error in the district court’s
consideration of objective indicia of nonobviousness after it found a
prima facie obviousness case.442 Intercontinental’s patent related to
resealable food packaging (referred to in the opinion by its former
name, Kraft).443 The Federal Circuit determined that the district court
did not err in granting summary judgment of obviousness,444 finding
that the district court properly considered objective indicia of
nonobviousness and properly based its obviousness determination on

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id. at 1366–67.
Id.
Id.
383 U.S. 1 (1966).
Millennium Pharm., 862 F.3d at 1367–68.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1370.
869 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1351–52.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1344–45.
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all of the Graham factors.445 The Federal Circuit thus rejected Kraft’s
argument that the district court failed to sufficiently consider objective
indicia.446 It also rejected Kraft’s argument that objective indicia must
be considered before analyzing whether a skilled artisan would have a
reason to combine prior art and emphasized that the district court’s
ordering—analyzing objective indicia after considering the content of
the art and the existence of a reason to combine—was not
erroneous.447 The Federal Circuit also rejected Kraft’s arguments as to
the content of the record and the existence of a motivation to combine
based on that record.448 It furthermore declined to find any error in
the district court’s analysis based on the fact that the art being analyzed
had previously been considered during reexamination.449
When it considered the prior art from reexamination, the Federal
Circuit determined that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment of no inequitable conduct.450 Kellogg’s evidence
was insufficient to permit a finding of intent.451 The intent issue
concerned an article that Kraft had submitted to the PTO that
depicted a key piece of prior art.452 The article described the prior art
as not using “conventional wrapping film,” but Kraft suggested in
litigation that this was a misprint.453 Kraft’s decision not to bring the
belief of the misprint to the PTAB’s attention was not, on its own,
sufficient to support a determination of bad intent.454 Kellogg had not
developed evidence that Kraft’s counsel believed it was a misprint, and
neither the ex parte requester nor the examiner had ever raised the
issue.455 “The absence of such a statement indicates that the alleged
misprint was not as obvious as Kellogg claims.”456

445. Id. at 1345.
The Graham factors to determine nonobviousness are
consideration of: (1) the scope and content of the relevant prior art; (2) the difference
between the claimed invention and the relevant prior art; and (3) the level of ordinary
skill in the relevant art. Graham, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
446. Id.
447. Id. at 1346–47.
448. Id. at 1348.
449. Id. at 1350 (“[I]n this case[,] the ‘enhanced burden’ proposition [for art
considered in reexamination] provides no basis for a different result.”).
450. Id. at 1352.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1351.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 1351–52.
455. Id. at 1352.
456. Id.
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Judge Reyna, dissenting in part, believed that the district court
“improperly found a prima facie case of obviousness before
considering Kraft’s evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness,”
and on that basis would have reversed.457
In Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc.,458 the Federal Circuit
affirmed a bench judgment of obviousness in Hatch-Waxman
litigation, finding that evidence of commercial success and copying was
insufficient to establish nonobviousness.459 Merck’s patent related to a
process for preparing its branded antibiotic Invanz (generic name
ertapenem).460 The Federal Circuit analyzed how, in view of the prior
art, Merck’s claims amounted to straightforward application of wellunderstood prior art principles and were obvious.461 The Federal Circuit
also rejected Merck’s argument that the prior art failed to disclose the
precise order and detail of claimed steps because this “would have been
discovered by routine experimentation while implementing known
principles.”462 The Federal Circuit noted Merck’s objective evidence
concerning nonobviousness, particularly the commercial success of
Merck’s Invanz product.463 After giving evidence of commercial success
its “full and proper weight,” the Federal Circuit determined that the
district court committed no clear error in its obviousness analysis.464
However, the district court erred in holding that “multiple patents do
not necessarily detract from evidence of commercial success of a
product or process” because, since Merck had separate patents
covering ertapenem itself, evidence of Invanz’s commercial success
should be discounted.”465 But even correcting for this error, the
commercial success evidence could not overcome the obviousness
evidence.466 The Federal Circuit also rejected Hospira’s argument that
the district court erred in finding copying by Hospira; the evidence
could be given weight in this case because the ANDA did not require
Hospira to copy the patented manufacturing process—only that the

457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Id. at 1353 (Reyna, J., dissenting in part).
874 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 730–31.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 730–31.
Id.
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result of that process matched Merck’s.467
Dissenting, Judge Newman stated that she would have held that the
district court gave insufficient weight to objective evidence of
nonobviousness.468 Her opinion called for the Federal Circuit to
“remedy our inconsistent treatment of the procedures and burdens in
applying the evidentiary factors of obviousness.”469
In Bayer Pharma AG v. Watson Laboratories, Inc.,470 the Federal Circuit
reversed a bench judgment finding nonobviousness in a HatchWaxman case, holding that evidence disfavoring a combination of
reference did not teach away from it.471 The case involved Bayer’s
patent for a formulation of an erectile-dysfunction (ED) treatment,
vardenafil (brand name Levitra), as an oral disintegrating tablet (sold
by Bayer as Staxyn).472 The Federal Circuit determined that the district
court clearly erred in concluding that Watson failed to show a
motivation to formulate ED drugs as oral disintegrating tablets (ODT),
as the record included numerous references describing such
formulations, each of which the district court failed to consider.473 The
opinion discussed these references and analyzed Bayer’s
counterarguments, concluding that the record clearly showed a
motivation to formulate vardenafil ODT.474 The Federal Circuit found
clear error in the district court’s conclusion that there was no
motivation to employ technology reaching those limitations.475 There
was clearly an “otherwise apparent motivation to formulate a product,”
despite the fact that some of this technology had not yet been FDAapproved.476 And while the district court did not err in finding that
some of the combinations would have led to “bitter taste and increased
bioavailability,” such did not rise to the level of teaching away from the
combination—the combination would still have been productive, even
if disfavored.477 The Federal Circuit noted that Bayer had presented
objective evidence of nonobviousness (copying and unexpected
467. Id.
468. Id. at 733 (Newman, J., dissenting).
469. Id. at 731.
470. 874 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
471. Id. at 1329.
472. Id. at 1319.
473. Id. at 1321–22.
474. Id. at 1322–23.
475. Id. at 1324–25.
476. Id. at 1326 (citing Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 726 F.3d 1286, 1291–92 (Fed.
Cir. 2013)).
477. Id. at 1327 (citing In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
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results), but upon weighing the factors articulated in Graham, the
claims were obvious.478
In Novartis AG v. Noven Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,479 the Federal Circuit
held that the PTAB may differ in obviousness determination from
district courts even on similar evidence and arguments. There, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s IPR determinations of nonpatentability for obviousness.480 The existence of prior district court
and Federal Circuit authority finding Novartis’s claims nonobvious on
a similar record481 did not demonstrate factual or legal error in the
PTAB’s decisions.482 As a factual matter, the record in the IPR included
additional art and declarations not present in the district court and
Federal Circuit cases.483 As a legal matter, the Federal Circuit held that
the different standard of proof in IPR, preponderance of the evidence,
and in district court, clear and convincing evidence, meant that the
PTAB can properly reach a “different conclusion based on the same
evidence.”484 In re Baxter International, Inc.485 was not contradictory; Baxter
merely noted that, on the same evidence and argument, the PTO should
“ideally” reach the same outcomes as a district court.486 However, Baxter
“used ‘ideally’ to connote aspiration,” and recognized that the PTO has
its own standards to apply.487 Applying the PTAB standard of proof in
IPR, the Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence supported
the PTAB’s obviousness determination.488
In Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute v. Eli Lilly & Co.,489 the

478. Id. at 1329.
479. 853 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
480. Id. at 1296.
481. Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 611 F. App’x 988, 996 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (rejecting defendant’s claim that Novartis’s patents were invalid for obviousness
and holding defendant liable for infringement); Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Noven
Pharm., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 474, 486–87 (D. Del. 2015) (rejecting defendant Noven’s
claim that Novartis’s patents are invalid as obvious).
482. Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1293.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 1294 (citing Noven Pharm., Inc. v. Novartis AG, IPR2014-00550, 2015 WL
5782081, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 28, 2015), aff’d, 853 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
485. 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
486. Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1294 (citing In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365).
487. Id. (citing In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365).
488. See id. at 1294–95 (explaining that substantial evidence showed that a person
having of ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) would have known to assess the
compound of the structure prior to testing rather than waiting for tests to show
degradation because of a PHOSITA’s knowledge of organic chemistry basics).
489. 849 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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Federal Circuit vacated an IPR obviousness determination holding that
a recitation of the treatment goal within a claim step, but not the
preamble, supported a determination that the goal limited the claim.490
The Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute’s (“LAB”) patent related
to treatment of certain symptoms (e.g., erectile dysfunction) relating to
penile fibrosis.491 In co-pending litigation, LAB contended that Eli
Lilly’s marketing of its erectile dysfunction treatment Cialis induced
infringement of the patent.492 The Federal Circuit determined that the
PTAB did not err in rejecting LAB’s priority claim to its provisional
patent application.493 The Federal Circuit explained that to get from
the provisional patent application’s disclosure of dosing used in a rat
study to the later-claimed dosing of “up to 1.5 mg/kg/day,” a person
of skill would have had to make a series of assumptions.494 Specifically,
the person of ordinary skill would have to know the rats’ daily water
intake, the average weights of the rats and humans, and the conversion
methodology described in the provisional.495
The Federal Circuit considered three claim interpretations by the
PTAB. First, the PTAB erred in holding that the claim term “an
individual with at least one of penile tunical fibrosis and corporal tissue
fibrosis” could cover individuals having symptoms “associated with”
penile fibrosis without actually having the enumerated condition.496
The Federal Circuit examined the patent and file history and
concluded that, as in Rapoport v. Dement,497 the claim requires an
individual actually having the underlying condition.498
Second, the PTAB erred in finding the claim step, “arresting or
regressing [the fibrosis]” did not limit the claim, as the Federal Circuit
determined that such text required actually arresting or reversing the
condition.499 The Federal Circuit noted that this was not a preamble
but a step so it was distinct from other cases where preambles discussed
other intrinsic and extrinsic evidence (including LAB’s infringement

490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Id. at 1067–68.
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1057–58.
Id. at 1059.
254 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
L.A. Biomedical Research Inst., 849 F.3d at 1060 (citing Rapoport, 254 F.3d at 1059).
Id. at 1060–61.
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contentions) and were held non-limiting.500
Third, the Federal Circuit held that the PTAB did not err in
rejecting LAB’s argument that the term “continuous long-term regimen”
required that the drug concentration in the patient’s body be at a “constant
level.”501 The PTAB was not required to adopt LAB’s proposed limitation
despite the fact that the claim elsewhere required a “45-day” dosing
regimen.502 The Federal Circuit then analyzed the references reviewed by
the PTAB, and ultimately remanded for further determinations on issues
necessary to reach the obviousness conclusion.503
In a partial dissent, Judge Newman “agree[d] generally with the
court’s discussion of the ’903 patent and the prior art.”504 However,
she would have gone on to find LAB’s claims obvious over the cited
references and would affirm.505
In Meiresonne v. Google, Inc.,506 the Federal Circuit affirmed an IPR
obviousness determination, finding that the absence of express
criticism in the prior art reference undermined the “teaching away”
contention.507 The Federal Circuit determined that substantial
evidence supported the PTAB’s conclusion that the cited references
did not teach away from Meiresonne’s claims.508 While one reference
included some criticism of a certain approach, it “does not say or imply
that text descriptions[, the approach at issue,] are ‘unreliable,’
‘misleading,’ ‘wrong,’ or ‘inaccurate,’ which might lead one of
ordinary skill in the art to discard text descriptions completely.”509 The
Federal Circuit rejected Meiresonne’s citation to DePuy Spine, Inc. v.
Medtronik Sofamor Danek, Inc.,510 which expressly criticized a prior art
approach and stated that it could lead to unacceptable failure.511
In Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd.,512 the Federal Circuit
confirmed that where there is no persuasive link between the product’s
success and the innovative patent features, no nexus exists to support
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.

Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1062–63.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1066–67.
Id. at 1068 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting from the judgment).
Id.
849 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1383.
567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Meiresonne, 849 F.3d at 1383–84 (citing DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1326–27).
853 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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the secondary considerations to overcome nonobviousness.513 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s IPR determination of
unpatentability for both original claims and proposed substitutes.514
Novartis’s patent related to a solid pharmaceutical composition used
in treating multiple sclerosis.515 As to nexus, the Federal Circuit
determined that the PTAB did not err in rejecting Novartis’s argument
that the commercial success, industry praise, and long-felt need
evidence related to its Gilenya product demonstrated
While Gilenya was the first FDA-approved,
nonobviousness.516
commercially available, solid multiple sclerosis composition, such
compositions were already known in the field prior to Gilenya’s
release, so the mere fact that Gilenya was first to market did not
demonstrate nonobviousness.517 Per Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Emtrak,
Inc.,518 it is appropriate to find no nexus where the evidence indicates
that the commercial success was not “attributable” to the claimed
advantages of the patent.519 As to unexpected results, the PTAB also
did not err in finding that Novartis failed to substantiate this argument,
and the PTAB further declined to take up arguments Novartis raised
for the first time on appeal.520
Additionally, the Federal Circuit found that there was no due
process or Administrative Procedure Act (APA) error in the PTAB’s
partial reliance on a reference (“Sakai”) as supporting motivation to
combine.521 Although the PTAB’s institution decision had declined to
institute on anticipation and obviousness over Sakai, both the petition and
the conduct of the proceeding indicated that Sakai was still at least
relevant enough to support motivation to combine other references.522
The Federal Circuit noted that Novartis elected not to move to specifically
exclude Sakai, citing Genzyme Therapeutic Products Ltd. v. Biomarin
513. Id. at 1331.
514. Id. at 1319.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 1330–31.
517. Id. at 1331.
518. 544 F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven though commercial
embodiments of [Asyst’s] ’421 invention may have enjoyed commercial success, Asyst’s
failure to link that commercial success to the features of its invention that were not
disclosed in [the] Hesser [patent] undermines the probative force of the evidence
pertaining to the success of Asyst’s . . . products.”).
519. Torrent, 853 F.3d at 1331 (citing Asyst Techs., 544 F.3d at 1316).
520. Id. at 1328–30.
521. Id. at 1324.
522. Id. at 1324–26.
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Pharmaceutical Inc.523 The Federal Circuit also found that the PTAB did
not err in finding Novartis’s claims obvious.524 The Federal Circuit
rejected Novartis’s argument that the PTAB failed to take into account
the potential negatives surrounding the proposed combination.525 The
Federal Circuit relied on Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,526 which instructs
tribunals to take into account that there might be “conflicting”
teachings as to potential combinations and, ultimately, the Federal
Circuit held that the PTAB properly analyzed the record.527 In fact,
Medichem does not impose a requirement to “expressly discuss each and
every negative and positive piece of evidence lurking in the record.”528
E. Written Description and Enablement
To meet the § 112 requirement, a patentee may not rely on
background knowledge for written description support absent some
suggestion in the specification. In Rivera v. International Trade
Commission,529 the Federal Circuit affirmed the determination that
there had been no Tariff Act violation due to invalidity for lack of
written description.530 Mr. Rivera’s patent related to single-serve coffee
brewing and addressed compatibility between disk-shaped coffee
“pods” and cup-shaped coffee “cartridges.”531 The Federal Circuit
found that the International Trade Commission (ITC) correctly
determined that Mr. Rivera’s patent did not describe the full scope of
his claim (specifically, it did not describe a “cartridge or pod adapter
assembly” that was itself the “pod”; it described only how to adapt a
cartridge so that a pod could be put into it).532 The Federal Circuit
rejected Mr. Rivera’s reliance on Honeywell International Inc. v. United
States.533 In Honeywell, disclosure “of a CRT-type monitor provided
written description support for other types of monitors.”534 The case
did not address the situation here, where Mr. Rivera was relying on an
523. 825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Torrent, 853 F.3d at 1326 n.2.
524. Torrent, 853 F.3d at 1327–31.
525. Id. at 1327.
526. 437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
527. Torrent, 853 F.3d at 1327 (citing Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1165).
528. Id. at 1328 (citing Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1165).
529. 857 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
530. Id. at 1323.
531. Id. at 1316–17.
532. Id. at 1320.
533. 609 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1321 (citing Honeywell, 609
F.3d at 1301).
534. Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1321 (citing Honeywell, 609 F.3d at 1301).

2018]

2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1191

“undisclosed configuration that eliminates a fundamental
component . . . (i.e., the ‘pod’).”535 The Federal Circuit also rejected
Mr. Rivera’s argument that background knowledge of one of skill in
the art could supplement the written description to provide written
description support.536 Under Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.,537 the
knowledge of ordinary artisans can inform the specification but not fill
in limitations not disclosed therein, even if those limitations would be
obvious.538 The court did not find Falkner v. Inglis539 and Boston Scientific
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson540 contradictory because, in those cases, the
specifications at least alluded to the relevant material as a potential
configuration of the claims.541
In Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC,542 the Federal Circuit
concluded that a post-priority date reference may be used to
interrogate the sufficiency of the written description’s disclosure of a
representative species, affirming in part and reversing in part the
judgment that Amgen’s patents were not invalid and the district court’s
entry of a permanent injunction against the sale of Sanofi’s “Praluent”
product.543 Amgen’s patents related to antibodies that reduce bad
cholesterol.544 Regarding the § 112 written description and enablement
requirement, the Federal Circuit found that the district court erred by
excluding certain evidence tendered by Sanofi, evidence bearing on
whether Amgen’s patent disclosed a representative number of the
claimed species.545 Though post-patent evidence is typically not
germane to evaluating written description, it may be used to evaluate the
sufficiency of the species disclosure.546 In re Hogan547 was not contrary
because, in that case, the post-priority-date evidence was being used for
a different purpose (i.e., to show a change in the state of the art relevant

535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
1366).
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.

Id.
Id. at 1322.
107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1322 (citing Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571–72).
448 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
647 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1322 (citing Bos. Sci., 647 F.3d at 1366; Falkner, 448 F.3d at
872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1381–82.
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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to evaluating enablement of the genus).548 The Federal Circuit
remanded for a new trial on written description and enablement “[f]or
many of the same reasons.”549 The Federal Circuit notes that the district
court also erred by instructing the jury that disclosure of a “newly
characterized antigen” could satisfy the written description requirement
for a claim to an antibody.550 The opinion discusses how prior
precedent on this issue did not endorse such a rule.551 However, the
Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err in denying
Sanofi’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of no written
description and no enablement because the record was incomplete
without the post-patent evidence discussed above.552
In addition, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications were not prior art because
Sanofi had not shown that the provisional applications provided
written description support for the claims of the PCT applications.553
The Federal Circuit’s opinion discusses how the district court was
correct to exclude Sanofi’s alleged prior art.554 The references were
published PCT applications claiming priority to provisionals that
predated the priority date of Amgen’s patents.555 The district court
correctly determined that Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics,
Inc.556 was not contrary because Dynamic Drinkware described how, for
prior art purposes, the provisional patent application’s specification
must support the claims in the non-provisional application to properly
claim priority to the provisional application.557
The permanent injunction was also vacated because the written
description/enablement judgment was vacated.558 The Federal Circuit
noted that the district court’s permanent injunction analysis failed to
properly apply the public interest factor from eBay, Inc. v.

548. Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1375 (citing In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606).
549. Id.
550. Id. at 1378–79.
551. Id. at 1376–77 (citing Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d
1341, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 960, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
552. Id. at 1380.
553. Id. at 1376–77.
554. Id. at 1379.
555. Id. at 1380.
556. 800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
557. Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1380 (citing Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378).
558. Id. at 1381.
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MercExchange, LLC.559 Significantly, the district court entered an
injunction despite its conclusion that a permanent injunction would
disserve the public interest by reducing consumer choice in drugs.560
The Federal Circuit emphasized that a district court may only enter a
permanent injunction if a plaintiff shows that the public interest would
not be disserved.561 Further, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court erred in reasoning that reduction in consumer choice, without
more, was sufficient to disserve the public interest because “[u]nder
such an approach, courts could never enjoin a drug.”562
In Storer v. Clark,563 the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s
interference decision that granted priority to an application by Clark
(assigned to Gilead), over an application by Storer (assigned to
Idenix).564 The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB properly
determined that Storer was not entitled to the priority date of his
provisional application due to a lack of enablement as to the
subsequently claimed compounds.565 The Federal Circuit noted that
Storer initially attempted to have the District of Delaware review the
PTAB’s priority determination, but the court dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction under Biogen MA, Inc. v. Japanese Foundation for
Cancer Research.566 The Federal Circuit noted, “Although Storer says
that Biogen was incorrectly decided, that decision is binding on this
panel.”567 The claims at issue related to treatment of hepatitis C and
the formation of specific compounds used therein.568 The Federal
Circuit concluded that a person of skill in the art would have been
unable to practice the invention, based on the provisional and the
prior art, without undue experimentation.569 To assess undue
experimentation, the Federal Circuit applied the eight-factor test of In
re Wands.570 The Federal Circuit closely considered the chemical
559. 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1381 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 394).
560. Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1381.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. 860 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-1248, 860 F.3d 1340 (U.S.
Apr. 23, 2018) (mem.).
564. Id. at 1352.
565. Id. at 1349–50.
566. 785 F.3d 648 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Storer, 860 F.3d at 1343.
567. Storer, 860 F.3d at 1343.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 1350.
570. 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Storer, 860 F.3d at 1345 (citing In re Wands,
858 F.2d at 737).
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compounds and techniques at issue and particularly noted the PTAB’s
determinations that the relevant art—“fluoridation of tertiary
alcohols”—was “highly unpredictable,” and significant experimentation
would be necessary to reach the claimed compounds from the disclosure
in Storer’s provisional patent application.571 On the whole, the record
supported the PTAB’s determinations.572
F. Indefiniteness
In analyzing indefiniteness under § 112, the Federal Circuit found
that terms of degree having sufficient objective baselines may survive
an indefiniteness challenge, reversing the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in Sonix Technology Co. v. Publications
International, Ltd.573 The patent related to a technique for visually
encoding information, such as information typically in a universal
product code (UPC) or QR code, into an item such that the information
has a “visually negligible” effect on the item’s appearance.574 The Federal
Circuit found that the district court erred in finding the term “visually
negligible” indefinite.575 Both sides agreed that the term should receive
its ordinary meaning, so neither the district court nor the Federal
Circuit construed the term.576 At the Federal Circuit, the issue received
de novo review, with clear error review for factual findings.577 The
Federal Circuit rejected Publications International’s argument for
deference to the district court’s holding that “visually negligible” was
subjective because the district court did not make a specific factual
finding on that issue and expressly explained that its indefiniteness
determination was not dictated by extrinsic evidence.578
The Federal Circuit held that the patent contained sufficient
guidance to avoid indefiniteness.579 The court found that Datamize, LLC
v. Plumtree Software, Inc.580 and Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.581 were
571. Storer, 860 F.3d at 1346–47.
572. Id. at 1352.
573. 844 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
574. Id. at 1371–73.
575. Id. at 1371.
576. Id. at 1374.
577. Id. at 1376.
578. Id.
579. Id. at 1377 (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2010)).
580. 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by Nautlilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
581. 766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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not contrary, as those cases involved terms invoking personal taste or
opinion.582 The “visually negligible” term, by comparison, had a
sufficient “objective baseline” to allow a person of skill to ascertain its
scope even though it was a term of degree.583 The Federal Circuit
considered the written description, file history, and other extrinsic
evidence, and found those factors supportive.584 Finally, the Federal
Circuit noted that the appellees’ “other actions during litigation also
reflect that they understood ‘visually negligible,’” and had even
proposed a claim construction for them at one point.585
In One-E-Way, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,586 the Federal
Circuit reversed the summary determination of invalidity for
indefiniteness based on the use of the term in a “non-technical manner”
in the claim.587 One-E-Way’s patents related to wireless headphones that
would not interfere with one another, even in crowded spaces.588 The
Federal Circuit determined that the term “virtually free from
interference” was not indefinite as read in the context of the file history
and specification because it meant that One-E-Way’s system would
prevent one user from eavesdropping on another.589 The Federal
Circuit relied on support from the specification and noted that, in the
file history, the applicant had specifically written that an example of
“virtually eliminating” interference was that eavesdropping could not
occur.590 The Federal Circuit rejected the argument from Sony and the
other parties that were respondents in the ITC investigation, that the
claim failed to teach how much interference was permitted, reasoning
that the use of the term “interference” was “in a non-technical manner to
simply mean” secure from eavesdropping.591 The Federal Circuit also
rejected the argument that One-E-Way failed to establish how “virtually
free from interference” differed from “free from interference,” which
appeared in other unasserted claims.592 The Federal Circuit reasoned,
“Audio ‘free from interference’ will be a be a bit better than audio
582. Sonix Tech., 844 F.3d at 1377–78 (citing Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1368,
1370–71, 1373–74; Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1348–49).
583. Id. at 1378.
584. Id. at 1378–80.
585. Id. at 1380.
586. 859 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
587. Id. at 1067.
588. Id. at 1060.
589. Id. at 1067.
590. Id. at 1065.
591. Id. at 1066.
592. Id.
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‘virtually free from interference,’” and so audio “free from
interference” would be “at a minimum, free from eavesdropping as
well.”593 In dissent, Chief Judge Prost advocated for affirming the ITC’s
indefiniteness finding and criticized the majority for relying entirely
on “a single, non-definitional remark from the prosecution history and
ignor[ing] intrinsic evidence that injects ambiguity.”594
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
The Federal Circuit continued to address questions of claim
construction, implementing the Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc.,595 standard of review and expounding on the effect of
error in claim construction on other issues such as invalidity and
infringement.596 In Technology Properties Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies
Co.,597 the Federal Circuit held that the scope of surrender is not
limited by a patentee disclaiming more than necessary during
prosecution, vacating a stipulated judgment of noninfringement.598
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err in holding
that Technology Properties’s traversal during prosecution of a first
reference (“Magar”) led to disclaimer of two categories of claim
coverage.599 Although Technology Properties might have traversed
Magar on only one of the two categories, it was bound by both aspects
of its double disclaimer, per Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.600 The district
court erred, however, in its assessment of the scope of disclaimer
associated with traversal of a second reference (“Sheets”).601 During
prosecution, Technology Properties disclaimed the use of certain
control signals to change an oscillator’s clock frequency, but the
company did not disclaim the use of control signals altogether.602
593. Id. at 1066–67.
594. Id. at 1067 (Prost, J., dissenting).
595. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
596. Tech. Props. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., 849 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(citing Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841–42).
597. 849 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
598. Id. at 1360 (holding that because the party stipulated noninfringement the
court remands).
599. Id. at 1358.
600. 432 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that a patentee cannot prevail on a
doctrine of equivalents theory due to disclaimer of multiple alternatives to the claimed
invention).
601. Tech. Props., 849 F.3d at 1356–57, 1359 (analyzing whether the term was
distinguishable from other patent claims).
602. Id. at 1359.
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Although this was a “minor modification” to the claim construction,
the Federal Circuit found vacatur necessary because the judgment was
based on stipulated noninfringement.603
In TVIIM, LLC v. McAfee, Inc.,604 the Federal Circuit determined that
an allegation of inconsistent infringement and validity analyses were
immaterial to the jury finding because the patentee conceded that
either analysis was proper regardless of the claim construction
standard applied.605 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment of no infringement and patent invalidity by anticipation and
obviousness of TVIIM’s patent related to techniques for identifying
computer security vulnerabilities.606 Contrary to TVIIM’s arguments,
the record did not indicate that the jury applied inconsistent claim
constructions in its noninfringement and invalidity findings.607 The
Federal Circuit noted that, although TVIIM on appeal cited three
terms as having multiple ordinary meanings, TVIIM did not ask the
district court to construe any of the three, thus it waived any new
construction.608 The Federal Circuit did not find that any of the terms
had multiple ordinary meanings and determined that the jury, on the
evidence presented, could have reasonably found both no
infringement and invalidity under a single ordinary meaning for each
term.609 Further, TVIIM conceded that the jury could have reasonably
found either noninfringement or invalidity (though, it argued, that it
could not find both) under “any single ordinary meaning
construction.”610 The Federal Circuit marked this as a dispositive
concession: “[E]ven if we were to find an inconsistent verdict, substantial
evidence under ‘any’ construction supports the jury’s verdict of invalidity.
Consequently, any potential error by the jury regarding
[noninfringement] was harmless.”611
However, in another case this term the Federal Circuit held that
failure to identify prejudice from alleged claim construction errors
serves a basis for affirmance. In Comcast IP Holdings I LLC v. Sprint

603. Id. at 1360 (emphasizing that minor modification would not impact the
outcome of the case).
604. 851 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
605. Id. at 1359.
606. Id.
607. Id. at 1362–63.
608. Id. at 1363.
609. Id. at 1363, 1365.
610. Id. at 1365.
611. Id.
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Communications Co.,612 the Federal Circuit affirmed an infringement
judgment and $7.5 million damages award, plus prejudgment interest,
against Sprint.613 The three asserted patents are related and involve
the use of Domain Name System (DNS) to route telephone calls.614
The Federal Circuit rejected Sprint’s suggestion that the district court
erred in construing “switched telecommunication system” and noted that
the specification did in fact support the district court’s construction.615
The Federal Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s determination that Sprint’s accused call flows included a “call
destination” and a “unique identifier of a second party.”616 Neither Sprint
nor Comcast sought construction of either term.617 Thus, the court held
that the jury was thus free to apply the plain and ordinary meaning,
and the record, including testimony from Comcast’s expert,
reasonably supported the finding.618 The Federal Circuit also rejected
Sprint’s argument that the district court erred in construing the term
“parsing,” noting Sprint’s failure to identify prejudice from that
construction “in its opening brief” because it failed to explain how the
accused call flows do not practice the asserted claims under the
narrower claim construction.619 Even without waiver, the Federal
Circuit held that the district court correctly construed the term.
In Medicines Co. v. Mylan, Inc.,620 the Federal Circuit construed a key
limitation, “efficiently mixing,” which neither the court nor parties
treated as a means-plus-function term requiring sufficient disclosure of
structure under § 112, as limited to a specific mixing technique in the
specification notwithstanding the following quasi-definitional language
in the specification:
“‘efficient mixing’ . . . is characterized by
minimizing levels of Asp9-bivalirudin in the compounding solution.”621
The Federal Circuit reversed a bench judgment of infringement as to
one of Medicines patents and affirmed summary judgment of
noninfringement as to another patent based primarily on claim

612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.

850 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1305, 1307.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1312.
853 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1306.
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construction.622
Medicines’s patents related to techniques for
minimizing impurities in batches of bivalirudin, a synthetic peptide used
to prevent blood clotting.623 Representative claims from both patents
addressed “pharmaceutical batches” of bivalirudin compounds, and
the parties agreed that “pharmaceutical batches” meant a batch or
batches, made by the same “compounding process.”624 The claims
went on to require that the batches not exceed a maximum impurity
level.625 On appeal, the issue was whether, and which of, Medicines’s
claims required that the “batches” be made using an “efficient mixing”
process, a process that mixed more efficiently than the prior art
techniques that the patents described as “old” and “inefficient.”626
The Federal Circuit found that the district court had correctly held
that one of Medicines’s patents required “efficient mixing,” but erred
in holding that the other did not.627 To support its holding, the
Federal Circuit discussed the specification and file history in detail and
reasoned that all of Medicines’s claims required “the use of a process
that achieves batch consistency.”628 From that, the Federal Circuit
concluded that “batch consistency” required “efficiently mixing.”629
In both of Medicines’s patents, “efficiently mixing” meant mixing in
the manner described by one of the examples in Medicines’s written
description.630 The Federal Circuit rejected Medicines’s argument that
the term simply meant mixing in such a manner as to minimize the
relevant impurity.631 Although the patent described “efficiently
mixing” in such terms, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the
description was not definitional “because it [did] not accord with the
linguistic formula used by the patentee to signal the designation of
other defined terms.”632 The Federal Circuit also cited concerns that
Medicines’s definition was essentially functional.633
“Although
functional limitations in patent claims are not per se objectionable
even when the means-plus-function format is not invoked, they cannot
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.

Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1300, 1302.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1298, 1306.
Id. at 1306.
Id.
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be ‘so broad that [they] cause[] the claim to have a potential scope of
protection beyond that which is justified by the specification
disclosure.’”634 Moreover, the court stated that one of ordinary skill in
the art would have been guided by the specification to define
“efficiently mixing.”635 Applying this construction, the Federal Circuit
found that Mylan did not infringe as a matter of law because Mylan’s
mixing technique did not comport with the written description’s
relevant description of “efficiently mixing.”636
In Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.,637 the Federal Circuit
affirmed a noninfringement verdict finding that a reference to
“advantageously” performing operation did not mean the asserted
claims’ non-performing designs.638 Core Wireless’s patent related to
the means for sending packet data from a handset to a network on a
selected channel.639 The Federal Circuit found that the district court
did not err in application of its claim construction as JMOL. The
Federal Circuit found that, properly construed, Core Wireless’s claims
required certain channel selection be by the handset, not the
network.640 The Federal Circuit considered the claim construction
evidence in detail and rejected Core Wireless’s argument that the
construction entered by the magistrate judge and district court did not
require such channel selection by the handset.641 “The problem with
Core Wireless’s theory is that the entire point of the invention is to
enable the mobile station [handset] to make the channel selection
decision . . . .”642 The district court identified the structure that worked
with the handset making the channel selection, and the limitation at
issue was a means-plus-function limitation.643 The Federal Circuit
rejected Core Wireless’s contention that the limitation was only a
preferred embodiment.644 Ultimately, the court emphasized that a
reference in the specification to performing channel selection in the
634. Id. at 1306–07 (alternation in original) (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210
(C.C.P.A. 1971)).
635. Id. at 1309.
636. Id. at 1307.
637. 853 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
638. Id. at 1361 (finding that the accused device did not infringe and is capable of
being a mobile station).
639. Id. at 1362.
640. Id. at 1363.
641. Id. at 1362, 1364, 1366.
642. Id. at 1366.
643. Id.
644. Id. at 1368.
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handset “advantageously” did not mean that the claim covered
embodiments where channel selection was performed elsewhere.645
Under this construction, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
jury’s noninfringement verdict.646
In MasterMine Software, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,647 the Federal Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part a judgment of noninfringement
and invalidity based on claim construction reciting structures
performing active functions.648 The court determined that the district
court did not err in requiring that the “pivot tables” in MasterMine’s
claims actually display data.649 The Federal Circuit relied on the
specification and noted that the applicant made reference to
“dragging and dropping” elements into pivot tables.650 The Federal
Circuit found that this “dragging and dropping” disclosure fell short
of showing unmistakable disclaimer but supported the district court’s
construction.651 However, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court erred in holding five MasterMine claims indefinite as “claiming
two subject-matter classes” (i.e., an IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v.
Amazon.com, Inc.652-type claiming of both a method and an system).653
MasterMine’s claims did not introduce method elements into system
claims but were “simply apparatus claims with proper functional
language.”654 The Federal Circuit considered its authority on the issue
and concluded that the claims’ use of “wherein” clauses containing
active verbs (e.g., “wherein the reporting module . . . presents a set of
user-selectable database fields”) merely claimed that the system would
have a structure “capable of performing the recited functions.”655
Further, the claims did not recite activities performed by the user and
their use of functional language was “specifically tied to structure.”656
The Federal Circuit held that, “[b]ecause the claims merely use
permissible functional language to describe the capabilities of the
645. Id. at 1367.
646. Id. at 1370.
647. 874 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
648. Id. at 1308.
649. Id. at 1310–11.
650. Id. at 1312.
651. Id.
652. 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
653. MasterMine Software, 874 F.3d at 1310.
654. Id. at 1313.
655. Id. at 1316 (citing Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments
Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
656. Id.
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claimed system, it is clear that infringement occurs when one makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells the claimed system.”657
The Federal Circuit determined that the § 112, ¶ 6 means-plusfunction presumption may be rebutted where there is no function
associated with the “means” term. In Skky, Inc. v. MindGeek, s.a.r.l.,658
the Federal Circuit affirmed an IPR determination of
unpatentability,659 finding that the PTAB did not err in declining to
apply § 112, ¶ 6 to the preamble term “wireless device means.”660 In
the claim, there was no function associated with the “wireless device
means,” and the Federal Circuit held that the term denoted the
“common parlance” structure of a wireless device.661 Thus, MindGeek
rebutted the presumption of means-plus-function treatment. The
PTAB also correctly rejected Skky’s argument that the term should be
construed to require multiple processors as inconsistent with the
claims and written description.662
In Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,663 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment of noninfringement, finding that statements in an
IPR preliminary response resulted in prosecution disclaimer.664 The
Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not err in
concluding that Aylus’s statements during IPR could be relied on to
support a finding of prosecution disclaimer.665 The Federal Circuit
reviewed a number of cases applying prosecution disclaimer in other
post-issuance proceedings, finding that “[i]t follows that we should apply
the doctrine in IPR proceedings.”666 Citing Cuozzo Speed Technologies,
LLC v. Lee,667 the Federal Circuit rejected Aylus’s argument that
statements in IPR should receive different treatment because an IPR is

657. Id.
658. 859 F.3d 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-349, 2018 WL 1994802 (U.S.
Apr. 30, 2018) (mem.).
659. Id. at 1016 (holding that a part or segment of the entire song was
unpatentable).
660. Id. at 1018–19.
661. Id. at 1020 (describing the standard to describing devices).
662. Id. at 1018.
663. 856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
664. Id. at 1359, 1362 (holding that statements made during IPR proceedings by
the patent owner can be used to support a prosecution disclaimer and that these
statements “constitute[d] a clear and unmistakable surrender of claim scope”).
665. Id. at 1359.
666. Id. at 1359–60.
667. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
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“adjudicative” and not administrative.668 The IPR proceeding extended
from the inter partes reexamination (IPRx) process, but did not change
that process’s basic administrative character.669
Further, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did not
err in concluding that statements in a preliminary response may lead
to prosecution disclaimer.670 Although, per Shaw Industrial Group, Inc.
v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc.,671 “an IPR does not begin until
instituted, [the Federal Circuit found] the differences between the two
phases of an IPR to be a distinction without a difference.”672
Statements in the preliminary response are part of the public record,
and the public may rely on them.673 Lastly, the court held that the
district court also did not err in finding that Aylus had made clear,
unmistakable disclaimers of claim scope.674
IV.

INFRINGEMENT

A. Direct Infringement
In Georgetown Rail Equipment Co. v. Holland L.P.,675 the Federal Circuit
affirmed an infringement judgment and award of enhanced damages
because it found that the defendant willfully shipped data to third
parties meeting the claim limitation of “put into service.”676 Based on
the patent claims and specification, the district court correctly rejected
Holland’s arguments that the claim preamble was limiting because the
phrase “mounted on a vehicle for movement along the railroad track” was
a statement of intended use and did not exclude devices lacking a
vehicle mount.677 Further, the Federal Circuit also rejected Holland’s
argument that Georgetown relied on the preamble during prosecution
to overcome prior art; the Federal Circuit found that the statements in
question from the prosecution history were ambiguous.678
The Federal Circuit also determined that the district court did not err in
668. Aylus Networks, 856 F.3d at 1360–61 (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44).
669. Id. at 1361.
670. Id.
671. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016) (mem.).
672. Aylus Networks, 856 F.3d at 1361.
673. Id.
674. Id. at 1362 (noting that the case was not “subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation”).
675. 867 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
676. Id. at 1233 (holding that substantial evidence supported the infringement finding).
677. Id. at 1234.
678. Id. at 1238.
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denying a JMOL and that the record was sufficient to support a
determination that Holland was “using” the accused data processing
equipment insofar as it was gathering data and sending it to a third party
for analysis.679 As in Centillion Data Systems v. Qwest Communications,680 this
was sufficient to “put into service” those limitations of the claim that
Holland was not itself performing.681 The record also sufficiently supported
a determination that Holland had actually gathered the data at issue.682
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s remedy findings,
determining that there was no error in denying JMOL of no lost profits.683
The Federal Circuit found that the record contained sufficient evidence
to support Georgetown prevailing on Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre
Works, Inc.684 factors one and four: demand for the patented product and
the amount of profit that would have been made.685 Additionally, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding enhanced damages for willfulness.686 The Federal Circuit
considered the record and concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to show that Holland recklessly infringed.687
Finding no infringement where an operator did not obtain a benefit
from the invention, the Federal Circuit partially affirmed and partially
reversed an infringement judgment in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Motorola Mobility LLC.688 The case involved two patents from IV: the
’144 patent relating to file transfer between computers and the ’462
patent relating to a laptop formed by docking a smartphone into a
“shell.”689 The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in
failing to grant JMOL that neither Motorola nor its customers directly
679. Id. at 1237, 1239 (finding no reasonable jury could have found infringing data
equipment or could have found that the product was intended to be sold as covered
by the requirements under the theory of infringement).
680. 631 F.3d 1279, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that where a customer controls
a system and derives a benefit from that system, it is tantamount to putting the system
into service, which is a “use” of the system as a matter of law).
681. Georgetown Rail Equip, 867 F.3d at 1239–40 (citing Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1285).
682. Id. at 1231, 1239.
683. Id. at 1240.
684. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) (establishing relevant factors for setting
reasonable royalty rates as equivalent to ordinary licensing negotiations between
“willing” participants).
685. Georgetown Rail Equip., 867 F.3d at 1241–42.
686. Id. at 1232, 1245.
687. Id.
688. 870 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding certain claims are valid within
patent infringement requirements and other claims remanded).
689. Id. at 1323.
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infringed.690 Applying Centillion to show “use” of the patented system,
which is required to show infringement, it was necessary for IV to show
that an accused infringer both “control” the system in question and
obtain “benefit” from it.691 To infringe, the system had to generate
delivery reports upon the sending of Multimedia Messaging Service
(MMS) messages; the record indicated that while reports of this kind
were stored on users’ phones, they were not accessible and there was
no evidence of a user ever accessing such reports.692 Moreover, IV had
not developed any argument that Motorola itself accessed or otherwise
benefited from such reports.
In Shire Development, LLC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,693 the
Federal Circuit reversed an infringement judgment that found no
infringement of a “consisting of” Markush claim where unclaimed
materials were also present.694 Shire’s claim required a hydrophilic
matrix that “consists of compounds selected from the group consisting
of” various materials.695 In the accused composition, the relevant
matrix contained an unrecited material, magnesium stearate.696
Further, the magnesium stearate exhibited lipophilic properties and
“exerted lipophilic influence” in the accused matrix.697 The Federal
Circuit found that the district court erred in holding that the presence
of the magnesium stearate could be discounted for infringement
purposes.698 The Federal Circuit held that Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.
was not applicable.699 Unlike Norian, the magnesium stearate in
Watson’s composition “structurally and functionally relate[d] to the
invention.”700 Specifically, the magnesium stearate’s lipophilic influence
affected the overall hydrophilic character of the matrix—which was a
requirement of the claim.701 Because of this influence, the exception
from Norian, which found infringement of a “consisting of” claim
690. Id. at 1330–31.
691. Id. at 1329.
692. Id. at 1329–30.
693. 848 F.3d 981 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
694. Id. at 982 (holding that the defendants were entitled to noninfringement
because the product did not satisfy the requirements for the claim).
695. Id. at 983.
696. Id. at 984, 986.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 986–87.
699. Id. at 985 (citing Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp, 363 F.3d 1321, 1324–25, 1331–
32 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
700. Id. at 986.
701. Id.
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notwithstanding presence of unenumerated elements because they were
“aspects unrelated to the invention,” did not apply.702 The Federal
Circuit found it irrelevant that Watson was using the magnesium
stearate as a lubricant, and not for its lipophilic properties.703
In Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp.,704 the Supreme Court
reversed the Federal Circuit’s determination that exporting of a single
commodity component of a multi-component invention to one’s own
overseas facilities could support § 271(f)(1) liability.705 U.S. law makes
it illegal to induce infringement outside the United States by exporting
a “substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention,” where “such components” are uncombined when exported
but are later combined to make an infringing product.706 The
Supreme Court held that, because the statute spoke explicitly in terms
of plural “components,” this provision in the statute could only be met
if a defendant exported more than one component.707 Bolstering its
interpretation, the Court noted that the following sub-section, which
addresses contributory infringement instead of inducing
infringement, used “component” in the singular.708 The Court also
noted in its conclusion, curiously, that “substantial portion” in the
statute “has a quantitative, not a qualitative, meaning.”709
The Court’s opinion rested generally on a direct interpretation of
§ 271(f)(1)’s reference to exporting “a substantial portion” of the
components of a multi-component invention.710 In that context,
“substantial” connoted “a quantitative measure.”711 The Court rejected
Promega’s argument that “substantial” should be read in a case-specific
manner, mixing qualitative and quantitative considerations.712 As a
matter of law, a single component can never constitute a “substantial

702. Id. at 981 (quoting Norian Corp., 363 F.3d at 1321, 1331).
703. Id. at 986.
704. 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017).
705. Id. at 737 (finding that the Federal Circuit erred in its assessment of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f)(1) (2012) and that terms within the statute did not cover components of the
invention).
706. See § 271(f)(1).
707. See Life Techs., 137 S. Ct. at 742 (2017) (discussing components that come and
go abroad being outside the scope).
708. Id. at 742.
709. Id. at 743.
710. Id. at 738–39.
711. Id. at 739.
712. Id. at 740 (explaining that the case-specific manner requires the fact finder to
decipher whether components are substantial).
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portion of the components.”713 The Court also declined to reach the
related question of “how close to ‘all’ of the components ‘a substantial
portion’ must be.”714 The Court concluded with a brief discussion of
the history of § 271(f), finding that it supports the present outcome.715
Concurring in part, Justice Alito did not view the history of § 271(f) as
illuminating and noted that the Court’s opinion should not be taken
as holding that “any number greater than one is sufficient.”716
This decision will not likely have a large impact. The vast majority
of patent cases involve either infringing acts inside the United States
or the importing of infringing articles into the United
States. Comparatively few cases center on exporting, perhaps because
the United States is not strong technology exporter.717 Also, the patent
owner can meet the additional requirements of that other sub-section
because the adjacent sub-section of the statute (35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2))
does not have a qualitative requirement—though it is narrower in
other respects—and it may be possible that a patent owner could still
stop an exporter who exports only a single component.718 Obviously,
this decision is significant in the cases where it does apply because it
could eliminate liability for sales outside the United States, although
export cases are not a significant percentage of the overall case load in
U.S. courts.
B. Induced Infringement
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc.,719 the Federal
Circuit found that physicians’ “direction and control” of patients’ selfadministration supported induced infringement, affirming a
judgment of liability for inducing divided infringement as per Akamai
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.720 Eli Lilly’s claims were
method claims, and the limitations in each claim included a step of
“administering” a certain amount of folic acid before administering
pemetrexed (brand name ALIMITA, used in treatment of certain

713. Id. at 743.
714. Id. at 742.
715. Id. at 742–43.
716. Id. at 742 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
717. See id. at 738 (majority opinion) (conveying stricter requirements for United
States born inventions).
718. Id. at 739, 742.
719. 845 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
720. 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 805 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Eli Lilly & Co., 845 F.3d at 1361.
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cancers).721 At issue was who, if anyone, was the “direct infringer” for
the purpose of supporting Eli Lilly’s induced infringement case against
the defendants who were planning to sell generic pemetrexed.722
The Federal Circuit found that the district court correctly
determined that, for purposes of predicate infringement, the
physicians were “directing or controlling” the patients’ selfadministration.723 Both prongs of Akamai’s direction or control test
were satisfied.724 First, the receipt of a benefit (i.e., reducing certain
toxicities associated with pemetrexed) was conditioned on the
patients’ self-administration, and the physicians’ continued
participation in treatment was conditioned on the patients taking folic
acid.725 Second, the physicians established the method and timing of
the patients’ self-administration by telling patients to take folic acid
regularly for a period of time before starting the pemetrexed.726
The Federal Circuit also rejected defendants’ arguments that their
actions did not otherwise amount to inducement, as well as
defendants’ validity attacks.727 These discussions were largely specific
to the record. Notably, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
definiteness holding, and its construction of “vitamin B12,” despite the
redundancy in the claim.728
The ITC may bar importation of components on induced
infringement grounds. In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission,729 the Federal Circuit affirmed the limited exclusion order
against Arista Networks (“Arista”) based on infringement of three
patents and affirmed determination of no infringement as to two other
patents.730 The Federal Circuit discussed only two of these patents:

721. Eli Lilly & Co., 845 F.3d at 1361–62.
722. Id. at 1364.
723. Id. at 1365–67.
724. Id. at 1365, 1367–68. The Akamai direction or control test includes an analysis
of “circumstances in which an actor (1) ‘conditions participation in an activity or receipt
of a benefit’ upon others’ performance of one or more steps of a patented method,
and (2) ‘establishes the manner or timing of that performance.’” Id. at 1365 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022).
725. Id. at 1366.
726. Id. at 1367.
727. Id. at 1369 (noting that the defendants attacked the definiteness of the term
“vitamin B12,” obviousness, and obviousness-type double patenting).
728. Id. at 1369, 1371–72.
729. 873 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
730. Id. at 1357.
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one the ITC held was infringed and one it held not infringed.731
As to the infringed patent, the Federal Circuit found that the ITC
did not err in its claim construction, and the Federal Circuit rejected
Arista’s claim construction argument that the syntax of the claim
required that user-supplied commands be stored in a specific
database.732 The Federal Circuit also rejected Arista’s prosecution
history-based argument on the same claim construction issue.733 The
Federal Circuit also held that the ITC’s order had sufficient support
for its finding that certain “components of Arista’s accused products
induce infringement of the ’537 patent,” and so the ITC did not err in
extending its exclusion order to bar importation of those
components.734 While this meant that components such as processors,
memories, computer processing unit cards, and chassis would be
excluded, the Federal Circuit noted the ITC’s broad discretion in its
remedies.735 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held, “Blocking imports of
articles that induce patent infringement has a reasonable relationship
to stopping unlawful trade acts.”736
As to the noninfringed patent, the record supported the ITC’s
determination that the accused products “infer[red]” information
about a subsystem’s operation, which was different from the claim’s
requirement of “detect[ing]” such operation.737
C. Indirect Infringement
In Lifetime Industries, Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc.,738 the Federal Circuit
clarified the application of Ashcroft v. Iqbal739 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly740 to indirect infringement, reversing the district court’s
dismissal of a patent infringement complaint.741 The Federal Circuit
determined that the district court erred in concluding that Lifetime had
failed to adequately state claims for direct and indirect patent

731. Id.
732. Id. at 1361–62. The reference to storing in a database did not apply to the
commands but to “router configuration data” derived from those commands. Id.
733. Id. at 1362.
734. Id. at 1362–63.
735. Id. at 1363.
736. Id.
737. Id. at 1363–64.
738. 869 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
739. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
740. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
741. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d at 1372.
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infringement.742 Lifetime’s patent related to a two-part seal for mobile
living quarters that extends from the side of an RV.743 The claims
required both the seal and the RV.744 As to direct infringement,
Lifetime’s second amended complaint met pleading standards set forth
in Iqbal and Twombly.745 Although Trim-Lok only manufactures seals and
not RVs, it was plausible that Trim-Lok had installed a seal onto an RV
at some point so as to reach the claimed invention.746 The Federal
Circuit rejected Trim-Lok’s argument that Lifetime’s complaint lacked
sufficient detail in its allegation, noting that the complaint identified
where, when, by whom, and why the infringement occurred.747 As to
indirect infringement, the Iqbal/Twombly standard was also met.748 For
inducement, Lifetime adequately pleaded that Trim-Lok had
knowledge of the patent before directing the installation of the seal in
question on an RV, thus supporting its allegations as to intent.749 For
contributory infringement, Lifetime adequately pleaded knowledge of
both the patent and the infringement, which was all that was
required.750 The Federal Circuit also approved Trim-Lok’s pleading in
the alternative as to whether the employees who installed the seals were
Trim-Lok employees (in which case Trim-Lok would face direct
infringement liability) or non-employees (in which case it would face
indirect infringement liability).751
V.

REMEDIES

A. Damages
The Federal Circuit continued to clarify the mechanics for proving
damages and for requiring a higher showing of willfulness when
awarding enhanced damages. In Prism Technologies LLC v. Sprint
Spectrum L.P.,752 the Federal Circuit affirmed judgment of infringement
and $30 million damages award finding no error in leveraging cost742. Id. at 1373.
743. Id. at 1373–74.
744. Id.
745. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d at 1376 (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 663–64; Twombly,
550 U.S. at 545–46).
746. Id. at 1378–79.
747. Id. at 1379.
748. Id.
749. Id. at 1379–80.
750. Id. at 1380–81.
751. Id. at 1381.
752. 849 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 429 (2017) (mem.).
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avoidance evidence for a reasonable royalty computation.753 The
Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not err in
denying Sprint’s motion for a new trial.754 The Federal Circuit also
held that a new trial was not warranted because Prism’s expert gave
testimony suggesting that certain Sprint networks were an “Internet
Protocol network” (a term whose details Sprint was contesting).755 The
Federal Circuit rejected Sprint’s argument that the district court failed
to resolve a dispute between the parties as to what “Internet Protocol
network” required. In fact, to the contrary, the order denying Sprint’s
motion to exclude the testimony resolved the issue in Prism’s favor.756
The Federal Circuit also rejected Sprint’s additional argument for a
new trial.757 Sprint argued that Prism’s expert referred to a path
“through” the accused network—as opposed to the path “to access” the
network—which is what the claim, as interpreted, required.758
Second, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s discretion in
admitting evidence of Prism’s recent settlement, which was negotiated
just before closing arguments in separate litigation, with AT&T.759 The
Federal Circuit considered the weighing of probativeness versus
prejudice that the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 403 applies, noting
that there is no “per se” rule when it comes to admissibility of such
licenses.760 It further noted that the AT&T settlement included the
patents asserted against Sprint (though the settlement included other
patents), and that Prism had tendered evidence apportioning the
agreement’s value to the asserted patents.761 It also noted that the AT&T
settlement was entered “not just after all discovery was complete, but
after the entire trial was finished, except for closing arguments and jury
deliberations.”762 Sprint also attempted to urge a “categorical legal rule
barring admission of a patentee’s licenses entered into in settlement
of infringement litigation,” but the Federal Circuit concluded that
because Sprint failed to preserve those arguments, they were waived.763
753. Id. at 1363–64.
754. Id.
755. Id. at 1367–68.
756. Id. at 1367.
757. Id. at 1366.
758. Id. at 1367–68 (noting that, in context, it was clear to what the expert was
referring).
759. Id. at 1368.
760. Id. at 1368; see FED. R. EVID. 403.
761. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d at 1370–71.
762. Id. at 1371.
763. Id.
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The Federal Circuit went on to express skepticism about such a rule,
both under applicable Supreme Court precedent and FRE 408.764
Third, contrary to Sprint’s arguments, the Federal Circuit found that
the district court did not fail to consider Sprint’s allegations of legal
error in weighing the motion for a new trial.765
Fourth, there was no error in admitting Prism’s damages evidence,
which focused on the costs that Sprint “avoided” by infringement.766
While Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.767 requires that a damages proof
be tied “to the claimed invention’s footprint in the market place,”768
that requirement “can be met if the patentee adequately shows that the
defendant’s infringement allowed it to avoid taking a different, more
costly course of action.”769 Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.770
was not contrary.771 Riles rejected a patentee’s attempt to use, as part
of his damages base, certain costs that went beyond the patent.772 The
Federal Circuit found that “[h]ere, in contrast, the uncontroverted
evidence showed that Sprint would have chosen to build its own
backhaul network in the absence of a license.”773 The Federal Circuit
affirmed that the district court did not err in permitting Prism to use
Sprint’s costs for leasing backhaul network capacity from third parties
as a starting point for its damages analysis.774
As to Prism’s cross-appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court did not err in denying Prism’s motion for an accounting and post2014 royalties.775 The district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the jury’s award covered “past, present, and ongoing
infringement.”776 WhitServe LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc.777 also supported
the district court’s holding, as the jury’s award was expressly limited to past
infringement, so an accounting for future infringement was necessary.778

764.
765.
766.
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.
777.
778.

Id. at 1372–75.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d at 1376 (citing Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1317).
Id. at 1376.
298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d at 1376 (citing Riles, 298 F.3d at 1312).
Id. (citing Riles, 298 F.3d at 1312).
Id.
Id. at 1376–77.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
694 F.3d 10 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d at 1378–79 (citing WhitServe, 694 F.3d at 35).
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In Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc.,779 the Federal Circuit
determined that applying the Panduit factors is sufficient to satisfy the
apportionment requirement in damages analyses.780 The Federal
Circuit partially affirmed, partially reversed, and partially vacated
various judgments in a case involving four Mentor patents and two
Synopsys (parent of EVE) patents.781
The patents related to
simulation/emulation technology for computer software.782
In the principal appeal relating to Mentor’s ’376 patent,783 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgement of infringement and the
$36 million lost profits award,784 finding that the district court did not
err in denying JMOL because substantial evidence supported the
infringement judgment.785 The district court did not err in holding
that Synopsys was estopped from contesting validity under assignor
estoppel; under Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc.,786 that doctrine
has “continued vitality” even post-Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.787 Likewise, the
district court did not err in its awarding lost profits.788 The Federal
Circuit rejected Synopsys’s argument that the district court erred when
it failed to apportion lost profits to the “inventive contribution” of
Mentor’s patent.789 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the Panduit

779. 851 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-804 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2017).
780. Id. at 1290.
781. Id. at 1275.
782. Id. at 1280.
783. The other issues on appeal related to two Synopsys patents. Regarding
Synopsys’s ’109 patent, the Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment of
indefiniteness. Id. The district court erred in holding that the claims’ reference to
displaying information “visually near” certain other information was indefinite. Id.
The patent gives sufficient examples to make a person of skill reasonably certain about
what “near” meant. Id. at 1291. Regarding Synopsys’s ’526 patent, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment of § 101 patent ineligibility. Id. at 1280. The Federal
Circuit determined that the patent’s definition of “machine readable medium,” a term
present in all claims, included “carrier waves,” which rendered the claims patent
ineligible. Id. at 1294–95. Per In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007), claims
covering signals themselves are not patent eligible. Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1294–
95. The Federal Circuit concluded that although the claims also covered some patent
eligible embodiments, this did not save them. Id.
784. Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1280.
785. Id. at 1282.
786. 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
787. 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1283 (citing Diamond Sci. Co.,
848 F.2d at 1222–26).
788. Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1290.
789. Id. at 1287–88.
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analysis incorporated sufficient apportionment,790 holding that
“Panduit’s requirement that patentees prove demand for the product
as a whole and the absence of noninfringing alternatives ties lost profit
damages to specific claim limitations and ensures that damages are
commensurate with the value of the patented features.”791 The Federal
Circuit noted that Synopsys did not appeal the jury’s relevant Panduit
fact findings.792 The Federal Circuit also rejected the contention from
Synopsys and amici that, where complex multi-function devices are at
issue, there is a risk of “serial infringement claims” unless further
apportionment is made.793 The Federal Circuit concluded that
“[u]nder Panduit, . . . there can only be one recovery of lost profits for
any particular sale.”794
On the cross-appeal issues,795 the Federal Circuit vacated the motion in
limine precluding Mentor from presenting willfulness evidence.796 The
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in barring Mentor’s
willfulness evidence.797 The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district
court’s reasoning that Mentor’s willfulness claim was based only on post-

790. Id. at 1288.
791. Id.
792. Id. at 1288–89.
793. Id. at 1289.
794. Id.
795. The other issues on cross-appeal related to two Mentor patents. Regarding
Mentor’s ’882 patent, the Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment of no
written description. Id. at 1296. The Federal Circuit rejected Synopsys’s argument
that the specification required a specific relationship between two clocks in the
claimed invention, with one running faster than the other. Id. The originally-filed
claim 1 expressly required that the clocks be “independent” and undermined
Synopsys’s contention that the specification was limited in the manner proposed. Id.
at 1297. Regarding Mentor’s ’531 and ’176 patents, the Federal Circuit also reversed
summary judgment of issue preclusion against Mentor. Id. at 1301. Mentor and EVE
had litigated these patents in 2006, ultimately reaching a settlement and bestowing a
license to EVE. Id. at 1295. Synopsys’s acquisition of EVE in mid-2012 terminated the
license. Id. at 1281. The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in finding
Mentor precluded from pursuing infringement counterclaims in the present case. Id.
at 1295. Mentor’s counterclaims were specifically directed to acts occurring after the
EVE acquisition, and so they could not have been previously litigated. Id. The Federal
Circuit reviewed prior authority on the issue and concluded that Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v.
Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and Brain Life LLC v. Elekta Inc.,
746 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2014), were on point and guided its decision. Mentor Graphics,
851 F.3d at 1298.
796. Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1295.
797. Id.
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suit conduct.798 The claim recited some conduct occurring after Synopsys
filed declaratory judgment claims against Mentor but before Mentor’s
counterclaim for infringement, and therefore the conduct constituted
“pre-suit acts.”799 Moreover, the district court was also wrong in finding
that Mentor’s failure to seek a preliminary injunction meant it could not
pursue willfulness.800 There is no “rigid rule” on that issue, per Aqua Shield
v. Inter Pool Cover Team801 and Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc.802
Following the initial appeal EVE-USA petitioned for a rehearing en
banc. In Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc.,803 the en banc court
declined to revisit the question of the need for apportionment in
Panduit-based damages cases, denying EVE-USA’s petition for rehearing
en banc.804 Concurring in the denial, Judge Stoll endorsed the Federal
Circuit’s determination that when the Panduit factors are applied in a
lost profits analysis, there is no further apportionment requirement.805
Also concurring in the denial, Judge Moore noted that EVE asked the
court to revisit assignor estoppel doctrine, but she found this case an
insufficient vehicle to do so as the parties did not substantially brief the
issue. The facts were not well oriented to consider whether the privity
doctrine had expanded too broadly.806 In dissent, Judge Dyk
determined that Supreme Court precedent required apportionment
in all cases, including lost profits cases applying Panduit, as the first and
second Panduit factors were insufficient to actually provide the
necessary apportionment.807
In Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP v. Samsung Electronics Co.,808 the
Federal Circuit determined that a remand was necessary to determine
whether, for damages purposes, disclaimer of a claim can cure a failure
to mark, while affirming infringement judgment and claim
construction.809 The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not
err in construing Rembrandt’s claims as broad enough to cover
798. Id.
799. Id.
800. Id. at 1295–96.
801. 774 F.3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
802. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Mentor Graphics Corp., 851 F.3d at 1296 (citing Halo Elec.
Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934; Aqua Shield, 774 F.3d at 773).
803. 870 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (per curiam).
804. Id. at 1298.
805. Id. at 1299–300.
806. Id. at 1304.
807. Id. at 1300–04 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
808. 853 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
809. Id. at 1374.
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multiple “types” of modulation methods.810 Its interpretation was
based on the applicant’s post-allowance insertion of language into the
claim stating that the interpretation “clarified” to establish that it
would cover multiple methods.811 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held
that despite the statement including an “i.e.” clause, the applicant’s
claim construction was not rendered indefinite.812 The Federal Circuit
also rejected Samsung’s argument that the district court’s
interpretation created a conflict with a dependent claim.813
Further, the Federal Circuit also concluded that the district court
did not err in rejecting Samsung’s obviousness attack.814 The Federal
Circuit held that the “different types” limitation was a question of fact,
and, therefore, the jury could freely weigh the expert testimonial
evidence on this issue, as well as to the issue of the sufficiency of
Samsung’s proof regarding the prior art combination.815 Though
Rembrandt had argued that one of Samsung’s references taught away
from combination with the other reference, it was not necessary to
weigh whether there was substantial evidence to support a teaching
away determination.816 The Federal Circuit concluded that “[w]hether
a reference teaches away is doctrinally distinct from whether there is
no motivation to combine prior art references.”817
As to damages, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court
did not err in denying Samsung’s motion to exclude testimony from
Rembrandt’s damages expert on methodological grounds in his
assessment of the incremental value associated with the patented
technology.818 The Federal Circuit rejected Samsung’s arguments that
the time periods analyzed by the expert were improperly chosen, that
the expert erred in attributing the entirety of an observed price
differential to the patented technology, and that the expert should not
have relied on a settlement agreement that was redacted in various

810. Id. at 1376.
811. Id.
812. Id. at 1376–77 (interpreting the “i.e.” clause as “two types of modulation
methods, i.e., different families of modulation techniques, such as [frequency-shift
keying and quadrature amplitude modification]”).
813. Id. at 1377.
814. Id. at 1377, 1380.
815. Id. at 1378–79. There was a question of fact as to whether one of Samsung’s
references disclosed a key limitation, which was left for the jury to decide.
816. Id. at 1379.
817. Id.
818. Id. at 1380.
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ways.819 As such, the court held that substantial evidence supported
the jury’s award of damages on “all of Samsung’s infringing sales,”
subject to the marking and notice issue discussed below.820
The district court erred, however, in denying Samsung’s motion to
limit damages based on Rembrandt’s failure to mark products covered
by one of its claims—a claim that Rembrandt subsequently disclaimed.821
The Federal Circuit considered how § 287 exists to “protect[] the
public’s ability to exploit an unmarked product’s features without
liability for damages until a patentee provides either constructive
notice through marking or actual notice.”822 The Federal Circuit held
that Rembrandt cannot perform an “end-run” around the marking
statute via disclaimer,823 stating that “disclaimer cannot serve to
retroactively dissolve the § 287(a) marking requirement for a patentee
to collect pre-notice damages.”824 However, Rembrandt’s argument
that the marking statute should attach on a claim-by-claim, not patentby-patent, basis was novel, not waived, and not developed by the district
court. The Federal Circuit “remand[ed] to the district court to address
in the first instance whether the patent marking statute should attach
on a patent-by-patent or claim-by-claim basis.”825
In NOVA Chemicals Corp. (Canada) v. Dow Chemical Co.,826 the Federal
Circuit held that mere filing of an action to set aside judgment cannot
lead to an award of enhanced damages, but a lack of substantive
support for such a complaint can, affirming the finding of
exceptionality under § 285.827 NOVA Chemicals Corp. (NOVA) had
been found liable for infringement in 2010, but in 2013, while
supplemental damages proceedings were still ongoing, it filed a
complaint for equitable relief from liability based on allegations that
Dow had committed fraud with respect to true ownership of the
asserted patents.828 The district court had dismissed NOVA’s equity
action as lacking plausibility.829

819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.

Id. at 1380–81.
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1384–85.
856 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 485 (2017) (mem.).
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1015–16.
Id. at 1016.
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To the extent the district court’s exceptionality finding was based on
the mere fact that NOVA filed a complaint for equitable relief from
liability for its infringement, which was subsequently found
implausible, the district court erred.830 The Federal Circuit reasoned
that “[a] party whose only option for relief from a prior judgment is to
file a separate action in equity should not be disincentivized from
doing so if that party has a plausible basis for relief.”831 However, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in basing its exceptionality
finding on the substantive strength of NOVA’s equity arguments.832
The district court was also correct to base its § 285 decision on a
comparison of this patent case to the totality of other patent cases.833
It rejected NOVA’s argument that the baseline for comparison should
have been other actions to set aside a prior judgment.834 NOVA’s
argument lacked legal authority, and the Federal Circuit declined to
hold that the comparison to other cases should be so limited.835
Finding that a plaintiff’s failure to reassess case viability post-Alice
supports a fee award, in Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond,
Inc.,836 the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees to Bed,
Bath & Beyond (BBB).837 The district court did not abuse its discretion
in finding the case exceptional under § 285, particularly in view of
Alice.838 The Federal Circuit analyzed Inventor Holdings’s (IH) claims,
which related to techniques for purchasing goods at a local point-ofsale system from a remote seller, and determined that they fail both
steps of the Alice test for patent eligibility.839 At step one, the Federal
Circuit reasoned, “The idea that a customer may pay for items ordered
from a remote seller at a third-party’s local establishment is the type of
fundamental business practice that, when implemented using generic
computer technology, is not patentable under Alice.”840 At step two, the
Federal Circuit found that only conventional components are disclosed
to implement this idea.841 The Federal Circuit also rejected IH’s
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.

Id.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id. at 1018–19.
876 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1373–74.
Id. at 1377–78.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id.

2018]

2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1219

argument that, because the district court had rejected other defendants’
§ 101 challenges pre-Alice, it was reasonable for IH to believe its claims
patent-eligible.842 First, the district court never endorsed the eligibility
of IH’s claims or gave reasons for its denial of other defendants’
motions.843 Second, “Alice was a significant change in the law as applied
to the facts of this particular case.”844 Post-Alice, IH had an obligation
“to reassess its case in view of new controlling law.”845 The district court
also did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellate attorneys’ fees,
per Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.846
In Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc.,847 the Federal
Circuit determined that the district court neither abused its discretion
in rejecting BRP’s Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.848 challenge
to royalty rate testimony from Arctic Cat nor erred in denying JMOL on
the same issue.849 The record was sufficient to establish that a laterdeveloped system from BRP could be used as a value benchmark for the
infringing system.850 The district court also did not abuse discretion in
granting Arctic Cat an ongoing royalty. Though BRP argued that the
ordered rate “impermissibly covers [BRP’s] profits, [the Federal
Circuit] has affirmed rates at or near the infringer’s alleged profit
margin.”851 The district court also did not err in denying JMOL on
willfulness because the record included sufficient evidence on the
issue. The district court’s jury instruction that willfulness could be
proved by evidence that BRP “actually knew or should have known” of
the risk of infringement was consistent with Halo Electronics Inc. v. Pulse
Electronics, Inc. and WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.852

842. Id. at 1378–79.
843. Id. at 1379.
844. Id.
845. Id.
846. 745 F.3d 513 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Inventor Holdings, 876 F.3d at 1380 (citing
Therasense, 745 F.3d at 517) (noting that § 285 does not prevent trial courts from
awarding attorneys’ fees for an entire case and appeals).
847. 876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
848. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
849. Arctic Cat Inc., 876 F.3d at 1369–70.
850. Id. at 1369.
851. Id. at 1370.
852. 837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018); Arctic Cat
Inc., 876 F.3d at 1371.
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B. Attorneys’ Fees
In Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,853 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the exceptionality finding and award of attorneys’ fees,
concluding that arguments that the positions taken were “objectively
reasonable” insufficient.854 As required by Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon
Health & Fitness, Inc.,855 the district court properly examined the
totality of the circumstances and determined that the case stood out
from others.856 The case’s core dispute was whether a previous Bayer
license (executed under UK law) gave Dow’s partner rights to exploit
certain patents commercially.857 The district court found Bayer’s
interpretation of the license as conveying only non-commercial rights
unpersuasive and found its pre-suit investigation lacking.858 In
particular, it cited the surrounding conduct and circumstances for the
license’s negotiation and recited a variety of Bayer’s statements and
conduct that the district court viewed as unacceptable.859 The Federal
Circuit rejected Bayer’s argument that the case could not be
exceptional because Bayer’s contract interpretation was objectively
reasonable.860 Octane Fitness rejected such rigidity, and the district
court’s analysis properly reviewed the totality of the case.861 The
Federal Circuit held that, even though Bayer presented expert
testimony from a “former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom,” this testimony did not undermine the district court’s
analysis because the expert had only considered the license’s text, not
surrounding conduct.862 The Federal Circuit also declined Bayer’s
argument for re-weighing evidence on appeal.863 Per Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.,864 such was reserved to the
district court’s discretion.865
853. 851 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
854. Id. at 1303.
855. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
856. Bayer, 851 F.3d at 1303 (citing Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1752 (holding that
an “exceptional case” is one that stands out from others on the basis of the strength of
a party’s litigating position or the way in which the case was litigated)).
857. Id.
858. Id. at 1304–05.
859. Id.
860. Id. at 1305.
861. Id. at 1306.
862. Id. at 1307.
863. Id.
864. 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
865. Bayer, 851 F.3d at 1307–08.
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In University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der
Wissenschaften E.V.,866 the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion
in declining to find a case exception even considering the weaknesses
of the case, affirming non-exceptionality finding and denial of § 285
attorneys’ fees motion.867 The case involved University of Utah’s
(“UUtah”) claim that Dr. Brenda Bass was the sole inventor, or joint
inventor, of patents assigned to Max Planck that listed Dr. Thomas
Tuschl as first-named inventor.868 It was undisputed that after Dr.
Tuschl published some preliminary results concerning RNA
interference, Dr. Bass published a mini-review hypothesizing that
certain activity observed by Dr. Tuschl involved molecules having a
feature called “3′ overhangs.”869 Dr. Tuschl went on to explore 3′
overhangs, which ultimately led to the patents in question.870 Dr. Bass
testified that she had not done any experiments to study the effect of
3′ overhangs or to otherwise develop the inventions Dr. Tuschl
patented.871 Notwithstanding these facts, UUtah pursued a high
damages request.872 Just before summary judgment, UUtah withdrew
its claim for sole inventorship.873 The district court granted summary
judgment for Max Planck on the joint inventorship claim but rejected
Max Planck’s claim for attorneys’ fees and exceptional case status.874
The Federal Circuit determined this was not an abuse of discretion
because Octane Fitness does not require any particular methodology for
exceptionality, and the district court’s opinion set forth why the case
did not “stand[] out from [other patent cases]” to be considered
exceptional.875 The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that UUtah’s conduct,
notwithstanding Dr. Bass’s testimony, did not warrant an
exceptionality finding.876
In Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. All-Tag Security S.A.,877 the Federal Circuit
866. 851 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
867. Id. at 1319.
868. Id. at 1320.
869. Id.
870. Id.
871. Id.
872. Id. at 1322.
873. Id. at 1321.
874. Id. at 1321–22.
875. Id. at 1323 (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014)).
876. Id.
877. 858 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 650 (2018).
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determined that a finding of exceptionality absent evidence of bad faith
was an abuse of discretion, reversing exceptional case determination
and award of attorneys’ fees under § 285.878 The Federal Circuit found
that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
Checkpoint’s conduct warranted an exceptionality finding.879 Though
a party’s “motivation” in bringing a suit is relevant to exceptionality per
Octane Fitness, in this case, the record indicated that Checkpoint’s
belief in All-Tag’s infringement was reasonable, and there was no
evidence of harassment or abuse, or other indicators of bad faith.880
Though the district court concluded that Checkpoint’s goal by the
litigation was “to protect its own competitive advantage,” a patent right
permits such protection.881 The Federal Circuit also considered how
Checkpoint’s claims survived summary judgment motions.882 And
although the products tested by Checkpoint’s expert were, apparently,
not the specifically accused products, “[t]here was no representation
by All-Tag that the accused products were different from the tested
products, and the district court did not so find.”883
In Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, LLC v. Guardian Protection
Services, Inc.,884 the Federal Circuit reversed a denial of motion to
declare case exceptional under § 285, finding that a failure to declare
exceptionality was an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s attempt to withdraw the complaint.885 The Federal Circuit
considered how Rothschild had maintained “willful ignorance” of
prior art cited by appellant ADS Security (ADS) in a post-complaint
email, even after ADS filed for attorneys’ fees.886 The Federal Circuit
held that, despite Rothchild voluntarily moving to dismiss its own
action prior to the fees motion, the case could still be considered
exceptional because Rothchild submitted affidavits opposing fees to
the district court stating that it continued to believe its claims were
valid and had still not considered ADS’s tendered claims.887 The
Federal Circuit reasoned, “It is unclear how Rothschild’s counsel and

878.
879.
880.
881.
882.
883.
884.
885.
886.
887.

Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1376–77.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id. at 1375–76.
Id. at 1376.
858 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1385.
Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1388.
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founder could reasonably believe that claim 1 is valid if neither analyzed
the purportedly invalidating prior art provided by ADS.”888 The district
court’s failure to address these “incongruent statements” was abuse of
discretion per Atlantic Research Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Troy.889 The
Federal Circuit also identified other problems in the district court’s review
of the record. The district court failed to properly consider
Rothschild’s conduct in other litigation, where it had settled the vast
majority of its fifty-eight filed cases for nuisance value.890 The district
court also erred in reasoning that an exceptionality finding would
interfere with the operation of Rule 11, which the district court
reasoned had encouraged Rothschild to voluntarily withdraw its
complaint.891 Per Octane Fitness, litigation conduct may support
exceptionality even if it is not on its own sanctionable under Rule 11.892
Concurring, Judge Mayer wrote separately to note that Rothschild’s
infringement complaint was “frivolous on its face” due to obvious § 101
problems, and thus supported exceptionality under Octane Fitness even
absent Rothschild’s problematic affidavits and willful ignorance.893
In AdjustaCam, LLC v. Newegg, Inc.,894 the Federal Circuit reversed
the denial of a motion for § 285 attorneys’ fees because of the court’s
failure to recognize the impact of the Markman order rendering the
case baseless.895 The Federal Circuit determined that the district court
abused its discretion in two respects. First, it failed to follow the
instructions of a previous remand, which had come following Octane
Fitness, that had instructed the district court to evaluate the full merits
of Newegg’s motion.896 The district court’s re-adoption of its previous
findings was inconsistent with the remand order.897 Although the
matter had been assigned to a new judge following the original district
judge’s retirement, the Federal Circuit held that it could not excuse
the district court’s failure to reevaluate the record.898 University of Utah
888. Id.
889. 659 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, 858 F.3d
at 1388. This abuse of discretion occurs when the court “fail[s] to conduct an adequate
inquiry.” Atl. Research Mktg. Sys., 659 F.3d at 1360.
890. Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, 858 F.3d at 1389.
891. Id. at 1390.
892. Id.
893. Id. at 1390–91 (Mayer, J., concurring).
894. 861 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
895. Id. at 1354–55.
896. Id. at 1357, 1359.
897. Id. at 1359.
898. Id. at 1357, 1359–60.
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v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften e.V. did not
bar the Federal Circuit from reversing because, in this case, there was
“no evidence that the district court properly weighed the issues.”899
Second, the district court clearly erred in its assessment of the
substantive strength of AdjustaCam’s case.900 The Federal Circuit
considered how the court’s Markman order rendered AdjustaCam’s
case baseless and criticizes the district court for relying, in its nonexceptionality determination, on an argument AdjustaCam had not
actually made.901 Further, the Federal Circuit considered how
AdjustaCam’s use of “after-the-fact declarations” to excuse its behavior
was unreasonable per Octane Fitness.902 Because of both of the district
court’s errors, the Federal Circuit reversed.
In AIA America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals,903 the Federal
Circuit held that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury for
fact finding in fee awards, affirming the § 285 attorneys’ fee award to
Avid.904 The Federal Circuit rejected the Alzheimer Institute of
America’s (“Institute”) argument that the Seventh Amendment
required a jury trial to determine the facts underlying the award.905
The Federal Circuit applied the test of Tull v. United States906 to
conclude that an award of fees is properly characterized as an equitable
remedy, not a legal one, so the Seventh Amendment requires no jury
trial.907 It rejected the Institute’s argument that, because the fee award
involved a measure of fact finding as to state of mind and intent, a jury
trial was required; such an argument lacked case law support.908 The
Federal Circuit also found that the district court also did not err in
making fact findings that went beyond what the jury had addressed.909

899. Id. at 1360.
900. Id. at 1359.
901. Id. at 1360.
902. Id. at 1361.
903. 866 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
904. Id. at 1371.
905. Id. at 1372, 1374.
906. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
907. Avid, 866 F.3d at 1373 (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 418 (finding that, in
determining whether a statutory cause of action involves only legal rights, the court
compares the action to those brought in eighteenth-century English courts and then
determines whether the action is legal or equitable in nature)).
908. Id. at 1373–74.
909. See id. at 1372, 1374 (noting the jury’s conclusion that Institute lacked standing
to press a patent suit against Avid and had engaged in bad conduct in obtaining the
patent in question).
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Cases like Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc.910 and Jurgens v. CBK,
Ltd.911 bar a court from making fact finding inconsistent with the jury’s
verdict, but they do not bar additional fact finding that is not
inconsistent with the verdict.912 The district court also did not violate
the Institute’s due process rights because it provided both parties an
opportunity for briefing, submission of evidence, and an in-court
hearing on the fee issue.913
In Nantkwest, Inc. v. Matal,914 the Federal Circuit reversed a denial of
attorneys’ fees motion finding that the PTO may recover attorneys’ fee
following a successful defense in a § 145 appeal.915 The case was a § 145
appeal to the Eastern District of Virginia from the PTO’s rejection of
a patent application assigned to Nantkwest.916 The Federal Circuit
found that the district court erred in reasoning that the “all expenses”
provision of § 145 did not authorize payment of attorneys’ fees,
particularly against the backdrop of the American Rule.917 The court
expressed “substantial doubts” that the American Rule applies to § 145
proceedings.918 Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC.919 does not mean that
the American Rule’s specific requirements must apply to all fee statutes
irrespective of a prevailing party.920 But even if the American Rule were
to apply, § 145’s reference to awarding “expenses” includes attorneys’
fees.921 The Federal Circuit relied on various dictionaries, as well as
historical versions of the Patent Act and Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan,
Ltd.,922 as demonstrating that “expenses” is a broader term than “costs”

910. 256 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
911. 80 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
912. Avid, 866 F.3d at 1374.
913. Id.
914. 860 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated, 869 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en
banc).
915. Id. at 1353; see 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012) (allowing a patent applicant to appeal to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia if that person is dissatisfied
with a decision of the PTAB under 34 U.S.C. § 134(a)).
916. Nantkwest, 860 F.3d at 1353–54.
917. See id. at 1354–56, 1359 (noting that according to the American Rule, litigants
generally pay their own attorneys’ fees, win or lose).
918. Id. at 1355.
919. 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit
bankruptcy courts to award attorneys’ fees to counsel or other professionals employed
by the bankruptcy estate for work performed in defending a fee application in court).
920. Nantkwest, 860 F.3d at 1355.
921. Id. at 1359.
922. 566 U.S. 560 (2012).

1226

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1141

and includes attorneys’ fees.923 The Federal Circuit also rejected
Nantkwest’s argument that the PTO’s attorneys’ fees were not “expenses
of the proceedings” because the PTO was represented by its own fulltime employees, whose salaries it was obligated to pay regardless of the
suit.924 Citing regional circuit authority and Raney v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons,925 the Federal Circuit reasoned that the PTO can recover an
apportionment of its lawyers’ salaries “because the litigation required
the lawyers to divert their time away from other pending matters.”926 In
dissent, Judge Stoll would have concluded that § 145 lacked the
specificity necessary to overcome the American Rule’s general bar
against shifting attorneys’ fees.927
Acting sua sponte, the Federal Circuit vacated the NantKwest Federal
Circuit opinion and ordered a rehearing en banc.928 The Federal
Circuit has requested new briefing to address whether the Federal
Circuit properly determined that § 145 authorizes a district court to
award attorneys’ fees to the PTO.929
The Octane Fitness standard for awarding attorneys’ fees applies to
cases under the Lanham Act. In Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.,930
the Federal Circuit vacated a determination of attorneys’ fees.931 The
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in not applying the
same standard for attorneys’ fee recovery under the Lanham Act as
under the Patent Act.932 The Federal Circuit reasoned that, applying
Second Circuit law, Lanham Act fee recovery would apply the standard
of Octane Fitness.933
Further, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court also
erred in its award of fees under § 285 and Octane Fitness.934 The district
court clearly erred in finding that Fossil had declined to abandon
various invalidity defenses until after trial. The record indicated that
Fossil had not pursued such defenses at trial.935 Despite the record
923.
924.
925.
926.
927.
928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.
934.
935.

Nantkwest, 860 F.3d at 1356–57.
Id. at 1359.
222 F.3d 927 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Nantkwest, 860 F.3d at 1359.
Id. at 1360.
NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal, 869 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Id.
866 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id.
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indicating otherwise, the district court erroneously determined that
another of Fossil’s invalidity defenses “bordered on frivolous.”936 The
district court also erred in failing to take into account that Romag had
previously been sanctioned for its own litigation conduct.937 The
Federal Circuit rejected Romag’s argument that the district court
denied attorneys’ fees connected to one of Fossil’s noninfringement
defenses based solely on the district court’s previous refusal to grant a
Rule 50(a) motion on the subject.938 The district court’s reasoning was
not based solely on the Rule 50(a) denial.939
Dissenting in part, Judge Newman agreed that the issue of fees
under the Lanham Act should be remanded for treatment under
Octane Fitness.940 However, she would have affirmed the district court’s
§ 285 award as within the district court’s discretion.941
C. Sanctions and Inequitable Conduct
In Walker v. Health International Corp.,942 the Federal Circuit concluded
that the presentation of meritless arguments, even post-settlement,
warranted both trial and appellate sanctions, affirming the lower court’s
judgment award, and granted defendants’ motion for appellate
sanctions.943 Under Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Mr. Walker’s conduct sufficiently
vexatious to support an award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction.944 The
Federal Circuit rejected each of Mr. Walker’s arguments, holding that
the district court created an “ample” record of Mr. Walker’s bad
conduct, finding no error in the district court’s refusal to re-hear
arguments already deemed meritless and that the district court had
jurisdiction notwithstanding the settlement.945 Additionally, the Federal
Circuit determined that Mr. Walker’s appeal was frivolous because it
presented meritless arguments and baseless accusations against the
opposing counsel, even after these errors were pointed out to Mr.

936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.

Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id. at 1342 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1342–43.
845 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1154–55.
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Walker.946 The Federal Circuit held Mr. Walker and his counsel jointly
and severally liable, awarding Rule 38 sanctions amounting to
$51,801.88 in double costs and attorneys’ fees.947
In Organik Kimya San. Ve Tic., A.Ş. v. International Trade Commission,948
the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s award of default judgment and
a limited exclusion order barring Organik Kimya from importing
certain polymers for twenty-five years unless and until Organik Kimya
could show that it was no longer seeking to import polymers developed
using trade secrets of the Complainant Dow Chemical.949 The Federal
Circuit held that the ITC did not abuse its discretion in entering
default judgment after finding that Organik Kimya had engaged in
severe discovery misconduct, including “spoliation of evidence on a
staggering scale.”950 The Federal Circuit rejected Organik Kimya’s
argument that the ITC should have applied the framework of Micron
Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc.951 when contemplating entry of default
judgment.952 Micron addressed a district court’s power to enter default
judgment as part of its “inherent authority to control the judicial
process and litigation.”953 This holding was inapplicable because
neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the ITC was relying on
inherent authority to enter default judgment, but on express
regulatory authority established in 19 C.F.R. § 210.33(b).954 Thus,
simple abuse of discretion analysis applied and led to affirmance.
The ITC also did not abuse its discretion in the limited exclusion
order, including its term.955 The evidence supported the ITC’s
conclusion that it would have taken Organik Kimya twenty-five years to
develop the polymers in question independent from Dow’s trade
secrets.956 The Federal Circuit concluded, “Given this basis for the
[ITC’s] decision, and that Organik Kimya can end the exclusion order
946. Id. at 1156.
947. Id. at 1157.
948. 848 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
949. Id. at 995.
950. Id. at 997.
951. 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
952. Organik, 848 F.3d at 1003. Additionally, in a footnote, the opinion notes that
the same outcome would have applied even had Micron’s analysis applied. Id. at 1003.
953. Id. at 1326.
954. 19 C.F.R. § 210.33(b) (2017).
955. Organik, 848 F.3d at 1005.
956. Id. (finding Dow’s expert credible “when he opined that it would take Organik
Kimya fifteen to twenty-five years to develop opaque polymers” independent of Dow’s
trade secrets).
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period at any time by seeking an advisory opinion or initiating a
modification proceeding before the [ITC],” there was neither legal
error or abuse of discretion in the ITC’s choice of remedy.957
In Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Merus N.V.,958 the Federal Circuit
found litigation tactics disguising prosecution misconduct warranted
an adverse inference of specific intent, affirming a judgment of patent
unenforceability for inequitable conduct.959 The district court
correctly established the broadest reasonable interpretation of
Regeneron’s claims.960 Applying that interpretation, the district court
correctly determined that certain references withheld during
prosecution were non-cumulative and but-for material.961 The Federal
Circuit rejected each of Regeneron’s arguments for non-materiality
and cumulativeness.962
The Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion in entering an
adverse inference of specific intent to deceive based on Regeneron’s
litigation misconduct.963 The Federal Circuit considered a variety of
acts by Regeneron that the district court found sanctionable, including
Regeneron’s refusal to provide element-by-element infringement
contentions, and its refusal to engage with the district court’s claim
construction procedural rules, specifically, its refusal to propose
constructions beyond “plain meaning.”964 Also, the Federal Circuit
considered a record of bad conduct by Regeneron in connection with
the district court’s inquiry into the scope of waiver of privilege in
connection with certain key documents bearing on Regeneron’s
conduct during prosecution.965 Applying Second Circuit law, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court was entitled to draw
an adverse inference generally and not with respect to a single piece
of problematic evidence.966 It rejected Regeneron’s argument that the
adverse inference was actually a dismissal, which would have required
a showing of bad faith.967 Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.,968
957.
958.
959.
960.
961.
962.
963.
964.
965.
966.
967.
968.

Id. at 1005.
864 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, 878 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1352–53.
Id. at 1352–56.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1361–62.
Id. at 1351, 1363.
Id. at 1363–64.
269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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relied on heavily by the dissent, was not contrary because the adverse
inference was not a sanction only against litigation misconduct, but
against litigation misconduct that “obfuscated [Regeneron’s]
prosecution misconduct.”969
Unlike Aptix, the unenforceability
determination was not a sanction in its own right, but only the proper
result once the adverse inference was combined with the materiality
determinations discussed above.970 Dissenting, Judge Newman would
have reversed, reasoning that an unenforceability declaration is not an
available remedy for litigation misconduct.971
VI.

EQUITABLE DEFENSES
A. Laches

In SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC,972
the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion,
holding that laches remains a defense to patent infringement.973 The
Supreme Court reasoned that, similar to Petrella, application of laches
in patent infringement cases would undermine Congress’s guidance as
to the term for recovering damages in patent cases, i.e., § 286’s six-year
damages limitation.974 The Supreme Court reasoned that § 286
“represents a judgment by Congress that a patentee may recover damages
for any infringement committed within six years of the filing of the
claim.”975 The Court rejected First Quality’s argument that Petrella should
not apply because § 286 “runs backward from the time of suit,” not
forward from the accrual of the cause of action.976 The Court further
rejected the notion that there was a meaningful difference between
§ 286 and the statute of limitations in Petrella, noting that Petrella
described the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations as running
backward from the complaint.977 The Court also rejected the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning that § 286’s reference to “except as otherwise
provided by law” permitted continued application of laches.978 The

969.
970.
971.
972.
973.
974.
975.
976.
977.
978.

Regeneron Pharm., 864 F.3d at 1364.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1365–66.
137 S. Ct. 954 (2017), vacating in part, 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 959–60.
Id. at 960–61.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 961–62.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 961.
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Federal Circuit reasoned that § 282 codified laches as a defense,
apparently relying on that section’s reference to “unenforceability.”979
But even if that section somehow incorporated laches, the court held
that nothing in § 282 suggests that laches could be invoked to bar a
damages claim that was otherwise within § 286’s damages period.980
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito discussed, in some detail, a
variety of pre-1952 Patent Act cases that the Federal Circuit cited and
concluded that these cases do not support First Quality’s arguments.981
He separately addressed claims at law, claims in equity, and postmerger cases982 and concluded that while there was some precedent
for applying laches to defeat damages claims pre-1952, it was not
sufficiently uniform to overcome Petrella’s reasoning.983
Dissenting, Justice Breyer found laches to be an available defense,
largely relying on pre-Patent Act practice that, in his view, applied
laches in patent damages cases “with virtual unanimity.”984
B. Patent Exhaustion
Foreign sales and use-restricted sales may exhaust U.S. patent rights.
In Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,985 the Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s determinations concerning patent
exhaustion.986 First, the Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit
erred in determining that there was no exhaustion from Lexmark’s
sale in the United States of printer cartridges subject to “single-use/no
resale” restrictions.987 While such restrictions “may have been clear
and enforceable under contract law, . . . they do not entitle Lexmark
to retain patent rights in an item it has elected to sell.”988 The Supreme
Court discussed how exhaustion doctrine imposes positive limits on
the scope of a patentee’s rights such that, after a sale, “there is no
exclusionary right left to enforce.”989 The Supreme Court also drew a
distinction between a patentee’s ability to restrict the acts of its

979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.
985.
986.
987.
988.
989.

Id. at 962–63.
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id. at 964–66.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 967 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017), rev’g in part, 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1531, 1535, 1538.
Id. at 1531.
Id. at 1532.
Id.
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licensees, as in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,990
which can preserve the right to sue for infringement, and the ability to
restrict the post-sale activities of purchasers.991
Further, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit also erred
in determining that there was no exhaustion from Lexmark’s sale of
products overseas.992 “An authorized sale outside the United States,
just as one within the United States, exhausts all rights under the
Patent Act.”993 The Supreme Court rejected Lexmark’s argument that
the territorial nature of patent law should lead to a different result.994
Because exhaustion is a “separate limit on the patent grant,” it may be
triggered whenever—and wherever—the patentee makes a decision to
sell an item embodying the patent rights.995 Boesch v. Graff996 was not
contrary because it involved an overseas sale in which “the patentee
had nothing to do with the transaction.”997 The Supreme Court also
considered and rejected the rule proposed by the government that
foreign sales exhaust patent rights absent specific reservation of such
rights,998 commenting that “[the government’s] position is largely
based on policy rather than principle.”999
VII.

PATENT OFFICE APPEALS
A. Inter Partes Reviews

1. IPR procedure and practice
In Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc.,1000 the Federal Circuit
denied Cascades’s petition for en banc hearing of its appeal; instead,
the patentee’s argument against the constitutionality of IPR proceedings
will be heard by a three-judge Federal Circuit.1001 Cascades argued that a

990. 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
991. Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1534.
992. Id. at 1535.
993. Id.
994. Id. at 1536–37.
995. Id. at 1537.
996. 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
997. Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1537.
998. Id.
999. Id.
1000. 864 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (per curiam).
1001. Id. at 1310–11 (holding that a patent creates a private property right and the
AIA statutory scheme meets the constitutional requirements of due process in
disposition of property).
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patent right is a private right, not a public one, and therefore the PTAB’s
cancellation of patents in IPR was an unconstitutional exercise of judicial
power.1002 Concurring in the denial of initial hearing en banc, Judge
Newman reasoned that the matter should be resolved by a panel of the
Federal Circuit prior to any en banc consideration.1003 Also concurring in
the denial of initial hearing en banc, and joined by Judges Prost and
Hughes, Judge Dyk viewed the issued raised in the petition as settled in
MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,1004 which held that patent
rights are public rights.1005 Addressing the dissents, he saw no
inconsistency between MCM and either Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff,1006
or McCormick Harvesting Machinery Co. v. Aultman & Co.1007 He also saw
no inconsistency in concluding that patent rights are public rights,
conferred by federal statute.1008
Dissenting, Judge O’Malley expressed uncertainty that MCM was
correctly decided.1009 She approved Judge Reyna’s dissent and noted
that McCormick indicated that patent rights may only be annulled by
the courts and not the Patent Office.1010 Judge Reyna’s dissent read
McCormick as limiting the power to “annul” patents as vesting only in
the judiciary and not the Patent Office.1011 He also viewed MCM and
Patlex as “inconsistent and irreconcilable” opinions within the Federal
Circuit’s case law.1012 Finally, he cited the separation of powers as an
issue to be analyzed carefully.1013
The Federal Circuit granted a petition for en banc rehearing and
vacates its opinions in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.,1014 and Wi-Fi
1002. Id. The Supreme Court has since ruled that patents are public rights. See Oil
States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greens’s Energy Grp., LLC, No. 16-712, 2018 WL 1914662,
at *6 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
1003. Id. at 1311 (Newman, J., concurring).
1004. 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1005. Id. at 1293 (holding that because patent rights are public rights, the Seventh
Amendment posed no barrier to administrative agency review as to patent validity);
Cascades Projection, 864 F.3d at 1312 (Dyk, J., concurring).
1006. 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
1007. 169 U.S. 606 (1898); Cascades Projection, 864 F.3d at 1311–12.
1008. Cascades Projection, 864 F.3d at 1312.
1009. Id. at 1312–13 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
1010. Id. at 1313.
1011. Id. at 1314 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
1012. Id.
1013. Id.
1014. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 878
F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
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One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.1015 The case concerned the extent to which
the PTAB’s decisions on whether a petition for an IPR is not time
barred are reviewable by the courts.1016 Sitting en banc, the Federal
Circuit held that the PTAB’s determination that Broadcom’s petition
for IPR was not time barred was judicially reviewable. The Federal
Circuit reasoned that the statement that IPR institution decisions are
non-appealable in § 314(d) is expressly limited to institution decisions
“under this section,” i.e., institution decisions evaluating whether the
petitioner is likely to prevail as set forth in § 314(a).1017 The Federal
Circuit found that “[i]t does not address any other issue relevant to an
institution decision.”1018 Because the time-bar provision is in a
different section § 315(b), it is not addressed by the nonappealability
restriction of § 314(d). The Federal Circuit reasoned that this
approach is consistent with the approach of Cuozzo, which, when
discussing § 314(d), noted that it barred judicial review of the PTAB’s
assessment of a “reasonable likelihood of success” for the petition1019
In this decision, the Federal Circuit overruled the contrary reasoning
of Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc.1020
Concurring, Judge O’Malley would have reached the same outcome,
but she would have analyzed the PTAB’s time-bar assessment as an
instance of the PTAB exceeding its statutory authority to undertake an
IPR.1021 In dissent, Judge Hughes viewed the majority’s reading of
§ 314(d) as excessively narrow and incompatible with the statute, and
contrary to Cuozzo.1022 In his view, Cuozzo rejected the notion that
§ 314(d) was limited to barring review of reasonable-likelihood-ofsuccess determinations and specifically held that Congress had “told
the Patent Office to determine whether the IPR should proceed, and
it has made the agency’s decision ‘final’ and ‘nonappealable.’”1023
In Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall, LLC,1024 the Federal Circuit vacated the
IPR determination of obviousness and anticipation, finding the

1015. 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Wi-Fi One, LLC, 837 F.3d at 1329.
1016. Wi-Fi One, LLC, 837 F.3d at 1333.
1017. Wi-Fi One, LLC, 878 F.3d at 1370–71.
1018. Id. at 1372.
1019. Id. at 1369 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2141, 2142 (2016)).
1020. 803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled by Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367.
1021. Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1375 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
1022. Id. at 1377–78 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
1023. Id. at 1379.
1024. 872 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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PTAB’s procedures for reviewing late-submitted evidence
inadequate.1025 The PTAB abused its discretion by denying Ultratec’s
request to supplement the record with testimony from CaptionCall’s
expert made during co-pending district court litigation, which was
inconsistent with statements the expert had made during the IPR.1026
The Federal Circuit considered how admission and review of the
expert’s statements would have imposed little burden on the PTAB
and discussed how the PTAB’s procedures for requesting
supplementation of the record have the effect of denying the PTAB
any opportunity to actually know the content of the requested
supplementation before ruling on the motion.1027 The Federal Circuit
criticized the PTAB’s practice of denying a request to admit evidence
without examining the evidence it denied. In the IPR proceeding, the
PTAB never reviewed the expert’s testimony because it was not
accompanied with Ultratec’s motion to supplement the record;
instead, the PTAB only considered “the parties’ competing
characterizations” of the testimony, as articulated during a conference
call of which there was no record.1028
The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB also failed to provide a
reasoned basis for its denial, and its procedures on this issue “impede
meaningful appellate review of the agency decision-making.”1029 The
Federal Circuit rejected CaptionCall and the PTAB’s argument that
Ultratec bore responsibility to bring a stenographer to the conference
call at issue, as the rules impose no such burden.1030 Further, the
Federal Circuit held that it was the PTO’s responsibility to provide a
satisfactory explanation for its action.1031
In related appeals for Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc.,1032 the Federal
Circuit partially affirmed and partially vacated the PTAB’s IPR
determination that some of SynQor’s claims from two of its patents
were patentable and others anticipated or obvious.1033 As to the first

1025. Id. at 1269.
1026. Id. at 1270.
1027. Id.
1028. Id. at 1273.
1029. Id. at 1274.
1030. Id. at 1274–75.
1031. Id. at 1275.
1032. 869 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1033. Id. at 1312 (finding that the PTAB sufficiently addressed the patentee’s
argument that the voltage-range limitation claims in the patent would have been
obvious and that other claims were anticipated).
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group of rejection for the first patent, the Federal Circuit found that
substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s decision not to adopt the
proposed grounds because there was sufficient evidence to indicate
that a person of skill would not have been motivated to combine the
cited references in the required manner.1034
As to the second group of proposed rejections, the Federal Circuit
found that the PTAB erred in affirming the examiner’s withdrawal of
rejections “based solely on SynQor’s proffered objective evidence of
nonobviousness.”1035 The Federal Circuit found that the court stated
that the PTAB should have considered all the Graham factors, not just
the objective evidence.1036 Second, the PTAB’s apparent assessment of
the secondary considerations was inconsistent with how it treated
secondary considerations evidence in reexamination of two other
SynQor patents “without any explanation to justify such
inconsistency.”1037 Prior decisions relating to SynQor’s patents did not
address secondary considerations, which required giving the parties an
opportunity to address the issues on remand.1038
As to the third group of proposed rejections, the PTAB erred in
finding that a certain combination of prior art elements were
nonobvious because “on the same day, the [PTAB] reached the
opposite conclusion on this issue in [another SynQor] reexamination
on essentially the same record.”1039 The Federal Circuit determined
that vacatur was necessary because the PTAB failed to explain its
inconsistent results.1040 Moreover, the Federal Circuit discussed some
of the Board’s apparent reasoning in declining to adopt the rejections
from the separate reexamination and finds it lacking.1041 The Federal
Circuit concluded that “the direct conflict between the [PTAB’s] fact
findings in the reexaminations before us is unsupported by any
rational explanation in either of the Board’s decisions.”1042 The
Federal Circuit also concluded that the PTAB’s failed to address “all
grounds for proposed rejection” presented by Vicor.1043

1034.
1035.
1036.
1037.
1038.
1039.
1040.
1041.
1042.
1043.

Id. at 1318, 1320.
Id. at 1320–21.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1321.
Id. at 1316–17.
Id. at 1322–23.
Id. at 1312, 1323.
Id. at 1323.
Id.
Id. at 1324.
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On the second patent, for the first proposed rejection, the Federal
Circuit held that the PTAB correctly found the claims anticipated on
the presented record.1044 The Federal Circuit rejected SynQor’s
arguments that it presented a new ground of rejection that affected
the outcome, and that the PTAB misinterpreted the reference at
issue.1045 For the second proposed rejection, the PTAB correctly found
the claims obvious.1046 The Federal Circuit rejected SynQor’s
argument that the record demonstrated teaching away.1047 The third
and fourth proposed rejections were among those suffering from
inconsistent treatment between the two reexamination proceedings,
and the Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s treatment of them.1048
In Idemitsu Kosan Co. v. SFC Co.,1049 the Federal Circuit held that an IPR
decision may rely on post-institution arguments, affirming the IPR
obviousness determination.1050 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found
that the PTAB did not err in determining that the prior art taught
combining various compounds for the purpose of light emission.1051 The
Federal Circuit rejected Idemitsu’s argument that the PTAB made
improper assumptions in its characterization of the prior art.1052 The
Federal Circuit also rejected Idemitsu’s argument that the PTAB’s
reasoning came from an argument that was raised “too late” in the IPR
proceedings.1053 The Federal Circuit outlined the back-and-forth of SFC’s
petition, Idemitsu’s response, which raised the issue in question, and
SFC’s reply, which more fully developed the issue.1054 This outline
determined that that “what Idemitsu characterize[ed] as an argument
raised ‘too late’ is simply the by-product of one party necessarily getting
the last word.”1055 Under Genzyme Therapeutic Products Ltd. v. Biomarin
Pharmaceutical Inc., the PTAB is permitted to reach counterarguments not
preemptively raised in either the petition or the institution decision.1056
1044. Id. at 1324–25.
1045. Id. at 1324.
1046. Id. at 1326.
1047. Id.
1048. Id. at 1321–22.
1049. 870 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1050. Id. at 1377 (affirming the court of appeals’ holding that Idemitsu Kosan’s
patent was unpatentable as obvious and supported by substantial evidence).
1051. Id. at 1380.
1052. Id. at 1379–80.
1053. Id. at 1380.
1054. Id. at 1381.
1055. Id.
1056. Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360,
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The Federal Circuit declined to find error in the Board’s fact finding on
this issue without expert testimony, at least in this context.1057
While Idemitsu argued in its response that the prior art taught away
from the claimed technology, the Federal Circuit found that it did not
provide supporting evidence.1058 The Federal Circuit determined that
“SFC, of course, bears the ultimate burden of establishing
unpatentability, but it is not required as a matter of law to rebut mere
attorney argument with expert testimony in order to satisfy that burden.”1059
The Federal Circuit found the PTAB’s fact-finding sufficiently
supported by the record in the context.1060
In NFC Technology, LLC v. Matal,1061 the Federal Circuit reversed and
remanded an IPR obviousness determination, holding that minimal
documentation corroborating inventorship was not fatal to the
patentee’s priority claim.1062 The court found that the PTAB erred when
it determined that NFC Technology (NFC) failed to show that certain
third-party prototyping activity predating a cited reference did not inure
to NFC’s benefit.1063 The Federal Circuit considered how the testimony
and documentary evidence of record established NFC’s pre-critical date
conception and found that the PTAB improperly discounted certain
evidence establishing conception and inurement.1064 The Federal
Circuit emphasized that the PTAB also relied improperly on Woodland
Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc.1065 to find that the absence of emails or
other communications between the inventor and the third-party
prototyper led to a conclusion that the prototyper was not acting
according to the inventor’s design or direction.1066 In Woodland Trust, as
in NFC Technology, in view of the amount of time that had passed, it was
not surprising that certain documents that might have existed in the past
could not be produced at present for corroboration.1067 Quoting In re
Jolley,1068 the Federal Circuit wrote, “Corroboration of every factual issue
1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
1057. Id. at 1371–72.
1058. Idemitsu Kosan Co., 870 F.3d at 1381.
1059. Id.
1060. Id. at 1381.
1061. 871 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1062. Id. at 1368.
1063. Id. at 1370.
1064. Id. at 1372, 1374–75.
1065. 148 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1066. NFC Tech., 871 F.3d at 1373 (citing Woodland Trust, 148 F.3d at 1373).
1067. Id. at 1373–74.
1068. 308 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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contested by the parties is not a requirement of the law.”1069 Because the
PTAB had not yet determined whether the prototype at issue actually
reduced the claims to practice, it was necessary to remand the case.1070
In In re Chudik,1071 the Federal Circuit reversed an anticipation
rejection supported by two references after initial examination.1072
The patent at issue related to a surgical implant for use in shoulder
surgery.1073 The Federal Circuit determined that the rejections were
not supported by substantial evidence.1074 For the rejections over the
first reference (“Rambert”), the court found that the PTAB erred in
reasoning that, although the reference depicted a configuration that
did not precisely practice the claim, the device in the reference “can
still be arranged” in such a way as to practice and, therefore,
anticipate.1075 The Federal Circuit held that “[p]rior art that ‘must be
distorted from its obvious design’ does not anticipate a new
invention.”1076 The PTAB and examiner’s failure to explain how the
Rambert device could practice the claim without tearing the reference
apart warranted reversal.1077 For the rejections over the second
reference (“Bouttens”), the PTAB committed a similar error, reasoning
that the reference indicated a certain cavity could have “any” suitable
shape and certain parts could be reconfigured.1078 The Federal Circuit
found that the PTAB failed to explain how such a device would actually
work, and its reasoning amounted to “a significant and impermissible
modification” improper for an anticipation analysis.1079
In Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal,1080 the en banc court barred the PTAB
from placing the burden of persuasion on patent owners proposing
substitute claims in an IPR without formal rulemaking from the PTO.
The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s denial of motion to amend

1069. NFC Tech., 871 F.3d at 1374.
1070. Id. at 1375.
1071. 851 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1072. Id. at 1367.
1073. Id.
1074. See id. at 1367, 1371–72, 1374–75 (finding that because the substantial evidence
showed that the devices had to be distorted from their obvious design to practice as
the claim depicts, the designs do not anticipate a new invention).
1075. Id. at 1373.
1076. Id. at 1374 (quoting In re Wells, 53 F.2d 537, 539 (C.C.P.A. 1931)).
1077. Id. at 1374.
1078. Id.
1079. Id. at 1374–75.
1080. 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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claims in IPR and remanded.1081 The Federal Circuit found that the
PTAB erred in placing the burden of proof on the patent owner in
assessing the patentability of proposed substitute claims.1082 No single
opinion was joined by a majority of judges sitting en banc, though a
majority supported vacating the judgment).1083 In her opinion, Judge
O’Malley reasoned that vacatur was warranted because the PTAB’s
decision was incompatible with the unambiguous statutory text of 35
U.S.C. § 316(e).1084 The PTAB’s reasoning thus failed step one of
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1085 In Judge
O’Malley’s view, § 316(e) unambiguously required the IPR
petitioners—not patent owners—to bear the burden of proof on all
issues of unpatentability, including for proposed substitute claims.1086
Were the statute ambiguous, the result would be the same because the
PTO has promulgated no regulation requiring Chevron deference and
the most reasonable reading of the statute was the one given above.1087
With support from a majority of judges sitting en banc, O’Malley
ordered that the PTAB re-assess “the patentability of the proposed
substitute claims without placing the burden of persuasion on the
patent owner. The [PTAB] must follow this same practice in all
pending IPRs unless and until the PTO Director engages in notice-andcomment rulemaking.”1088
Similar to Judge O’Malley, Judge Moore reasoned that § 316(e) is
unambiguous in its assignment of the burden of proof for motions to
substitute claims in an IPR.1089 Further, Judge Moore would have
specifically held that PTAB decisions designated as precedential (here,
MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. RealD Inc.1090) or informative (here, Idle Free

1081. Id. at 1296 (determining that the PTAB can no longer place the burden of
establishing the patentability of amended claims on the patent owner in IPR
proceedings).
1082. Id. at 1324.
1083. Id. at 1295.
1084. Id. at 1296; see also 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012).
1085. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1315 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842).
1086. Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1295.
1087. Id. at 1335–36.
1088. Id. at 1328.
1089. Id. at 1328 (Moore, J., concurring).
1090. IPR2015-00040, 2015 WL 10709290 (P.T.A.B. July 15, 2015), overruled by Aqua
Prods., 872 F.3d 1290.
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Systems, Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.1091) are not entitled to Chevron deference.1092
Concurring, Judge Reyna reasoned that § 316(e) is ambiguous as to
who bears the burden of persuasion on a motion to amend claims in
IPR, and so proceeded to Chevron step two.1093 He would have held that
the PTO did not promulgate regulations concerning assignment of the
burden of proof sufficient enough to satisfy Chevron step two, and the
PTAB’s reasoning would not be given Chevron deference.1094
Interpreting § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 in the first instance,
Judge Reyna would have held that those rules “place a default burden
of production [though not of persuasion] on the patentee.”1095 This
final conclusion was joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judges Chen,
Taranto, and Hughes, though they do not join Judge Reyna’s Chevron
step two analysis or his conclusion that vacatur was warranted.1096
Dissenting from the judgment, Judge Taranto reasoned that
§ 316(e) was ambiguous as to who bears the burden of persuasion on
a motion to amend claims in IPR, and so proceeded to Chevron step
two.1097 He would have held that Chevron deference was owed, however,
to the PTO’s allocation of the burden of proof per 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c),
and so he would have affirmed the PTAB’s decision.1098 Judge Hughes
joined the Taranto opinion, and further reasoned that 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.20(c) would be due under Auer v. Robbins1099 deference even if not
Chevron deference.1100
2. Obviousness
In In re Van Os,1101 the Federal Circuit vacated a rejection for
obviousness finding that the PTAB may not rely on conclusory statements
of intuitiveness.1102 The claims, which were apparently assigned to Apple,
related to a touchscreen interface that permits rearranging icons, and
1091. IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL 5947697 (P.T.A.B. June 3, 2013), overruled by Aqua
Prods., 872 F.3d 1290.
1092. Aqua Products, 872 F.3d at 1328.
1093. Id. at 1334–35 (Reyna, J., concurring).
1094. Id. at 1335.
1095. Id.
1096. Id.
1097. Id. at 1342 (Taranto, J., dissenting).
1098. Id.
1099. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
1100. Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1342 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
1101. 844 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1102. Id. at 1361–62 (explaining that “conclusory assertion[s]” with no “articulated
rationale” do not support a “motivation to combine”).
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they concerned a sustained button press that would trigger an editing
mode.1103 The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB erred in holding,
without discussion, that it would have been “intuitive” to apply sustainedbutton-press-to-activate technology from a prior art reference for the
purpose of invoking editing mode.1104 The PTAB needed to provide
further reasoning or analysis was necessary to support finding that
motivation existed to make this modification.1105 Concurring in part
and dissenting in part, Judge Newman agreed that the PTAB’s
treatment of the sustained-press-to-edit mode was inadequate, but she
would have reversed rather than vacated and remanded.1106
In Rovalma S.A. v. Bohler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co.,1107 the Federal Circuit
held that the IPR statute does not bar the PTAB from relying on the
patentee’s own submissions to find obviousness, vacating the IPR
determination.1108 The PTAB switched its claim construction view—
the institution decision adopted the constructions of the petitioner,
Böhler, but the final decision adopted the constructions of patentee
Rovalma.1109 The final decision relied in part on Rovalma’s own
submissions to find obviousness.1110 The Federal Circuit found that the
PTAB erred by failing to sufficiently explain the basis for its
decision.1111 Specifically, the PTAB only substantively discussed one of
the limitations of the claims and applied generally conclusory
reasoning to the others.1112 Further, the Federal Circuit found that the
PTAB’s discussion of motivation to combine was also lacking.1113 This
alone was sufficient to warrant vacating and remanding the decision,
so the PTAB could better explain itself.1114
The Federal Circuit emphasized that the IPR statute did not bar the

1103. Id. at 1360, 1362.
1104. Id. at 1361.
1105. Id. at 1361–62.
1106. Id. at 1362 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1107. 856 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1108. Id. at 1019 (explaining that: (1) “substantial-evidence issues” obviated the
need for remand; (2) the Board was within its rights to use “patentee’s submissions” to
discern a claim of obviousness; and (3) the Board inadequately explained its
determination of obviousness, leaving an open question of whether there were
procedural violations).
1109. Id. at 1024, 1026.
1110. Id. at 1024.
1111. Id. at 1025–26.
1112. Id.
1113. Id.
1114. Id.
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PTAB from relying on Rovalma’s own submissions to support its
obviousness determination.1115 Rovalma had notice of the arguments
Böhler was making and had an opportunity to respond to them.1116
The Federal Circuit found that In re Magnum Oil Tools International
Ltd.1117 was not contrary because, in this appeal, the PTAB did not
engage in improper burden-shifting.1118 Further, it is well-established
in other contexts that a tribunal may rely on a party’s own submissions
in making findings against it.1119
Agreeing with Rovalma’s contention that it did not receive sufficient
process under the APA, the Federal Circuit remanded.1120 The same
deficiencies in the PTAB’s final decision discussed above made it
impossible to “conclusively determine whether the [PTAB’s] actions
complied with the APA’s procedural requirements.”1121
In Outdry Technologies Corp. v. Geox S.p.A.,1122 the Federal Circuit held
that the PTAB may establish a motivation to combine by reciting the
petitioner’s
arguments,
affirming
IPR
determination
of
obviousness.1123 Outdry’s patent related to methods for waterproofing
leather goods.1124 The PTAB correctly interpreted the claims,
ultimately rejecting Outdry’s plea for a narrower construction
unsupported by the specification.1125 The Federal Circuit also rejected
Outdry’s attempt to overcome the prior art by relying on the language
of the preamble, which recited a “process for waterproofing
leather.”1126 In this case, the preamble “like most preambles [was]
simply a statement of intended use, not a separate claim limitation,” as
per Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp.1127
Further, the PTAB’s finding that a person of skill would have been

1115. Id. at 1026–28.
1116. Id.
1117. 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
1118. Rovalma S.A., 856 F.3d at 1026–28.
1119. Id. (citing various cases that demonstrate where tribunals have used party
submissions against them).
1120. Id. at 1029–30.
1121. Id.
1122. 859 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-408, 2018 WL 1994804 (U.S.
Apr. 20, 2018).
1123. Id. at 1370.
1124. Id. at 1366.
1125. Id. at 1367–68.
1126. Id.
1127. 320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Outdry Techs. Corp., 859 F.3d at 1368 (citing
Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, 320 F.3d at 1345).
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motivated to combine references to reach the claimed inventions was
supported by substantial evidence.1128 Unlike in several recent cases
where the PTAB failed to adequately explain its analysis of motivation
to combine, the Federal Circuit “clearly articulated Geox’s arguments”
showing a motivation1129 stating that the PTAB’s “reliance on Geox’s
arguments does not undermine its otherwise adequate explanation for
finding a motivation to combine.”1130 Moreover, there was no
requirement that the motivation to combine be the same motivation
described by Outdry’s inventors.1131
In Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,1132 the
Federal Circuit held that a lack of clear criticism undermines a
“teaching away” challenge, affirming an IPR determination of
obviousness.1133 Broad Ocean filed its IPR petition challenging Nidec’s
patent on obviousness and anticipation grounds.1134 The PTAB
instituted on the obviousness challenge but denied institution based
on anticipation because Broad Ocean failed to supply an affidavit
claiming the accuracy of the translation.1135 Broad Ocean filed a
second petition re-raising the anticipation ground, including the
affidavit and seeking joinder with the already-running obviousness
proceeding.1136 Upon review, the PTAB denied institution as time
barred.1137 After rehearing, the PTAB reconstituted the Federal Circuit
with five judges, instead of three, and granted joinder of the two
proceedings.1138 The expanded PTAB panel ultimately issued the final
written decision on both obviousness and anticipation grounds.1139
The Federal Circuit found no need to examine whether the PTAB’s
construction of the preamble term “HVAC system” as a limitation was
1128. Outdry Techs. Corp., 859 F.3d at 1369–70.
1129. Id. at 1369.
1130. Id. at 1370.
1131. Id. at 1371–72 (“Any motivation to combine references, whether articulated in
the references themselves or supported by evidence of the knowledge of a skilled
artisan, is sufficient to combine those references to arrive at the claimed process.”
(emphasis added)).
1132. 868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-751, 2018 WL 1994809 (U.S.
Apr. 30, 2018).
1133. Id. at 1019 (holding that the PTAB appropriately determined the claim for
obviousness, but the PTAB declined to reach a conclusion on the anticipation claim).
1134. Id. at 1015.
1135. Id.
1136. Id.
1137. Id.
1138. Id.
1139. Id. at 1015–16.
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erroneous because it was undisputed that the prior art taught an HVAC
system either way.1140 The PTAB also did not err in finding that the
prior art did not teach away from the proposed combination.1141
Applying Meiresonne v. Google, Inc.,1142 nothing in the art “criticize[d],
discredit[ed], or otherwise discourage[d]” use of the technology in
question.1143 The Federal Circuit also rejected Nidec’s argument that
the prior art, by implication, rejected use of technology like that in the
companion reference.1144 Because the PTAB’s decision could be
affirmed on obviousness grounds, there was no need to reach the
separate issue of whether the PTAB properly rejected a time-bar
challenge by Nidec to also enter an obviousness determination.1145
Judge Dyk’s concurrence expressed reservations about the PTAB’s use
of an expanded PTAB panel to join issues that would otherwise be time
barred.1146 In this case, the PTAB allowed § 315(c)’s joinder provisions
to be used in a manner that essentially added issues to the case, i.e.,
Broad Ocean’s anticipation challenge.1147 Judge Dyk believed “it
unlikely that Congress intended that petitioners could employ the
joinder provision to circumvent the time bar by adding time-barred
issues to an otherwise timely proceeding.”1148 Judge Dyk also expressed
concern about the PTAB’s practice of expanding the administrative
panel from three judges to five in the context of rehearing a challenged
issue: “While we recognize the importance of achieving uniformity in
PTO decisions, we question whether the practice of expanding panels is
the appropriate mechanism of achieving the desired uniformity.”1149
In In re Stepan Co.,1150 the Federal Circuit held that the PTAB must
fully explain its basis for findings in its motivation to combine analysis,
vacating the PTAB’s decision to affirm the examiner’s rejection of

1140. Id. at 1017.
1141. Id. at 1017–18.
1142. 849 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017 (citing
Meiresonne, 849 F.3d at 1382).
1143. Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017.
1144. Id.
1145. Id. at 1019.
1146. Id. at 1019–20 (Dyk, J., concurring).
1147. Id. at 1020.
1148. Id.
1149. Id.
1150. 868 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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claims.1151 The claim related to an herbicide formulation.1152 The
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB failed to adequately support its
determination that the applicant, upon being presented with the prior
art, had failed to establish how the claimed matter demonstrated more
than “routine optimization” of known techniques.1153 The Federal
Circuit determined that “[m]issing from the Board’s analysis is an
explanation as to why it would have been routine optimization to arrive
at the claimed invention.”1154 On appeal, the PTAB argued that the
evidence in the record was sufficient to establish a motivation to
combine references with a reasonable expectation of success.1155
Citing In re Lee,1156 the Federal Circuit rejected this as “post hoc
rationalization.”1157 It also rejected a finding by the PTAB as to the
content of a reference.1158 Finally, the court found that the PTAB erred
by shifting the burden of proving patentability to Stepan because the
PTAB had not established a prima facie obviousness case.1159 Further,
the PTAB erred insofar as it determined that the scope of Stepan’s
claims was entirely within the scope of the prior art disclosure.1160
While there was some overlap, it was incomplete, and it was thus the
PTAB’s burden to establish that the non-overlapping element was
obvious.1161
While
Dissenting, Judge Lourie would have affirmed.1162
acknowledging imperfections in the PTAB’s opinion, to him, the claim
was clearly obvious over the references.1163
In EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.,1164
the Federal Circuit held that an uncorroborated declaration was
insufficient to establish an inventorship claim for cited prior art,
1151. Id. at 1347–48 (remanding the case because of evidentiary issues, questioning
the Board’s determination of a “reasonable expectation of success” for a person skilled
in the art, and concluding that the Board’s findings lacked support that the burden
rests with the PTO for establishing a “prima facie case of obviousness”).
1152. Id. at 1344.
1153. Id. at 1346.
1154. Id.
1155. Id.
1156. 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1157. In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d at 1347.
1158. Id.
1159. Id. at 1348.
1160. Id.
1161. Id.
1162. Id. at 1348–49 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
1163. Id.
1164. 859 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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affirming the IPR determination on obviousness as to some claims and
vacating the determination as to others.1165 The court held that the
PTAB did not err in rejecting EmeraChem’s contention that certain
portions of a key reference were not § 102(e) prior art because they
were not “by another.”1166 EmeraChem’s sole evidence on this point
was an uncorroborated declaration by an individual named as an
inventor on both the patent under review and the prior art reference,
and the PTAB was under no obligation to accept the declaration as
true.1167 In re DeBaun,1168 and In re Katz,1169 were not contrary because,
although the cases involved reliance on a declaration, they “required
more than a naked assertion by the inventor,” such as additional
explanation of relevant circumstances.1170 The Federal Circuit noted
that contemporary documentary corroboration is not required “in
every case.”1171
The Federal Circuit did find error in the PTAB’s obviousness
determination in certain dependent claims without addressing the IPR
petition or institution decision.1172 Although the Petition included
general statements concerning this reference or the reference being
cited for other claims, it did not give EmeraChema sufficient notice
under the APA’s requirements.1173 In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC,1174
is not contrary because, in that case, the institution decision “gave the
patentee notice of the prior art combination that the final decision
relied upon.”1175 Genzyme did not authorize the PTAB’s decision
because, there, the patentee had sufficient notice and opportunity to
respond to the combination the PTAB ultimately used.1176
In Corning v. Fast Felt Corp.,1177 the Federal Circuit reversed an IPR
determination of nonobviousness because the record could support

1165. Id. at 1348, 1352.
1166. Id. at 1348.
1167. Id. at 1345–46.
1168. 687 F.2d 459 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
1169. 687 F.2d 450 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
1170. Emerachem Holdings, 859 F.3d at 1347 (explaining that these cases provided
additional evidence—a drawing and additional explanation—to support their
respective declarations, whereas Emerachem only provided the declaration).
1171. Id. at 1347.
1172. Id. at 1348.
1173. Id.
1174. 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
1175. Emerachem Holdings, 859 F.3d at 1350.
1176. Id.
1177. 873 F.3d 896 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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no other outcome.1178 The PTAB analysis implicitly applied a claim
interpretation that failed to reflect the broadest reasonable
interpretation of a key term.1179 The Federal Circuit considered the
record and concluded that the PTAB’s decision could only be
understood as applying a narrow claim scope.1180 The Federal Circuit
found remand unnecessary because the record lacked sufficient
evidence to overcome Owens Corning’s prima facie demonstration of
obviousness based on the proper broadest reasonable interpretation
construction.1181 Also, Fast Felt did not seek remand in the event that
the Federal Circuit agreed with Corning’s claim interpretation.1182
In CRFD Research, Inc. v. Matal,1183 the Federal Circuit consolidated
three IPR appeals for the same patent, affirmed the invalidation of two
claims, and reversed the patentability determination of a third claim,
rendering all challenged claims unpatentable.1184 Essentially, the
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB may not shortcut the IPR
obviousness analysis by over-reliance on non-anticipation findings.
CFRD’s patent related to technology for transferring an ongoing
communication session from one device to another.1185 The opinion
analyzes the three written decisions sequentially.1186
In the first decision, the Federal Circuit agreed with the PTAB’s
findings on certain CFRD claims regarding anticipation or obviousness
because the determinations were supported by substantial evidence.1187
In the second decision, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did
not err in finding other CFRD claims anticipated or obvious.1188 For
some of these claims, the reasoning of the first decision applied; for
others, the Federal Circuit considered how the PTAB’s determinations
were supported by substantial evidence.1189
In the third decision, the Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB
committed legal error by failing to separately analyze certain obviousness
1178. Id. at 901.
1179. Id. at 900–01.
1180. Id.
1181. Id. at 901.
1182. Id.
1183. 876 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1184. Id. at 1349 (affirming the Board’s findings for some claims regarding
obviousness and anticipation, but finding error with others).
1185. Id. at 1333.
1186. Id. at 1337, 1340–41, 1344.
1187. Id. at 1337, 1340.
1188. Id. at 1342–43.
1189. Id. at 1343.
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arguments made by the petitioner Hulu and by generally over relying on
a previously performed anticipation analysis.1190 The Federal Circuit
stated that “[w]hatever the merits of the [PTAB’s} determination that [a
reference] does not anticipate . . . [a certain limitation], its findings on
anticipation [were] insufficient as a matter of law to decide the
obviousness inquiry.”1191 The court found that the PTAB also erred when
it declined to consider arguments in Hulu’s petition relating to a noninstituted single-reference obviousness analysis that Hulu had
incorporated into its multiple-reference grounds.1192 Ultimately, the
Federal Circuit held that, under a proper obviousness analysis, the record
demonstrated the unpatentability of CFRD’s claim.1193
3. Claim Construction
In MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC v. Ricoh Americas Corp.,1194 the
Federal Circuit held that distinctions between a provisional and final
application support a broad claim construction, affirming an IPR
anticipation decision.1195 MPHJ Technology Investments’s (MPHJ)
patent related to a virtual copier.1196 MPHJ argued that, properly
construed, its claims required “single button” operation, meaning that
a user would push the “go” button on a copier one time and the image
would be seamlessly replicated onto other devices and applications.1197
The Federal Circuit held that the PTAB correctly rejected MPHJ’’s
argument.1198 The Federal Circuit also affirmed PTAB’s findings that
MPHJ’s claims described a configuration which required a user to take
multiple steps to initiate a scan and transmit an electronic image.1199
The Federal Circuit noted that language tending to adopt a “single
button” limitation in MPHJ’s provisional was removed in the final

1190. Id. at 1345.
1191. Id.
1192. Id. at 1346 (“To bar Hulu from pressing an argument it raised in a ground the
[PTAB] found ‘redundant’ and that it expressly incorporated into other proposed
grounds of unpatentability on which the Board instituted would not only unfairly
prejudice Hulu, but would also raise questions about the propriety of the Board’s
redundancy decision.”).
1193. Id. at 1349.
1194. 847 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1195. Id. at 1363 (holding that the patent did not adequately describe an operation
and there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of anticipation).
1196. Id. at 1364.
1197. Id. at 1368.
1198. Id. at 1369.
1199. Id. at 1368.
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application, and that references to “single button” operation in the
final specification characterized it as optional.1200 Thus, the Federal
Circuit held that the PTAB did not err in finding several of MPHJ’s
claims anticipated.1201 Further, the PTAB also did not err in its other
claim constructions.1202
Dissenting, Judge O’Malley would have adopted MPHJ’s “single
button” claim interpretation based on statements in the specification
amounting to “unmistakable disavowal.”1203 She would have partially
reversed the PTAB’s anticipation determination, as well as its alternative
determination of obviousness (which the majority did not reach).1204
In Organik Kimya AS v. Rohm & Haas Co.,1205 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the IPR decisions confirming patentability as to two Rohm &
Haas patents, holding that grammatical uncertainty in the
specification does not require an expansive view of the “broadest
reasonable interpretation” standard.1206 The Federal Circuit found
that the PTAB did not err in its determination of the broadest reasonable
interpretation of a claim term.1207 The Federal Circuit considered the
record, and rejected Organik’s argument that definitional language in
the specification was grammatically ambiguous.1208 Organik argued that
the PTAB erred in resolving the ambiguity with the narrower of two
possible approaches.1209 The language in question1210 was not actually
ambiguous and meant that the suitable swelling agents were those having
the characteristic in question.1211 Applying that construction, the
Federal Circuit concluded the record established neither anticipation
nor obviousness.1212
4. Moving Forward with IPR Practice
The Supreme Court has recently issued two decisions that will impact
1200. Id. at 1368–69.
1201. Id. at 1369.
1202. Id. at 1370.
1203. Id. at 1374–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
1204. Id. at 1380–81.
1205. 873 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1206. Id. at 892, 896.
1207. Id. at 892.
1208. Id.
1209. Id.
1210. “Suitable swelling agents include, are those which, [have a certain
characteristic].” Id.
1211. Id.
1212. Id. at 894, 896.
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IPR practice. First, the Supreme Court in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,1213
examined whether, in an IPR, the PTAB must enter a final decision on
every claim addressed in the petition, or only some of the claims.1214 In
the decision being reviewed, the Federal Circuit held that the PTAB, in its
written decision, did not have to address those claims for which the PTAB
did not institute IPR.1215 The Supreme Court reversed this decision
finding that the PTAB must resolve all claims in the IPR petition.1216
Second, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of IPR
proceedings in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.1217
The Supreme Court held that, because patents are public rights, an IPR is
constitutional both under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.1218
B. Inter Partes Reexamination
In Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc.,1219 the Federal Circuit
vacated in part and affirmed in part the PTAB’s rejection for
obviousness following inter partes reexamination (IPRx).1220 The
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB did not erroneously rely in part on
Strava’s expert declarations.1221
Even though Strava’s expert
declaration included certain borderline legal conclusions (e.g., stating
something “would have been obvious”), this did not render the
declaration unreliable.1222 However, the PTAB failed to support its
obviousness determinations for some claims with sufficient factual
findings and explanations.1223 The Federal Circuit determined that the
PTAB decision failed to materially discuss Strava’s arguments for
several claims, and its attempt to incorporate by reference the
examiner’s determinations, which, in turn, referenced Strava’s
submissions and expert declarations, was improper.1224 The Federal
Circuit held that “[t]his multi-layered incorporation by reference does
1213. No. 16-969, 2018 WL 1914661 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
1214. Id. at *2.
1215. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir.
2016), rev’d, No. 16-969, 2018 WL 1914661 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
1216. SAS Inst., Inc., 2018 WL 1914661, at *9–10.
1217. No. 16-712, 2018 WL 1914662 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
1218. Id. at *11.
1219. 849 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1220. Id. at 1040–49 (noting that the PTAB properly relied on the expert declaration,
even though it committed error in a few but not all of the claims).
1221. Id. at 1039–41.
1222. Id. at 1041.
1223. Id. at 1041–44.
1224. Id. at 1041–46.
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not satisfy the substantial evidence standard of review.”1225 While the
PTAB may, in some cases, incorporate by reference an examiner’s
treatment, simply incorporating a party’s arguments by reference is
insufficient because it does nothing to “transform . . . attorney
argument into factual findings or supply the requisite explanation that
must accompany those findings.”1226 The Federal Circuit further
reviewed several categories of the PTAB’s decision concerning Icon’s
claims, finding some adequately supported by factual findings and
explanation, whereas others were not.1227 Those determinations
lacking sufficient explanation were vacated and remanded; the rest
were affirmed.1228 Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge
O’Malley agreed with the majority’s discussion, but she would have
reversed rather than vacated on those claims where the PTO and PTAB
had failed to carry their burden to establish unpatentability.1229
In In re Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC,1230 the Federal Circuit held that
dismissal of invalidity counterclaims without prejudice does not invoke
§ 317(b) estoppel against IPRx, affirming the PTAB’s determination of
unpatentability.1231 The PTO did not err when it denied Affinity’s
motion to have the IPRx terminated after Affinity settled a co-pending
district court litigation with requestor Apple.1232 Section 317(b) only
imposes an estoppel against maintenance of IPRx proceedings
following a “final decision” in civil litigation as to patentability.1233
Because the district court litigation never reached the merits of Apple’s
invalidity counterclaims and because the district court dismissed those
counterclaims without prejudice to Apple re-filing them, there was no
“final decision” suitable to invoke § 317(b).1234
As to the validity analysis, the Federal Circuit rejected Affinity’s claim
interpretation as unduly narrow.1235 Affinity argued that claim steps of
“sending” certain content to two separate computers must occur

1225. Id. at 1042.
1226. Id. at 1043–44.
1227. Id. at 1049.
1228. Id.
1229. Id. (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1230. 856 F.3d 902 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-233, 2018 WL 1994800 (U.S.
Apr. 30, 2018).
1231. Id. at 907–08.
1232. Id. at 904.
1233. Id.
1234. Id. at 905.
1235. Id. at 907.
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without any intervening step after “receiving” a request.1236 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that this was inconsistent with the claim
language, which set the two steps up as separate steps—i.e., not a single
step.1237 The Federal Circuit also noted that the claim preamble used
the open-ended term “comprising” in setting forth the claim.1238
The Federal Circuit affirmed an IPRx obviousness determination in
In re Ethicon, Inc.,1239 holding that a normal desire to optimize the
claimed invention can support a finding of obviousness.1240 The claims
at issue related to drug-delivery stents.1241 The Federal Circuit found
that substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s determination that the
prior art taught all limitations of Ethicon’s claims and taught a
motivation to combine them.1242 The Federal Circuit rejected
Ethicon’s argument that one reference taught away from another
stating that the mere statement that one sort of polymer “is probably
more desirable,” without more, is not teaching away.1243 There was also
no error in the PTAB’s determination that a person of skill would have
relied on certain art that was somewhat old and tangentially related to
the field at issue.1244 The art taught the general properties of the
copolymer family that was ultimately claimed.1245 Moreover, the
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB also did not err in concluding that
Ethicon’s evidence on secondary considerations of nonobviousness
was insufficient to overcome the prima facie obviousness case.1246
Ethicon was relying “solely on its expert’s conclusory testimony”
regarding copying; its evidence on unexpected results was thin, and its
evidence on commercial success “did not establish that any success,
praise or unexpected results were due to the [patented] coating,
rather than due to an unclaimed feature such as the drug or stent
design.”1247 Dissenting, Judge Newman would have held that the claims
were nonobvious, noting that none of the references cited disclosed
1236. Id. at 906.
1237. Id. at 907.
1238. Id.
1239. 844 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1240. Id. at 1352.
1241. Id. at 1346–47.
1242. Id. at 1350.
1243. Id. at 1351.
1244. Id. at 1349, 1351.
1245. Id. at 1351 (“The normal desire of artisans to improve upon what is already
generally known can provide the motivation to optimize.”).
1246. Id. at 1352.
1247. Id.
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the copolymer coating material described in the claims.1248
In Fairchild (Taiwan) Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc.,1249 the Federal
Circuit granted a motion to remand to the PTAB with instructions to
vacate the IPRx decision and issue the reexamination certificate
because of a jury verdict confirming the nonobviousness of the asserted
patents.1250 The IPRx proceeding was initiated by Power Integrations
in 2012 and concerned a patent that was the subject of ongoing
litigation between Power Integrations (PI) and Fairchild.1251 While the
district court matter was pending, the examiner in the IPRx rejected
Fairchild’s claims, the PTAB affirmed, and Fairchild appealed.1252
In the meantime, the litigation resulted in a jury verdict rejecting
PI’s invalidity arguments.1253 Sometime after the PTAB’s affirmance,
the Federal Circuit affirmed that aspect of the district court
judgment.1254 The time for PI to seek a writ of certiorari expired,
rendering that aspect of the district court proceeding final.1255 35
U.S.C. § 317(b) thus barred “maintain[ing]” the IPRx proceeding,
which by this time was on appeal to the Federal Circuit, because the
proceeding involved claims that were raised in a civil action that had
reached final decision.1256 The Federal Circuit reasoned that “[i]f a
defendant brought an invalidity challenge in a district court litigation
and was unsuccessful, it is not permitted to bring the same challenge
in an [IPRx].”1257 The Federal Circuit’s affirmance of the jury’s verdict
included a remand on infringement and other issues unrelated to
patent validity was irrelevant for purposes of applying § 317(b).1258
And, while Fairchild had claims in the IPRx that were not in the
litigation, it had committed to abandon those claims.1259 On remand,
the Federal Circuit ordered the PTAB to dismiss the IPRx as to the
claims in the litigation and to issue a reexamination certificate
1248. Id. at 1358 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1249. 854 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1250. Id. at 1366.
1251. Id. at 1365.
1252. Id.
1253. Id.
1254. Id. (citing Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843
F.3d 1315, 1340–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
1255. Id. at 1365–66.
1256. Id. at 1365 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (2012)).
1257. Id. (quoting Function Media, LLC v. Kappos, 508 F. App’x 953, 955–56 (Fed.
Cir. 2013)).
1258. Id. at 1366.
1259. Id.
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invalidating the abandoned claims.1260
In In re Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC, the Federal Circuit found that the
PTAB properly refused to terminate a merged reexamination proceeding
following the district court verdict of patentability as to only one
requestor.1261 The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s determination
that merged reexamination proceedings two IPRxs and one ex parte
reexamination (EPRx) could continue even after a district court litigation
involving one of the requesting parties resulted in a verdict confirming
patentability for some claims.1262 The Federal Circuit also affirmed the
PTAB’s determination of unpatentability for all claims.1263
The Federal Circuit held that the PTAB did not err in denying
Affinity’s motion to terminate the entire merged proceeding after it
obtained a verdict in civil litigation that some, but not all, of the claims
under reexamination were valid.1264 Applying § 317(b)’s plain
language, the estoppel to continue reexamination proceedings only
applies to the party that actually participated in the civil action (the
PTO severed out Volkswagen’s participation) and only applies to those
claims actually addressed in the action.1265 The Federal Circuit rejected
Affinity’s argument that reexamination should be terminated as to all
claims in the patent (as opposed to only those claims in the civil
action), and rejected Affinity’s argument that § 317 imposes a “patentbased,” as opposed to claim-based, estoppel in the case of already
instituted reexamination proceedings.1266 The Federal Circuit also
rejected Affinity’s argument for preclusive effect against the
reexaminations initiated by parties other than Volkswagen.1267 As to
the EPRx, § 317 had no effect.1268 And regarding the non-Volkswagen
IPRx, as stated above, the statute imposes estoppel only against those
who actually participate in the civil litigation.1269
Regarding the validity analysis, the Federal Circuit found that the
PTAB’s conclusion that Affinity’s claims were unpatentable over the

1260. Id.
1261. In re Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, 856 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
No. 17-233, 2018 WL 1994800 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2018).
1262. Id.
1263. Id. at 902.
1264. Id. at 886–87.
1265. Id. at 887.
1266. Id. at 892.
1267. Id. at 889.
1268. Id. at 893.
1269. Id. at 892–93.
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prior art was supported by substantial evidence as to all challenged
claims.1270 The Federal Circuit also rejected Affinity’s argument that
the PTAB erred in analyzing Affinity’s objective indicia of
nonobviousness.1271 It noted that Affinity “provided no explanation or
analysis that corroborates the relationship between the claims of the
patent and the relevant market.1272 And although Affinity had
demonstrated a significant history of licensing, the Federal Circuit
noted that “the mere fact of licensing alone cannot be considered
strong evidence of nonobviousness if it cannot also be shown that the
licensees did so out of respect for the patent rather than to avoid the
expense of litigation.”1273 The Federal Circuit noted that Affinity had
failed to make this latter showing.1274
In In re AT & T Intellectual Property II, L.P.,1275 the Federal Circuit held
that a decision to institute IPRx is not reviewable despite a requestor’s
motion to have the petition denied, and it affirmed the IPRx
determination of anticipation.1276 Per § 312(c) and Belkin International,
Inc. v. Kappos,1277 the Federal Circuit lacked authority to review the
PTAB’s institution decision.1278 Although the petitioner, LG, had sought
denial of the petition so that it could file an IPR petition, the Federal
Circuit determined that the PTAB could still review the petition.1279 As
to the anticipation determination, the Federal Circuit found that
substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s determination.1280 The
Federal Circuit also rejected AT & T’s contention that the examiner
shifted its basis for finding anticipation.1281
In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Cirrex Systems, LLC,1282 the Federal Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part an IPRx determination finding
that the claims at issue were unpatentable for lack of written

1270. Id. at 898, 900.
1271. Id. at 887.
1272. Id. at 901.
1273. Id.
1274. Id. at 901–02.
1275. 856 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-643, 2018 WL 1994807 (U.S.
Apr. 30, 2018).
1276. Id. at 997.
1277. 696 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
1278. AT & T, 856 F.3d at 996 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (2012)).
1279. Id. at 996.
1280. Id.
1281. Id. at 997.
1282. 856 F.3d 997 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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description.1283 On claim construction, the Federal Circuit considered
how the parties agreed to construction of a certain term, but it found
that the PTAB erred in holding that this construction covered a
specific embodiment.1284 The discussion was highly fact specific and
concerned equalization and attenuation of light signals in a fiber optic
communication system.1285 Applying the correct construction, the
Federal Circuit found all the claims on appeal lacking in written
description support, so the PTAB erred insofar as it had held some
claims patentable.1286 The Federal Circuit noted that each of the claims
that the PTAB found patentable had been added by amendment
during prosecution and so cannot be relied on to establish written
description support per Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.1287 Applying
the appropriate claim construction, the Federal Circuit found that the
material Cirrex had been citing for its written description arguments
failed to teach a requirement of the claims—namely, the attenuation
of certain light signals while they were still inside a certain circuit.1288
As to the claims where the PTAB had found unpatentability for lack
of written description, the Federal Circuit affirmed.1289 The material
cited by Cirrex failed to teach the claims’ requirement of a “diverting
element” inside a certain circuit.1290
In IPCom GmbH v. HTC Corp.,1291 the Federal Circuit held that the
PTAB’s failure to identify a specific algorithm for a means-plusfunction limitation required partial vacatur and remanded the PTAB’s
IPRx obviousness determination.1292 The Federal Circuit found the
PTAB erred in its interpretation of a means-plus-function limitation
appearing in several claims. Specifically, the PTAB erroneously failed
to identify the algorithm in the specification corresponding to the
claimed means.1293 Under In re Donaldson Co.,1294 the application of the
1283. Id. at 1011.
1284. Id. at 1005–06.
1285. E.g., id. at 1000 (discussing the scientific process of the optical network assembly).
1286. Id. at 999.
1287. 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the patentee’s initial
disclosure limits the permissible scope of his later-drafted claims); Cisco Sys., 856 F.3d
at 1007 (citing Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479).
1288. Cisco Sys., 856 F.3d at 1009.
1289. Id. at 1011.
1290. Id.
1291. 861 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1292. Id. at 1378.
1293. Id. at 1369.
1294. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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“broadest reasonable interpretation” standard is not a justification for
construing a means-plus-function limitation as encompassing any
means capable of performing the function.1295 The PTAB had rejected
the algorithm tendered by patent owner IPCom, but it did not identify
an algorithm of its own.1296 On remand, the PTAB needed to identify
the appropriate algorithm.1297 The Federal Circuit vacated the
obviousness determinations for claims affected by this issue.1298
The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s remaining
determinations.1299 For those claims unaffected by the issue above,
substantial
evidence
supported
the
Board’s
obviousness
determinations.1300 The Federal Circuit considered the references,
and the proof of motivation to combine.1301 The court found that the
PTAB did not err in reviewing the patentability of certain claims.
These claims had initially been part of the IPRx, but the PTAB did not
mention them when it issued a new ground of rejection following an
initial determination of patentability by the examiner.1302 Following
the PTAB’s decision, IPCom reopened prosecution and amended the
claims in question.1303 On that basis, the court held that there was no
error in the PTAB exercising jurisdiction to consider HTC’s challenge
to the claims when the matter returned to the PTAB.1304
In Soft Gel Technologies, Inc. v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc.,1305 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s IPRx obviousness determinations holding
that the “reasonable expectation of success” concept does not require
certainty.1306 In its analysis, the Federal Circuit was mostly fact-oriented,
and it rejected Soft Gel’s arguments as to the content of the record.1307
In rejecting Soft Gel’s argument that a person of skill would not have
had a reasonable expectation of success in combining various aspects of
the references, the Federal Circuit noted that the law does not require

1295.
1296.
1297.
1298.
1299.
1300.
1301.
1302.
1303.
1304.
1305.
1306.
1307.

IPCom GmbG, 861 F.3d at 1369 (quoting In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194).
Id. at 1370–71.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id. at 1372–76.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id. at 1372.
864 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1340.
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“absolute predictability.”1308 A reference suggesting that one dissolve a
certain compound (“CoQ10”) in lemon oil was sufficient to support a
reasonable expectation of success in dissolving CoQ10 in d-limonene (a
major constituent of lemon oil).1309 Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed.
C. Interference
In Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Chinese
University of Hong Kong,1310 the Federal Circuit vacated the cancellation
of Stanford’s patent claims following interference proceedings due to
written description issues.1311 The claims related to methods for detecting
fetal aneuploidies (abnormalities in the number of fetal
chromosomes).1312
After the PTAB found Stanford’s claims
unpatentable, Stanford appealed to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California under § 146.1313 Subsequently, Biogen
MA, Inc., v. Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research,1314 held that, for postAIA interferences, the Federal Circuit is the exclusive appellate tribunal
from PTAB interference decisions, and the appeal was subsequently
transferred to the Federal Circuit.1315 The Federal Circuit declined to
address Stanford’s argument that Biogen was incorrectly decided.1316
Instead, the Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in that case, and thus Biogen remains controlling law.1317
The Federal Circuit rejected Stanford’s argument that discovery taken
while the case was in the Northern District of California, including expert
discovery, could be taken into account in reviewing the Board’s
interference decisions.1318 “Given that the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board’s interference decisions,
Stanford’s attempt to include evidence elicited during proceedings there
is inappropriate—the activities in the district court are a nullity.”1319
The Federal Circuit determined that on the record before it, the
1308. Id. at 1342.
1309. Id. at 1339.
1310. 860 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1311. Id. at 1369.
1312. Id. at 1370.
1313. Id. at 1373 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2012)).
1314. 785 F.3d 648 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1315. Bd. of Trusts. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 860 F.3d at 1373 (citing Biogen,
785 F.3d at 650).
1316. Id. at 1374.
1317. Id.
1318. Id. at 1375.
1319. Id. at 1374.
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PTAB erred in relying on certain testimony from Chinese University of
Hong Kong’s expert as to how a person of skill would have read various
references in Stanford’s specification at the time of the invention.1320
The testimony failed to cite support for its conclusions, and Stanford
had assembled counterevidence.1321 Therefore, the Federal Circuit
held that the PTAB should not have relied in an unquestioning way on
the testimony in question.1322 Nor should the PTAB have presumed
that a reference in Stanford’s specification could only disclose one
technique or another; it could have disclosed both.1323
D. Derivation
Encouragement to undertake research does not amount to
derivation. In Cumberland Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Mylan Institutional
LLC,1324 the Federal Circuit affirmed an infringement judgment
Cumberland’s patent was to “acetylcysteine
against Mylan.1325
compositions substantially free of chelating agents,” such as
Cumberland’s ACETADOTE product.1326 The Federal Circuit found
that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Mylan had
failed to prove derivation. Even though the FDA had prompted
Cumberland to undertake the research that eventually led to the
invention, this did not establish derivation.1327 Per Gambro Lundia AB
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,1328 “derivation” does not necessarily occur by
a third party communicating an idea that makes the invention
obvious.1329 Similarly, an FDA suggestion that Cumberland “remove or
reduce” the previously present chelating agent did not teach the
claimed invention because it did not “direct a skilled artisan to remove
[the chelating agent], add nothing else, and test the resulting
formulation in exactly the manner to lead to the invention.”1330 The
Federal Circuit determined that the district court also did not clearly
err in rejecting Mylan’s obviousness challenge. Though the FDA had

1320.
1321.
1322.
1323.
1324.
1325.
1326.
1327.
1328.
1329.
1330.

Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1377.
846 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1221.
110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Cumberland Pharm., 846 F.3d at 1218.
Id. at 1221.
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encouraged Cumberland to remove the chelating agent, all prior art
indicated that without such an agent, the formulation would be
unstable.1331 Because stability was expressly a requirement of the claim,
the Federal Circuit held that there was no clear error in the district
court’s determination that a person of skill “would not have reasonably
expected a chelating-agent-free intranvenous acetylcysteine
formulation to succeed in being stable.”1332
E. Covered Business Methods
As covered business method (CBM) proceedings become more
popular, the Federal Circuit addressed the subject-matter eligibility for
various methods. In Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank National Ass’n,1333
the Federal Circuit held that references in the specification to use the
claimed invention in banking was insufficient to establish the CBM
status, reversing the determination that Secure Axcess’s patent was a
CBM patent and vacating subsequently-made claim construction and
obviousness determinations.1334 The patent claimed methods and
systems for authenticating web pages in connection with “activities that
are financial in nature” described in various portions of the written
description.1335 The Federal Circuit emphasized that CBM-status
inquiry focuses on the claims, not the written description.1336 Further,
the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB erred in reasoning that CBM
status could be triggered by claims addressing technology “incidental
to a financial activity.”1337 Under Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc.,1338
the statutory definition of a CBM patent does not include patents
claiming material “incidental” to such activities.1339 The court found
remand unnecessary: on the appellate record, Secure Axcess’s patent
lacked “a single claim that could qualify this patent as a ‘patent that
claims a method or corresponding apparatus . . . used in the practice

1331. Id. at 1222.
1332. Id.
1333. 841 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, 682 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(per curiam), and cert. denied, No. 17-357, 2018 WL 1994803 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2018).
1334. Id. at 1373.
1335. Id.
1336. Id. at 1378–79.
1337. Id. at 1380.
1338. 848 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, 859 F.3d 998 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per
curiam), and petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-350 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2017).
1339. Secure Axcess, 848 F.3d at 1380 (citing Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382).
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[etc.] of a financial product or service.’”1340
Dissenting, Judge Lourie concluded that Secure Axcess’s patent was
directed to a covered business method, reasoning that the claims were
“used in the practice” of providing financial services, particularly in
view of the written description’s repeated references to banks, and
Secure Axcess’s assertion of the patent against a litany of banks.1341
On petition for a rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit denied review
of the Secure Axcess determination limiting CBM status to claims reciting
financial activity.1342 The issue was whether patents whose claims
included no reference to financial activity, but whose specifications
indicated that they were for use in that field, qualified for CBM
review.1343 The judges were decidedly split in opinion.1344 In
concurrence, Judge Taranto approved the Federal Circuit’s decision
that claims not clearly directed to financial activity would not qualify for
CBM review.1345 He noted that congressional redrafting would be a
better approach to address the policy concerns raised by others.1346 Also
concurring, Judges O’Malley and Reyna approved the denial of en banc
review, for the reasons in Judge Plager’s concurrence in the denial of
Federal Circuit rehearing.1347 Concurring from denial of the rehearing,
Judge Plager endorsed the PTAB’s reasoning and emphasized that
because this was an appeal from an administrative agency, the Federal
Circuit was not in a position to substitute an alternate basis on the CBMcoverage issue from the basis used by the PTAB.1348 He associated Judge
Lourie’s dissent as advocating such an alternate basis.1349
As in his dissent from the panel opinion, Judge Lourie disagreed
with the panel’s analysis and argued that the matter should have
appeared en banc.1350 In his view, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning was
inconsistent with the statutory language, congressional intent, and

1340. Id. at 1382 (alternations in original).
1341. Id. at 1382, 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
1342. Secure Axcess v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 859 F.3d 998, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
1343. Id. at 1000 (Taranto, J., concurring).
1344. Judge Stoll did not participate in the en banc proceeding. Judge Plager
participated only in the decision on Federal Circuit rehearing.
1345. Id. at 998, 1000 (Taranto, J., concurring).
1346. Id. at 999.
1347. Id. at 1003 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
1348. Id. at 1013–14 (Plager, J., concurring).
1349. Id.
1350. Id. at 1004 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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Federal Circuit precedent.1351 Also dissenting, Judge Dyk raised
questions regarding the issue of whether claims address a “financial
product or service” is appealable under the AIA.1352 In his view, it is
not appealable, and Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America,
Inc.,1353 reaching the opposite result, was wrongly decided.1354
In Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services,1355 the Federal Circuit held
that there was no estoppel against maintaining a CBM challenge on claims
that were not previously instituted, affirming CBM patent-ineligibility
determination.1356 Credit Acceptance Corp.’s (CAC) patent related to
providing financing to a customer who is purchasing a product from a
dealer’s inventory.1357 Two CBM proceedings were at issue, both
brought by Westlake. The first resulted in an institution decision that was
pre-Alice and in which the PTAB declined to institute review of certain
claims of CAC’s patent.1358 The second CBM petition was post-Alice, but
before the first proceeding reached a final written decision, and this time
the PTAB addressed the subject-matter patentability of the claims it had
previously declined to review.1359 The PTAB reached a written review on
the first CBM proceeding and CAC moved to terminate the second
claim, arguing that § 325(e)(1) barred Westlake from challenging the
claims that the PTAB had declined to institute on.1360
The Federal Circuit held that it has jurisdiction to review the PTAB’s
decision that Westlake was not estopped.1361 The court did not find
Cuozzo contradictory because § 325(e)(1) is not limited to institution
decisions; its estoppel governs any stage of subsequent proceedings,
and the ability of an estopped petitioner to “maintain” a
proceeding.1362 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the AIA does not
bar review of such decisions, and noted that it would be incongruous
for estoppel to be non-reviewable as to subsequent CBM proceedings,
but would be reviewable as to subsequent district court or ITC

1351.
1352.
1353.
1354.
1355.
1356.
1357.
1358.
1359.
1360.
1361.
1362.

Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1010 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Secure Axcess, 859 F.3d at 1010–11.
859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1047.
Id.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1050.
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proceedings, as per AIA § 18(a)(1)(D).1363
The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB did not err in
concluding that Westlake was not estopped. Under Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp.,1364 there was no estoppel in future PTO proceedings for
claims on which CBM was not instituted.1365 The Federal Circuit reasoned
that Shaw Industries Group v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc.1366 was
supportive because, in that case, IPR estoppel attached only to those
grounds that could have actually been raised during the IPR—which
did not include non-instituted grounds.1367 Likewise, the court found
that the PTAB did not err in finding the claims patent-ineligible. At
Alice step one, they claim the abstract idea of processing an application
for financing a purchase.1368 There was no meaningful distinction
against the abstract claims in Alice or Bilski v. Kappos.1369 The Federal
Circuit rejected CAC’s argument that the claims improved the
functionality of computers—they did so only by automating previously
manual processes, so the computer-specific solution of Enfish was not
applicable.1370 The claims also failed to recite an inventive concept at
Alice step two.1371 Nothing in the recitation of components transforms
the claim into anything more than an abstract idea.
Dissenting in part, Judge Mayer would have held that the Federal
Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review the PTAB’s decision to deny a
motion to terminate for § 325(e)(1) estoppel.1372
In Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service,1373 the Federal Circuit
affirmed a CBM determination of subject-matter ineligibility.1374 As an
initial matter, the PTAB’s determination that the Postal Service had
standing to file a petition for CBM review is subject to judicial
review.1375 The Federal Circuit reasoned that neither Cuozzo, nor

1363. Id. at 1050–51.
1364. 814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled by Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872
F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc).
1365. Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1052 (citing Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1316).
1366. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016).
1367. Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1053.
1368. Id. at 1054.
1369. 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (plurality opinion); Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at
1054.
1370. Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1055.
1371. Id. at 1056.
1372. Id. at 1057 (Mayer, J., dissenting in part).
1373. 868 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
1374. Id. at 1371.
1375. Id. at 1356–59.
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Achates, precludes judicial review, as the determination of whether a
party has statutory authorization to file a petition is qualitatively
different from the merits-oriented analysis in institution decisions that
35 U.S.C. § 324(e) puts beyond judicial review.1376 As to the merits, the
Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did not err in determining that
the Postal Service had standing to file a petition for CBM review.1377
Applying de novo review, there was no error in the PTAB’s
determination that Return Mail’s § 1498(a) suit against the Postal
Service in the Claims Court was a suit for “infringement” sufficient to
confer standing.1378 The Federal Circuit rejected Return Mail’s
argument that AIA § 18(a)(1)(B)’s provision permitting CBM review
upon an infringement suit could only be triggered under the Patent
Act,1379 holding that “[i]nfringement is a prerequisite to § 1498(a)
liability; the government’s infringement triggers its obligation to pay just
compensation.”1380 The Federal Circuit noted that this reading creates
tension with the estoppel provision of AIA § 18(a)(1)(D), which by its
text applies to petitioners litigating in district court or the ITC, but does
not mention the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.1381 As to the dissent’s
argument about whether the word “person” in § 18(a)(1)(B) could
include the Postal Service, the Federal Circuit noted that Return Mail
had not made this argument, and it disagreed that the term could not
include a government agency in this context.1382
On the merits, the court held that the PTAB had properly found
Return Mail’s claims patent-ineligible under § 101. Under Alice step 1,
the claims were directed to the abstract idea of relaying “mailing
address data” by reviewing encoded data about message addressing
and transferring certain electronic data based on whether the sender
did or did not want to receive corrected addresses for the addressee in
question.1383 The Federal Circuit held that Return Mail’s claims were
not specific to improving technology, but rather that they were fully
practicable by a human mind.1384 Under Alice step 2, the court held

1376. Id. at 1356–59.
1377. Id. at 1356–57.
1378. Id. at 1362–63, 1366–67.
1379. Id. at 1361.
1380. Id. at 1364.
1381. Id. (“Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to
address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit.”).
1382. Id. at 1365.
1383. Id. at 1368.
1384. Id.
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that the claims lacked an inventive concept. Their references to
“encoded data,” and certain uses of the data, “amount[ed] to a basic
logic determination of what to do given a user’s preferences.”1385 The
Federal Circuit rejected Return Mail’s argument that the claims should
be found non-abstract because, as a practical matter, the claims did not
preempt any commercially deployed mail processing systems.1386 Per
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., “the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”1387
Dissenting, Judge Newman would have held that the issue of whether the
Postal Service was a “person” under § 18(a)(1)(B) was a jurisdictional issue,
not subject to waiver, and she would have held that the term “person,” in
this context, does not include the United States or its agencies.1388
VIII.

PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOLOGICS PRACTICE

Federal law does not authorize an injunction to force biosimilar
manufacturers to engage in Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act1389 (BPCIA) sharing of application details. In Sandoz
Inc. v. Amgen Inc.,1390 the Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed
in part the Federal Circuit’s opinion1391 interpreting various aspects of
the BPCIA.1392 The Supreme Court closely analyzed 35 U.S.C. § 262(l),
which describes the “patent dance” that biosimilars must engage in
before beginning marketing.1393 The Supreme Court found that the
Federal Circuit correctly held that federal law does not authorize an
injunction to require a biosimilar applicant (here, Sandoz) to disclose
its FDA application and manufacturing information to the
manufacturer of the reference product (the “sponsor”; here, Amgen),
as contemplated by § 262(l)(2)(A).1394 The appropriate remedy for an
applicant’s failure to disclose such material is the sponsor’s ability to
1385. Id. at 1368–69.
1386. Id. at 1369–70.
1387. Id. at 1370.
1388. Id. at 1371–72 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1389. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered section of 42 U.S.C.).
1390. 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017).
1391. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d in part, vacated
in part, 137 S. Ct. 1664.
1392. Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1678. The two key takeaways are (1) the requirement
that an applicant must provide a sponsor with a biologics license application (“BLA”)
that is not enforceable by injunction under federal law and (2) a biosimilar applicant
may provide notice of commercial marketing before obtaining a license. Id. at 1669.
1393. Id.
1394. Id. at 1675.
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file a declaratory judgment action for infringement because the
submission of the application to the FDA is itself an infringing act
under § 271(e)(2)(C)(i) and (ii).1395 Though reaching the same
outcome, the Supreme Court changed the reasoning. The Supreme
Court made clear that the act of “artificial infringement” for
biosimilars occurs with submission of the application.1396
However, the Supreme Court determined that the Federal Circuit
erred when it rejected Amgen’s request for an injunction under state
law.1397 Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, federal law does
not provide any remedy for an applicant’s failure to disclose its
application and manufacturing information, so the Federal Circuit
erred in concluding that federal law provided the “only remedies” for
such failure.1398 The Supreme Court vacated that determination, as
well as the Federal Circuit’s analysis of California law as a potential
basis for a state-law injunction.1399 On remand, the Federal Circuit may
revisit the California law issues.1400
The Federal Circuit also erred in its analysis of when an applicant
must notify a sponsor of its biosimilar application to the
FDA.1401 Interpreting § 262(l )(8)(A), “the applicant may provide
notice either before or after receiving FDA approval.”1402 The Federal
Circuit’s reasoning that the notice must come after the FDA’s approval
was inconsistent with the overall structure of the statute.1403
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer noted that the FDA may, at
some point, “determine[] that a different interpretation would better
serve the statute’s objectives.”1404 Should it do so, then, under National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,1405 the FDA
“may well have authority to depart from, or to modify, today’s
interpretation.”1406
On remand from the Supreme Court, based on preemption
grounds, the Federal Circuit held that the BPCIA preempts state
1395.
1396.
1397.
1398.
1399.
1400.
1401.
1402.
1403.
1404.
1405.
1406.

Id. at 1670.
Id. at 1670–71.
Id. at 1678.
Id. at 1674.
Id. at 1676.
Id.
Id. at 1677.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1678.
545 U.S. 967 (2005).
Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1678 (citing National Cable & Television, 545 U.S. at 982–84).
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enforcement of the “patent dance” provisions, affirming dismissal of
Amgen’s state law claims relating to Sandoz’s noncompliance with
§ 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA.1407 At issue was whether Amgen could
seek any relief under state law for Sandoz not providing Amgen with
its biosimilar application prior to filing.1408 The Federal Circuit
rejected Amgen’s argument that Sandoz had waived any argument that
the BPCIA preempted California law on this point by failing to make
it before the district court because the Supreme Court expressly invited
the Federal Circuit to analyze the preemption issue.1409 Even if the
Federal Circuit did not assess the issue, Sandoz would be able to take
it up on remand.1410 The Federal Circuit then concluded that the
BPCIA preempts any state law remedies for failure to comply with
§ 262(l)(2)(A).1411 In its reasoning, the Federal Circuit noted the
intrinsically federal nature of patent law and how states have not
traditionally regulated in that area.1412 Applying Arizona v. United
States1413 and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.1414 the Federal Circuit found
that the federal government has “fully occupied” the relevant field of
biosimilar patent litigation.1415 The Federal Circuit also rejected
Amgen’s argument that its state law claims are not in conflict with the
BPCIA.1416 Noting that Congress created no injunctive remedy for
breach of § 262(l)(2)(A), and reasoning that such must have been
intentional, the court concluded that applying state law would create
a conflict in the method of enforcement.1417
A BPCIA sponsor may list and sue on patents it believes infringed
even if the biosimilar application fails to disclose necessary information
required under the Act. In Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.,1418 the Federal
Circuit dismissed an appeal relating to the denial of discovery motion,
and it denied writ of mandamus concerning same, under the
BPCIA.1419 The district court denied Amgen’s motion to compel
1407.
1408.
1409.
1410.
1411.
1412.
1413.
1414.
1415.
1416.
1417.
1418.
1419.

Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1327.
567 U.S. 387 (2012).
331 U.S. 218 (1947).
Id. at 1328 (quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
Id. at 1329.
Id.
866 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1356.
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discovery into certain cell culture mediums for lack of relevance.1420
However, the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.1421
Though the discovery order conclusively determined a disputed
question (whether the cell mediums were discoverable), and was
completely separate from the merits of the action, it was still an act that
was reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, per Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay.1422 Amgen’s forced delay for review after final judgment of
whether the cell medium data should have been disclosed and/or
discoverable under BPCIA was consistent.1423 The Federal Circuit
found that “the lack of immediate appeal over orders denying
discovery of paragraph (l)(2)(A) information does not render such
orders ‘effectively unreviewable’ or distinguish them from run-of-themill discovery disputes.”1424
Amgen’s petition for mandamus was denied because Amgen did not
establish that it had a clear and indisputable right to relief.1425 Amgen
was responsible for electing to neither list nor sue on its cell-culture
patents, which the opinion reasons it could have done notwithstanding
Hospira’s non-disclosure of its cell mediums in its paragraph (l)(2)(A)
disclosures.1426 “Paragraph (l)(3)(A) merely requires the sponsor to
list patents that it ‘believes . . . could reasonably be asserted.’”1427 It does
not impose sanctions for mistakenly (but in good faith) asserting
patents that ultimately turn out to be noninfringed.1428 Nor would
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 have precluded Amgen from listing
the cell-culture patents as one of the reasons for Amgen’s uncertainty
about the infringement question was Hospira’s own failure to make its
disclosure.1429 Because Amgen could have listed the patents in
question in which case it could have sought discovery relating to them,
the Federal Circuit concluded that the denial of discovery did not

1420. Id. at 1358. Amgen claimed the cell culture medium data should have been in
Hospira’s paragraph (l)(2)(A) disclosures, and was trying to use discovery to learn
about them so as to evaluate possible infringement of other patents. Id.
1421. Id. at 1356.
1422. 437 U.S. 463 (1978), superseded by FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), as stated in Microsoft
Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).
1423. Amgen Inc., 866 F.3d at 1359–60.
1424. Id. at 1360.
1425. Id. at 1363.
1426. Id. at 1361.
1427. Id. at 1362 (omission in original).
1428. Id.
1429. Id.
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undermine the purpose of the BPCIA.1430
IX.

PATENT MARKING

The patentee has the burden at all times to prove compliance with the
marking statute. In Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc.,
the Federal Circuit generally affirmed an infringement verdict and
damages award, while vacating denial of JMOL as to marking.1431 Arctic
Cat’s patents related to a thrust steering system for personal watercraft.1432
Regarding marking, the Federal Circuit found that the district court
erred by placing the burden of proving a marking defense on the
defendant, BRP.1433 Instead, the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he
burden of proving compliance with marking is and at all times remains
on the patentee.”1434 However, the alleged infringer must meet a low
bar: “bears an initial burden of production to articulate the products
it believes are unmarked ‘patented articles’ subject to § 287.”1435 The
Federal Circuit held that, because the district judge committed this
error at the summary judgment stage, Arctic Cat was not properly
informed of its burden to prove compliance with § 287.1436 The
judgment as to marking is thus vacated “so that Arctic Cat has an
opportunity to proffer evidence” on the issue.1437
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit addressed many novel questions in 2017, but
many issues remain unresolved. In the next year, the court will
continue to delineate the legal lines from lower court appeals and
address new directives from the Supreme Court. In particular, the
Supreme Court has recently published two decisions that will influence
the development of patent law and practice.
First, in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC,
the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of IPR proceedings,
established by the AIA, which have been used to challenge thousands

1430. Id. at 1362–63.
1431. Arctic Cat Inc., v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
1432. Id. at 1357.
1433. Id. at 1369.
1434. Id. at 1367.
1435. Id. at 1368.
1436. Id. at 1367.
1437. Id. at 1369.

2018]

2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1271

of patents since 2012.1438
The PTAB declared Oil States’s patent, which relates to hydraulic
fracturing, invalid.1439 Oil States argued that patents are private
property rights that can only be revoked by a federal court under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, not by an executive branch agency
like the PTAB.1440 The PTO maintained that patents are public rights
derived from a federal regulatory system, and there is thus no
constitutional impediment to the PTAB invalidating patents.1441 The
justices addressed this clash between two policy issues, holding that,
because patents are public rights, IPRs do not violate either Article III
or the Seventh Amendment.1442 The second decision, SAS Institute, Inc.
v. Iancu, also implicates the PTAB’s proceedings. The case involved
the IPR process for instituting AIA reviews of patents.1443 The SAS
Institute ruling eliminated the PTAB’s practice of instituting review on
only some grounds and restructured the AIA process and petitioners’
approach to IPRs.1444 The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit
holding that the PTAB must resolve all claims in an IPR petition.1445
Still on the Supreme Court’s docket, in WesternGeco LLC, the Court
asked the U.S. Solicitor General to weigh in on the issue of the
availability of lost profits damages in patent cases when infringing
actions take place outside the United States.1446 In the lower court’s
decision, ION was found to have infringed WesternGeco’s patents by
shipping parts of a system for underwater oil and gas exploration from
the United States to be combined overseas.1447 While a jury initially
awarded WesternGeco $93 million in lost profits damages,1448 the
1438. No. 16-712, 2018 WL 1914662, *3 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
1439. Id. at *5.
1440. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Oil States, 2018 WL 1914662 (No. 16-712), 2017 WL
3713059, at *3.
1441. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 2–3, Oil States, 2018 WL 1914662 (No. 16712), 2017 WL 4805230, at *2–3.
1442. Oil States, 2018 WL 1914662, at *11.
1443. No. 16-969, 2018 WL 1914661, *2 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018).
1444. Id. at *4.
1445. Id. at *9–10.
1446. WesternGeco
LLC
v.
ION
Geophysical
Corp.,
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/westerngeco-llc-v-ion-geophysical-corp-2
(last visited May 9, 2018).
1447. WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016).
1448. WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 953 F. Supp. 2d 731, 740 (S.D.
Tex. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018).
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Federal Circuit reversed finding that the damages award was not
available because ION’s infringement took place “on the high seas,
outside the jurisdiction of U.S. patent law.”1449 In its briefing,
WesternGeco argued that there are no limitations on damages based
on an act of infringement of U.S. patents to ship components to other
countries to be combined there.1450
While the 2017 term indicated a balancing of the Federal Circuit’s
patent docket, the recent Supreme Court decisions in TC Heartland
and SAS Institute will likely lead to an influx of appeals.

1449. WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1349.
1450. Id. at 1351.

